On 26 January I published an article describing an Open Letter to German Chancellor Scholz issued the day before by a number of retired diplomats, military officers and educators affiliated with a Potsdam think tank. As I noted, the text was very much in the spirit of détente (Entspannungspolitik, in German) that can be traced back in the Socialist Party (SPD) to the early 1970s chancellor Willy Brandt and his ideas man Egon Bahr. However, given the address of the institute it should come as no surprise that a number of the signatories are associated with the leftwing Die Linke party.

Now a colleague in Berlin has alerted me to another Open Letter to Scholz on the same subject issued almost two months earlier, on 5 December 2021. That one, my colleague suggests, was more likely to have drawn the attention of the German leader because of the concentration of security experts and sprinkling of officials from his own SPD among its signatories.

With a view to the visit this week of the German chancellor to Washington, D.C., where he is suspected of being the weak link in the Western alliance as it confronts Russia, it is worthwhile considering what influences there may be on the overall thinking of Mr. Scholz as to the question of dealing with Russia today.

I offer below an edited machine translation of the German text of the Letter put forward by Professor Johannes Varwick, because it indicates both how far and at the same time how limited the imagination of the socialist wing of the German establishment is in seeking solutions to the present impasse over Ukraine and over Russian demands to revise the security architecture of Europe.

The overriding thought here is to tamp down the crisis by setting up conferences and lines of communication with Russia to find mutually acceptable compromises on its demands within a two year period during which all escalatory acts by all parties will be halted.

This is a noble concept, which may yet be implemented. However, it violates the sense of urgency that runs through the Russian demands for several straightforward reasons.  The Russian resentment over NATO expansion has been building up ever since 1997 and was embittered by their weak military and economic situation coming out of the turbulent 1990s. They have issued their ultimatum and massed their armed forces at the Ukrainian border precisely in order to take advantage of the ‘window of opportunity’ they see for themselves given their present strategic and tactical superiority over the United States and NATO, which they do not expect to last much beyond two years for a variety of reasons. Moreover, two years is also the time remaining in Vladimir Putin’s term of office and it would be understandable that he will not want to exercise his constitutional right and run again in 2024, meaning this existential question of European security architecture must be resolved in the coming two years not merely debated. Kicking the can down the road is not an option.  Regrettably, the German security and political experts seem not to take these Russian considerations into account.

At the same time, the solutions recommended here are worlds apart from the United States and U.K. actions of issuing threats of draconian sanctions, pouring more NATO troops into Eastern Europe and the ‘front line’ Baltic States, and sending vast quantities of munitions to Kiev on dozens of daily flights.

The text and list of signatories:

Out of the Spiral of Escalation! For a new beginning in relations with Russia (5.12.2021)

 We are watching with the greatest concern the escalation in relations with Russia, which is intensifying once again. We are threatening to get into a situation where war is within the realm of possibility. No one can profit from this situation, and this is in neither our nor Russia’s interest. Therefore, everything must be done now to break the spiral of escalation. The goal must be to lead Russia and also NATO away from a confrontational course again. What is needed is a credible Russia policy on the part of NATO and the EU that is not naïve or appeasement, but interest-driven and consistent. Now sober Realpolitik is called for.

One thing is certain: Russia’s threatening gestures toward Ukraine and its show of force toward NATO countries in exercises and especially through the activities of its nuclear forces are unacceptable. Nevertheless, indignation and formulaic condemnations do not lead anywhere. A one-sided policy of confrontation and deterrence has not been successful; economic pressure and the tightening of sanctions – as experience in recent years has shown – have not been able to persuade Russia to turn back. On the contrary, Russia sees itself challenged by Western policy and seeks recognition as a great power on a par with the United States and the preservation of its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space through aggressive behavior. This significantly increases the dangers for the Russian economy (exclusion from the SWIFT system) and a destabilization of the security situation, especially in Europe. None of this should be taken as an excuse for the West to stand idly by or to accept the intensification of escalation. NATO should actively approach Russia and work toward de-escalation of the situation. To this end, a meeting without preconditions at the highest level should not be ruled out. In principle, we need a fourfold political approach:

– First, a high-level conference to discuss the goal of revitalizing the European security architecture, based on the continuing validity of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris, and the 1994 Budapest Accord, but without preconditions and in different formats and at different levels.

– Secondly, as long as this conference is in session – and a period of at least two years would be realistic – there should be no military escalation on either side. The renunciation of the stationing of additional troops and the construction of infrastructure on both sides of the Russian Federation’s border with its western neighbors should be agreed upon, as should complete mutual transparency in military maneuvers. In addition, specialized dialogues at the military level must be revitalized in order to pursue risk minimization.

– Third, the NATO-Russia dialogue should be revived at the political and military levels without conditions. This includes a new approach to European arms control. Following the discontinuation of agreements essential for Europe’s security (INF Treaty, CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty), it is urgent, in view of Russian troop concentrations on the border with Ukraine, to agree on targeted measures to create more transparency, to promote trust by strengthening contacts at the political and military levels, and to stabilize regional conflict situations

Fourth, despite the current situation, consideration should be given to more far-reaching offers of economic cooperation. The decline in the importance of fossil fuels, on whose exports the Russian economy is heavily dependent, poses the risk of growing economic risks for Russia, which in turn could cause political instability. Economic cooperation could make an important contribution to European stability and could also be an incentive for Russia to return to a cooperative policy toward the West. Consequently, win-win situations must be created that overcome the current deadlock. This includes recognition of the security interests of both sides. With this in mind, a freeze should be agreed on questions of future membership in NATO, the EU and the CSTO for the duration of the conference. This would not mean a renunciation of the demand for fundamental standards agreed upon in the OSCE. This may not be easy for many, nor does it conform to pure doctrine. But any alternative is clearly worse. Germany has a key role to play here. Germany should refrain from anything that might weaken its firm anchoring in the transatlantic alliance, should work for de-escalation, and should press for agreements that preclude the use of military means in Europe beyond alliance defense. This should not be misunderstood as an invitation to Russia to change the territorial status quo in Europe, but there is no military solution to the Ukraine crisis that does not lead to uncontrollable escalation.

Ambassador (ret.) Ulrich Brandenburg, German Ambassador to NATO (2007-2010) and to Russia (2010-2014); Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska, Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (2006-2016); Brigadier General (ret.) Helmut Ganser, Head of Military Policy Division at the German NATO Mission in Brussels (2004-2008); Prof. Dr. Jörn Happel, Helmut Schmidt University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg; Ambassador (ret.) Hans-Dieter Heumann, President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (2011-2015); Ambassador (ret.) Hellmut Hoffmann, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2009-2013); Ambassador (ret.). D. Heiner Horsten, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna (2008-2012); Brigadier General (ret.) Hans Hübner, Commander of the Center for Verification Tasks of the German Armed Forces (1999-2003); Prof. Dr. HeinzGerhard Justenhoven, Director of the Institute for Theology and Peace; Stephan Klaus, Spokesman of the Young SPD; Lt. Gen. (ret.). D. Dr. Ulf von Krause, Commander of the Armed Forces Support Command of the Bundeswehr (2001-2005); Ambassador (ret.) Rüdiger Lüdeking, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna (2012-2015); Prof. Dr. Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck; Gen. (ret.). Klaus Naumann, Inspector General of the German Armed Forces (1991-1996) and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999); Prof. em. Dr. August Pradetto, Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces Hamburg; Roger Näbig, Conflict and Security Blog; Prof. Dr. Götz Neuneck, Deputy Scientific Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (2009-2019); Jessica Nies, spokesperson of the Young SPD; Colonel (ret.) Harry Preetz, National Chairman Area I of the Society for Security Policy; Colonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Senior Military Advisor at the German OSCE Representation (2005-2009); Colonel (ret.). D. Richard Rohde, Bonn Section Chief of the Society for Security Policy; Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Johannes Seidt, Chief Inspector of the Federal Foreign Office 2014 to 2017; Brigadier General (ret.) Reiner Schwalb, Defense Attaché at the German Embassy Moscow (2011-2018); Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, HelmutSchmidt-University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg; Brigadier General (ret.). D. Armin Staigis, Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (2013-1015); Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg; Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, Deputy Scientific Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (2009-2019).

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022

One of the consequences of the near hysteria prevailing in the United States media and political class over a supposedly impending Russian invasion of Ukraine is that the readership of my website has increased many times over in the past several weeks as a confused public seeks expert opinions from those outside the hopelessly propagandistic, ideologically driven mainstream. Moreover, the specifically American part of that readership has run way ahead of the rest of the world, so that U.S. readers are now three or more times greater in number than the nearest ‘competitor,’ Canada, whereas the traditional ratio was 2:1. The other top numbers of visitors are also coming from English-speaking  countries, namely the U.K. and Australia.  The rest of the world means about 50 countries where internet visitors turn up daily in significantly smaller numbers, meaning an order of magnitude fewer. Those countries may be large, like China and India, or absolutely tiny like Fiji, Mali and Rwanda. Nonetheless, I remain impressed that the entire world has the interest and finds the time to search for nonconformist views on what Russia and the Collective West are saying and may soon be doing to one another.

With increasing ‘hits’ comes increasing numbers of comments, which on average represent 1% of the readership.  I am appreciative of all comments which take issue with the logic of my essays or which provide supplemental information which I may have missed. I take these visitors as a proxy for the Vox Populi and they help guide my further research and writing.

 I take special pleasure in the remarks left by publishers-authors of peer websites. .  One such case occurred a day ago when www.breakingnews.com sent me a link to an online interview by the Russian state broadcaster Vesti FM dealing with Belarus, among other topics, that was posted on youtube :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-rbYFMFjrw

The program, Solovyov LIVE, is a daytime show normally hosted by Vladimir Solovyov, the same presenter of late night political talk shows whom I frequently cite, though on the given day it was run by one of his assistants, a certain Golovanov.

What was remarkable in the given show was not the interviewee, the rather nondescript political scientist Mikheev, who is a frequent panelist on the evening talk show. Nor was it Golovanov himself. Rather it was the materials about Belarus that the production company prepared for the broadcast.

First, there was a video showing the Ukrainian spy drone that the Belarus military had brought down in the area of Brest, way inside their territory. Clearly the drone was operating in violation of all international rules. 

The Minsk authorities had, of course, issued a stern protest to Kiev about this clear but inexplicable provocation. Golovanov, for his part, asked why the Kiev regime could be so stupid as to totally spoil relations with Belarus considering how Minsk had been a convenient intermediary with Russia ever since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian involvement in the civil war that broke out in Donbas.

The host and his interviewee then answered the question, saying that the spoiling of relations must have been instigated by the United States. Washington seems to have a talent for pushing together countries which have separate grievances with the West and giving them common cause to work against American interests.  Bad relations with Ukraine push Russia and Belarus much closer together.

Lukashenko had for years been sitting on two seats, flirting alternatively with the Kremlin and with Brussels.  The attempted color revolution in his country a year ago, which was nominally promoted by Lithuania but surely scripted from Washington, put paid to that balancing act.  Lukashenko by necessity threw in his lot with the Kremlin and has not looked back since, as the further materials presented on the Solovyov LIVE demonstrate.

For those who wonder how Washington could have so manipulated the Ukrainian leadership to arrange the break with Belarus, setting the stage for a joint Belarus-Russian invasion of Ukraine, I remind readers that the United States embassy in Kiev numbers over 900 staff, making it the largest U.S. diplomatic mission anywhere in Europe. Yes, CIA operatives are there in droves.  But then it is easy to imagine that other bureaucrats sent by Washington and perched in the embassy control key ministries in the Ukrainian government today just as their counterparts did in Russia during the Yeltsin years.

Now for the second video shown on the Solovyov LIVE program:  the meeting on Friday in Minsk between President Lukashenko and visiting Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.  Shoigu had come in connection with the pending start of massive Russian-Belarus war games, for which perhaps tens of thousands of Russian military personnel have been flown in, together with S-400 air defense missiles and other most recent weapons in the Russian inventory.  Pointedly the exercises will take place in the southern sector, that is to say just to the north of the border with Ukraine, which is itself just 100 km from Kiev.

In the video, Lukashenko is thanking the Russians for sending in their troops and most advanced military hardware, because he feels that the southern flank of Belarus is now vulnerable and needs reinforcement.  This will be the first time that Belarus military see the latest Russian equipment in front of them and not just in technical literature.  The exercises will provide the setting for Russians to provide training on this equipment to their Belarus colleagues, who will then operate it when the Russians return to their home bases. Moreover, Lukashenko said he will be purchasing this equipment in greater numbers in the coming year.

Lukashenko then spoke more broadly of the Russian-Belarus alliance as creating a unified defense territory from Brest to Vladivostok.  He made it clear that he intends to take concrete steps towards realizing the political integration with Russia that was sketched on paper two decades ago but had been dead letter.

From this the show moved on to deal with the old question of what would closer ties with Russia up to and including shared sovereignty bring to the principals.  It was always doubtful that Lukashenko would agree to accept a second tier role in such a combined state.  Now Golovanov and Mikheev were explaining the benefits to Belarus in broader terms than the immediate interests of one man.  As they pointed out, in the old USSR Belarus had a negligible share of leadership positions at the All-Union level, whereas the Ukraine was heavily favored.  Now that Ukraine is entirely out of play, some kind of merger with Russia would open up to the Belarus elites the possibility of playing leading roles in a country vastly larger than little Belarus.

From this perspective, the recent warnings to Belarus from the United States and the European Union not to get involved in any possible Russian attack on Ukraine would appear to be hopelessly ignorant of what they have wrought with their own hands: a Belarus-Russian union that was unthinkable just a couple of years ago.  And now, by way of the Belarus frontier, the Russians are capable of capturing Kiev within a day or two and liquidating the neo-Nazi forces that have held a knife to the throat of the civilian Ukrainian leadership before they know what hit them.

It would not be unreasonable to imagine that the departing staff from the U.S. and U.K. embassies in Kiev are not busy packing personal belongings before departure so much as burning all their incriminating office records.

                                                            *****

We may take as a given that none of the foregoing statements by Belarus President Lukashenko, not to mention the interpretation of Belarus interest in a closer union, will appear in Western mainstream media. After all, they totally ignored the assassination plot against Lukashenko a year ago which was foiled by a joint Russian-Belarus intelligence operation and then featured on Russian state television. Not only the broad public but political elites in the United States will be clueless.

In my last article posted on this website, I mentioned that close monitoring of Russian electronic and print media is a large part of the added value I strive to bring to my readers. This point was picked up by a retired U.S. lieutenant colonel who wrote to me that he also closely follows Russian media. He explained that he takes Russian press articles and runs them through google machine translation to understand what is being said.

As the Russians would say молодец ! meaning “bravo.” Such monitoring is much better than just reading Sputnik or Tass English-language editions, because they are cut to size to suit Western audiences and do not have the richness of Russian-sourced news and commentary addressed to the home audience in Russia. Yet, from my experience, the richest vein of information ore is not print media but electronic media, meaning television broadcasts that are reposted on youtube, like the Solovyov LIVE show discussed above or the political talk shows that I usually mine. And all of these are in Russian language only, without a text to run through google.

One day, Russian news managers may understand that it would be a far better investment in Soft Power to translate and broadcast with English subtitles their best domestic television shows, rather than spend money on Russia Today and pay second quality ex-Canadian, British and American newscasters to produce programs for distribution in the West based on their own limited understanding of what constitutes news.  Until then, I can only urge would be commentators to take Russian lessons and do their homework.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022

As I have indicated en passant in prior articles devoted to the unfolding crisis in and around Ukraine, a substantial part of the added value I seek to bring to reporting and analysis is derived from my following the Russian-language electronic and print media closely, whereas the vast majority of commentators who populate Western television news and op-ed pages only offer up synthetic, rearranged factoids and unsubstantiated claims from the reports and analysis of their peers. Investigative reporting does not exist among mainstream. Reprinting handouts from anonymous sources in high places of the Pentagon and State Department is the closest they come to daily fresh “news.”

Last evening’s Vladimir Solovyov talk show on Russian state Channel One provided yet another justification for paying close attention to what they are saying in Moscow.  The program was dedicated to the Donbas and included several politicians and political scientists from both Kiev and the Donetsk-Lugansk republics. The most interesting remarks were made by a Russian speaking former Rada member, Spiridon Kilinkarov, who noted that Western mainstream is every day publishing maps showing the positioning of Russian forces at the several common borders of Russia/Belarus and Ukraine. They also carry maps showing the likely routes to be used by the Russian invaders. But Western media are never showing the positions of Ukrainian troops, which one might expect are there to counter Russian threats.  The speaker went on to say that now two-thirds of the Ukrainian military or about 150,000 troops are all concentrated on the line of demarcation with Donbas.  That is to say, there are almost no Ukrainian forces in the northeast around Kharkiv facing Russian military or to the north of Kiev to face the combined Russian-Belarus military.  If this is true, then Mr. Zelensky’s insistence that he does not expect a Russian invasion is justified by Ukrainian boots on the ground.  If Russia is holding a pistol to the head of Ukraine, as Boris Johnson stated earlier this week, then Kiev is holding a pistol to the head of the rebel provinces.

Solovyov’s guests further explained that after eight years of facing down one another across about 200 meters of no-man’s land at the line of demarcation, the situation between Ukrainian armed forces and Donbas forces is very tense and volatile, so that it would be very easy for a provocation staged by British or American special forces, who are known to be in the area,  to touch off a major conflagration. This is surely the accident threatening to upset the ongoing negotiations between the United States and NATO on one side and Russia on the other side. 

The guests further assert that in effect the Ukrainian forces at the line of demarcation are not under the control of President Zelensky, whose power is very circumscribed by other political actors, oligarchs and militia chiefs in Kiev, not to mention by U.S. and U.K. forces on the ground in his country.

Many of these general observations cannot be verified from here. But the map of Ukrainian military positions can be verified against images from U.S. spy satellites.  I challenge The New York Times, the Financial Times and others to post such maps on their pages now.

As for the host, Vladimir Solovyov, he continues pressing a hard line Russian response of action, not words to U.S. provocations such as yesterday’s announcement by White House Press Secretary Psaki of the fake video Russia is supposedly preparing to justify an invasion. He used the show to urge imposition by Russia of a ‘total economic blockade’ of Ukraine, putting an end to the dozens of daily flights from the West carrying many tons of armaments. Given that Russia views the present security crisis around Ukraine as a replay of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, such a blockade would be entirely in keeping with historical precedent. It would mean, of course, establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine, which Russia has the military capability to declare and enforce.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022

The leak yesterday onto the pages of the Spanish daily El Pais of the contents of the U.S. written response to the Russian ultimatum on a roll-back of NATO and reorganized security architecture in Europe has prompted colleagues in the peace movement to raise higher the prospects for a negotiated settlement between Russia and the Collective West without recourse to a potentially devastating war.

In an essay published today on www.antiwar.com, Ray McGovern points to the American offer allowing Russian inspectors onto the missile sites in Romania and Poland that have been a major concern of the Russians going back more than six years. On-site inspections were a major confidence-building element in the disarmament treaties reached with Russia in the Reagan years (доверяй но проверяй – trust but verify!). It would be very helpful to see them reinstated, not only for purposes of efficacy of treaty enforcement but for a generalized relaxation of tensions that they confer through regular face-to-face meetings of expert personnel from both sides. The measure would reinstate communications channels that the United States cut starting in the Obama years with intent to isolate Russia and present it as a pariah nation to the world. That has proven to be a very misguided policy which finally may be abandoned as negotiations go forward.

Independently from the latest leaks, on the Russian side Alexei Gromyko, a recognized foreign affairs expert in his country who happens to be the grandson of the Soviet Foreign Minister about whom I wrote yesterday, has just published a thorough analysis of possibilities for the United States and Russia to agree on compromise solutions to the present confrontation that satisfy the main concerns and principles of both sides as regards reduction of security threats coming from each. On the side of the West these might include imposing neutral, demilitarized status on Ukraine and parallel concessions by the Russians as regards Belarus and Kaliningrad. I heartily recommend his paper to all readers.

It bears reminding that none of these possible compromises would have seen the light of day had it not been for Russia’s currently ‘holding a gun to the head of Ukraine,’ to use Boris Johnson’s graphic image.  Only application of maximum pressure on the West focused minds in Washington and Brussels to complaints over the evolving security arrangements in Europe that Russia had been making for more than fifteen years. And this application of maximum pressure by Moscow was made possible only by its new self-confidence in its strategic parity with if not superiority over the United States and the Collective West thanks to its modernized armed forces and state of the art new strategic weapons systems that already have been partly integrated into its field units. Even the Russophobe Financial Times yesterday featured an article detailing how the Russian armed forces have been transformed in recent years. The New York Times has done similarly. We see respect replace ridicule on their pages even as regards conventional arms and without discussion of the awe inspiring new strategic weapons systems.

For those who wonder  how Biden will be able to sell any compromise with the Russians to Congress, America’s current plumage display over ‘sanctions from hell’ that may be imposed on Russia for any incursions into Ukraine, the breast beating and saber rattling, including dispatch of an additional several thousand American troops will provide some cover.  Moreover, it is almost certain that Biden will be able to claim at the end of the day that the United States did not betray its principles (ideology above all in American political discourse!) so that the door at NATO would remain open notwithstanding Russian objections.  And likely, behind closed doors, the Pentagon will explain that Russia is armed to the teeth and possibly has first strike capability in its grasp. Then, of course, there is the China Factor, about which we will learn more tomorrow at the press conference given in Beijing by Presidents Xi and Putin following their face-to-face meeting. We are told they will roll out a joint statement on what ‘the new world order will look like.’

I have used the term ‘window of opportunity’ to explain the sudden aggressiveness of the Kremlin in pursuing a revision of the European security architecture.  This concerns Russia’s present superiority in arms which may be reduced if not erased by developments on the U.S. side two or three years hence. Moreover, the defenselessness of Ukraine may also be corrected through Western technical and materiel assistance in two or three years. It concerns the electoral calendar in Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s present mandate expires in 2024. If he is to have any chance to retire, he must solve the country’s vulnerability to further NATO encroachment in the coming year or two.  For his part, Alexei Gromyko very ably discusses the window of opportunity on the American side given the prospects in the November mid-term elections and the remaining time before the 2024 U.S. presidential elections get into full swing.

None of the foregoing negotiated settlement is more than a sketch of the possible and is no more certain to be realized than the war path we have discussed till now. A mishap along the way, a stumbling into armed conflict is always possible, though with each passing day that becomes less likely as all sides size one another up and appraise the consequences of their actions.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022

https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/diplomacy-vs-brinkmanship/

US Makes Putin Offer He Can Hardly Refuse

As the Cold War-2 unfolds, shades of the past return to haunt those of us old enough to recollect and not merely to have read about them.  One such recollection was brought to life on Monday at the session of the United Nations Security Council convened at U.S. demand to consider the ongoing threat of war at the Russian-Ukrainian border.

In his career as Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union from 1957 to 1985, a period of such length that the present incumbent Sergei Lavrov’s 18 years would seem to render him still a boy in short trousers, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was the dour face of the world’s second superpower at the UN and at all other international gatherings. He held his own in the give and take of debate, and did not mince his words. Yet, by his intelligence, sophistication and steadfast pursuit of national interest he won the respect of adversaries as well as allies.

It is too early to speak of respect that Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya, appointed only in 2017, may or may not have earned with adversaries. But his severe mien and in-your-face denunciation of American and Western claims that a Russian invasion of Ukraine is imminent at Monday’s session certainly drew the rapt attention of all. Surely Gromyko would be proud.

Let us not coddle the Russians. “Strategic empathy” is for fools. Clown though he may be, Boris Johnson was entirely accurate when he said in Kiev yesterday that “Russia is holding a gun to the head of Ukraine, by intimidating Ukraine, to get us to change the way we look at (European security)” [Reuters].

What we are witnessing today on the international stage is more than a re-run of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 with the roles of the United States and Russia reversed. It is an intentional reversal of roles and language up and down the line on Russia’s part.  Nebenzya’s brazen denial that his country is intimidating Ukraine by moving its armed forces around on its own territory was intentionally serving up to the USA and NATO the tripe that has been served up to Russia these past 25 years: that NATO is a purely defensive alliance which does not threaten Russia in any way when it holds massive war exercises at Russia’s borders or stages a mock recapture of the Kaliningrad enclave.

I have been in a friendly discussion with peers in the antiwar movement over Vladimir Putin’s end goal: will he settle for ‘half a loaf’ or is he truly  going va banque as the French and Russians say, meaning ‘going for broke’ in vernacular English. I believe in the latter interpretation:  Putin would never have delivered what is in effect an ultimatum to the United States to return to the status quo ante in Europe of 1997 if he were not persuaded that he can win most if not all of his objectives.   Moreover, the United States would not now be engaged in diplomatic discourse, however dissembling it may be on their part, were the Pentagon not aware of the facts it does not yet disclose to Congress, not to mention to the broad American public: that Russia is in a ‘gotcha’ position if things go to extremis, that it probably has a first strike capability, meaning it could so destroy the United States war-making capabilities on a first strike as to preclude an effective riposte. This is the so-called ‘window of opportunity’ that Russia has created for itself by developing and deploying hypersonic missiles and other cutting edge strategic weapons over the past twenty years while the United States poured its military budget into bloody wars on the ground in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Will there in fact be a war now in Ukraine?  No one can say.  The Russians have declared and should be believed when they say a war, if it comes, will not be of their choosing, but will be imposed on them by the United States using Ukraine as a tool, so as to enforce a cruel new round of sanctions from Europe.

How would that war end? No one is in doubt of absolute Russian victory, achieving any particular outcome they seek, but very likely ‘ending Ukrainian statehood.’ This is what Vladimir Putin warned more than a year ago if Ukraine failed to implement the Minsk Accords, which is manifestly the case now that Kiev said publicly a couple of days ago that implementation is off the table.

Would such a war trigger a broader conflagration at the global level?  Again, no one can say for sure, though from the foregoing it would appear to be very unlikely. This is so not only because of Russian strategic strength but also because of backing from the Chinese who can at any moment turn up the pressure on Taiwan and force the USA to confront a potential two-front war.

And so, We, the People can sleep soundly on our pillows even if the world order we have known for the past twenty-five years is about to come crashing down.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022