Transcript of ‘Dialogue Works’ edition of 19 November 2024

Transcript submitted by a reader

Nima R, Alkhorshid: 0:06
Hi, everybody. Today is Tuesday, November 19th, and Gilbert is here with us. Welcome back, Gilbert.

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD:
Well, thanks. Good to see you.

Alkhorshid:
Let’s get started with Biden’s decision to let Ukrainians use the US missiles, ATACMS, to hit deep into the Russian soil. What were the repercussions of this decision in the Russian media or Russian government?

Doctorow:
Well, I will address both of those points. The second one, the Russian government is easiest. Dmitry Gaskov, the press secretary of Vladimir Putin, addressed this very question yesterday.

0:47
And he said the answer was given by Vladimir Putin in the middle of September when he was visiting St. Petersburg, various business, and was interviewed in the street. And this question was put to him by the journalist from Russia State Television, who very frequently is following Putin around. And Putin’s answer was, as was quoted, was shown on the television, was that the use of such missiles coming from nuclear powers, that means from United States and NATO countries, would indicate the entry of those countries as co-belligerents with Ukraine, and they would be considered to be at war with Russia.

1:45
And how would Russia respond to that? Well, Russia takes into consideration that that is a changed nature of the war. It’s no longer a Russian-Ukraine war, but directly a Russian war with the countries providing and directing those missiles, because we will recall that Putin had insisted that giving permission to Ukraine to use them is a falsehood. In point of fact, the missiles can only be used under the direct efforts of the suppliers, that is the US manufacturer in the case of ATACMS, and the US military personnel who have access to the secret algorithms and the secret satellite-based intelligence that enable them to be programmed and directed at specific targets. So considering that, the Russians are looking upon any such attacks as being direct attacks, say by the United States, and will respond accordingly. But there’s a proviso here.

3:00
“Respond accordingly” does not mean that they’re going to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at Washington after being attacked. No, what Putin said in this was clear if you listen closely is the response will be commensurate with the damage that such an attack does to Russia. That means to individuals, civilians, and to infrastructure. So that is already a slightly calming explanation for us today when a lot of us are genuinely unnerved by Biden’s decision.

I wrote about this in a couple of essays already on Sunday night. Sunday is the day when the announcement was made in Washington. And I received many comments. And the comments were various. People are alarmed. Other people said it’s not that bad, and I’ll get into that separately. But there’s a lot of interest in this subject. Now, so much for Mr. Peskov.

4:08
Now, I was listening last night to a program which I watch rather frequently and highly recommend to anyone wanting to understand the Kremlin positions. And that is “The Great Game”. the talk show called a discussion group.

It’s the Russian equivalent of “Meet the Press” in the good old days when there was still something resembling professional journalism in the United States. That program is hosted by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who’s a member of the parliament. They were addressing this very question, and they took a very comforting view of it. What they said is that the Kremlin sees this decision by Biden as his effort to seal his legacy and to safeguard his place in history. And knowing the man, there was quite a bit of logic to that. That is, what they’re saying is, the intent of this decision was not to save the Ukrainians, because everybody knows that they cannot be saved.

5:16
It was not to do great damage to Russia, because the possibilities of doing great damage within the 300-kilometer, 150-200-mile range of the ATACMS are minimal. Most everyone who is the least bit serious in military analysis knows that the intended, the stated purpose of such attacks, according to Mr. Zelensky, was to remove the air bases and the jets that are dropping, that are bombing Ukrainian positions. To remove them within this 300-kilometer range is impossible. Everyone who’s the least but serious knows because the Russians long ago withdrew the bombers that are performing these operations, mostly using heavy glide bombs to great destruction against the Ukrainian fortified positions.

6:13
Those bombers are now well away from the range of the ATACMS or of the Storm Shadow missile that was also under discussion this fall. So the military potential under genuine military targets are meant is minimal to non-existent. Of course that leaves us with targeting that is not what was permitted under this latest decision, that is residential buildings and civilian infrastructure. And then of course the real monster case of an attack on the Kursk nuclear power plant. This threat is not covered by what the Russians were talking about and remains there for us to worry about if we are professional warriors.

7:16
Nonetheless, the view from the Kremlin is that this is not intended to be an effective and destructive attack on Russia, but is intended to make the case for America’s next electoral cycle, which is two years from now, for control of the Congress, that Biden did everything possible to save Ukraine and Trump did everything possible to destroy Ukraine. That will be the electoral message that would come out of what Biden has just done. And I’d say that is a very persuasive interpretation of what this latest decision by Biden is all about. And I would like to add something else that nobody’s talking about, but I find even further and parallel, this unrelated confirmation of this kind of innocent interpretation of what has just been done. That is how the French and the British have reacted.

8:28
Let us recall that going back to September 13th when Starmer, the British prime minister, came to the White House to speak with Biden, he came with a list of targets in the Russian Federation that he intended to quote, “allow”– which means the British would actually be targeting– the Ukrainians to strike with a Storm Shadow. He was snubbed by Biden, well, Biden gave him the bad news, the cold shower, that he had just decided not to approve any strikes by missiles that have American technology in them, as a Storm Shadow does, against targets deep within the Russian Federation. The reason that Ray McGovern and some others, I also bought into this, the reason given for Biden’s decision was he was faced by the Pentagon. The Pentagon officers told him, “Dear sir, if you want to do this, we face total destruction, because the Russians have threatened us.” This was, Putin made a statement about such strikes, making the US or others co-belligerents.

9:50
“Putin has made that statement, and we are not ready for nuclear war with Russia. Let’s have you back down.” Well the British kept on making public statements, Starmer made statements. As recently as Armistice, the 11th of November, when Macrone and Starmer met to celebrate jointly the cessation of hostilities in World War I, they both came out saying that they strongly support Ukraine and would like to see their missiles used to give Ukraine bargaining power against Russia.

10:42
Here it is less than a week later, or just a week later. And what do we hear from Starmer and Macron? Nothing. The obvious response to Biden’s decision by both France and Britain is to say, neither deny nor confirm, that they will do the like and send the Storm Shadow against Russian targets deep within the Russian Federation. Now how do we make sense of that? It doesn’t take a great mental effort. But these two countries have 60 days or less of Mr. Biden. And then they have four years of Mr. Trump.

11:34
It would be insane for them as a favor to Biden to poison relations with Trump. Trump has already made it known that he’s ready for a trade war with Europe. And that will have enormous economic consequences for the European Union if it goes badly. So it would be the height of stupidity for both countries to do what they said they would do and use, allow their equivalents, their long-range missiles to be fired nominally by Ukrainians against Russian Federation targets. So it looks like after the elections of November 5th, the British and the French understood that the game was up, and they cannot go directly against Trump.

Alkhorshid: 12:35
The question is right now, as you mentioned, in the European Union we have some sort of resistance against Donald Trump’s policy in Ukraine. But do you see at the end of the day they’re getting prepared to go along with Donald Trump’s position in Ukraine?

Doctorow:
Reluctantly, and for the reason I just gave. He has put them on notice that they will be a trade war, and a trade war could be vicious, considering how fragile the European economy is right now. It’s Germany in a second year of recession. And the economic situation in Germany continues to deteriorate, considering that in the last month, the value of the euro has descended from $1.08 to $1.05 per euro and is headed towards parity. And let us remember that when the euro was introduced, its exchange rate was $1.16 against the euro.

13:41
So the euro is now very weak and getting weaker. It is not a good time to aggravate– or to enrage, is a better way to put it– Mr. Trump over an issue that is not existential to the European Union: the use of one or another offensive weapon that they manufacture by Ukraine against Russia.

Alkhorshid: 14:06
How about the Russian strategy, nuclear strategy doctrine that they were talking about right after this decision of Biden? What do we know about that?

Doctorow:
Well, nothing, nothing. They xxx from the last change, which Mr. Putin announced about the time that he made his statement on such strikes rendering the manufacturers and implementers of the strike co-belligerents or being countries at war with Russia.

So that states that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country, which is, formally speaking, verboten. That stays in place. So I don’t see any other significant indicators that we have to worry about from the Russian stance.

Alkhorshid: 15:11
Can we argue that if Russia were to use nuclear weapons against Ukrainians, we could have seen that in the Kursk region, in the aftermath of that attack in the Kursk region. Because it was an attack on the Russian soil.

They didn’t use that. They didn’t use nuclear, they don’t need to use nuclear weapons. This is, at the end of the day, but we see in the mainstream media in the West, they’re talking about that Russia is about to use nuclear weapons. Is the war in Ukraine getting to the point that would be worse than what has happened in the Kursk region that would force Russia to do that, in your opinion?

15:57
Well, I don’t see any possibility of things getting so out of hand that Russia would have to have recourse to its tactical nuclear weapon arsenal. The only thing that could do that would be a Ukrainian attack on the Kursk power plant. If that were to happen, I would not rule out a Russian nuclear strike on Kiev. Because that is of such potential consequence, loss of life immediately and later from radioactive poisoning that I don’t think the Russians would have any interest in Ukraine existing any more.

Alkhorshid: 16:41
Do you see the possibility of Donald Trump and his team being in contact with Kiev in terms of using long-range missiles. Because if they use that, it totally would influence Donald Trump’s position and how they see the conflict. How do you see the people on the part of Donald Trump and his team?

Doctorow:
Well, if you recall, going back to 2016, in the period immediately after the election, there were charges made. And there were people under Trump had met with a Russian ambassador. The people under Trump, this turned into a big scandal and the individual involved was forced to withdraw from government service.

This was, technically speaking, an incoming administration does not have a right to conduct foreign relations. The point was made in such a clear way in 2016 that it is unthinkable that Trump would do today what you just said.

Alkhorshid: 17:58
Yeah. And the other point right now would be the way that the government in Moscow sees the conflict in Ukraine. Do you think that the possibilities– how, in the Russian media, are they talking about any sort of negotiations, any sort of talks with the Trump administration, the people who are coming to the power in Washington?

Doctorow:
No, they’re standing by and watching. Just to remember that Mr. Putin did not make a congratulatory telephone call to Trump, who was the only world leader who didn’t do that. That was not done, precisely to send a message that the ball is in the court of the United States, and Russia will take no initiatives whatsoever to bring the United States in as a broker or facilitator of negotiations with Kiev. The Russian television makes it crystal clear that they do not consider Mr. Zelensky to be a legitimate head of state, head of government. They believe that his time, they will know his time went out, and they do not believe that his continued holding power is legally supported, so they do not intend to negotiate with him.

Alkhorshid: 19:29
We have Russian, the US sanctions on Lavrov, and we know that Russia sanctioned the Rubio, Marco Rubio in the United States. Do you think that would be a first step for these two administration to talk to each other, just withdrawing the sanctions, they’re just considering not sanctioning, because these are two foreign ministers of the countries. It’s an important, it’s a diplomatic sign for both of them. How do you find that? Is the United States going to just remove sanctions on Lavrov in your opinion, in the first step?

Doctorow: 20:14
I don’t think that the question of these personal sanctions will be dealt with separately as a first step, as you say. I think there’ll be a combined step. That will be part of, it’ll be tucked into a much bigger agreement on direct US-Russian talks about the situation in Ukraine.

And I assume, at Russian insistence, also to take in the security architecture of Europe, because that was the fundamental starting point of this whole conflict. In December of 2021, when the Russians made their proposal to revise the security architecture and to roll back NATO, that was given no attention. It was scorned by the United States, And I think the Russians will bring it up again in any coming negotiation. They have no interest, they’ve made this crystal-clear, they have no interest in talks that lead to a xxxxxxx.

Alkhorshid: 21:21
Is the situation– yeah. You mentioned the Kursk region and the situation there. Do you think that the way that the war is going on in the Kursk region is still of concern for Russians or they’re not just, they’re getting rid of that concern?

Doctorow:
Well, it’s for concern of people in Kursk, of course. Remember, only a small part of the Kursk oblast was taken initially, and maybe half of that has been lost by the Ukrainians.

It’s only a small part of Kursk, but nonetheless there are a lot of displaced people throughout the oblast and further afield who were forced to abandon their homes as the Russian army moved them out to safety, both because of the threat that they would be kidnapped and made hostages by the invading Ukrainians and also by the fact that the Russian army wanted to have free hands to destroy anything that could be used on that territory for refuge, for safety by the Ukrainian army forces.

22:32
So they have flattened a good part of their own territory while depriving the Ukrainians of any safe place. For this reason, within that area we’ve got a problem. Let’s remember that the Ukrainian attacks have not only been on Kursk, but there also have been ongoing attacks and attempted incursions in the next oblast over, which has also a common border with Ukraine, and that is Briansk. So the difficulties are not just limited to Kursk.

But for Russians as a whole, the Russian people outside of that region, of course it is shameful that they have any part of their homeland occupied by hostile forces and occupied not just by Ukrainian army but by vicious mercenaries, and particularly those from Poland.

Alkhorshid: 23:41
Gilbert, we have– after this incursion in the Kursk region, many people were talking about that the mastermind of this attack was British government or the people in the British government. Do you think we are at the end of this and Russia would put an end to the conflict in the Kursk region in the near future. But at the end of the day, do you think who was behind this attack, in your opinion? Because so far we’ve seen more than 32,000 soldiers, if I’m not mistaken, were killed. Ukrainian soldiers were killed in this incursion, which achieved nothing for Ukrainians. It was a failure.

Doctorow: 24:26
It achieved something for a while. And it’s not over yet. And there are obviously people in Kiev who have this residual hope that what they still possess in Kursk can be used as a bargaining chip, at the negotiating table when a peace treaty is being discussed and negotiated.

That is, of course, rubbish. The Russians will not allow– let us say this explicitly, the Russians will not allow the future of the Kursk oblast to be a matter of discussion at any peace negotiations with Ukrainians. It is a foregone conclusion that there will not be a soul of mercenaries or Ukrainian soldiers on that territory when the Russians enter into negotiations. It is virtually a precondition to the start of negotiations that the Kursk oblast be liberated.

Alkhorshid: 25:24
Yeah. And the other part of this attack in the Kursk region was the way that they couldn’t fight the war on the main line of the battle in the Donbas, in that region, if I’m not mistaken, in the northern part, in the southern part of the main line of the conflict. If you were to mention which, because if you see that was beneficial for the Ukrainian army, you have to consider what they’ve lost in the main battle. In your opinion, considering that, was that beneficial even for the reasons that the West had in its mind with the Kursk region’s incursion?

Doctorow: 26:20
There were all kinds of crazy things that were in the West’s mind. Let’s remember that. And it’s still in the West’s mind. You’ve got all of these wonderful graduates of Harvard, Columbia, and other fine universities in the states who know nothing about anything, but doesn’t stop them from doing these exercises and strategy that are then, some of them, become US government policy. The evidence that having a high IQ and a very good diploma on the wall does not save you from utter stupidity, if you know nothing, have no feel for the fight you are engaging in. And that is certainly true of Jake Sullivan, of Tony Blinken, of the closest advisors and shapers of policy under Biden.

27:20
What do these people think? They think the Russians are very weak, that Putin is a weak leader. They think that the Russian public does not support their government and can very easily be brought to insurrection and to bring him down. This was clearly one of the objectives of the Kursk incursion. It was truly embarrassing for the Putin administration. No question about that. It was a show of poor judgment by the chief commanders of the Russian armed forces that they did not listen to warnings coming from subordinates that such an incursion could take place, the logic being that it was so insane that it was improbable, if not impossible.

28:16
They underestimated the capacity of Ukrainian leadership guided by the incompetence in Washington to commit utter self-destruction. Nonetheless, whatever the reasons for their short-sightedness, the consequences were there for everyone to see, if the Russian army had been caught out and that territory was taken in the first invasion of the Russian Federation since World War II. Now those facts are undeniable, so to say that the mission in Kursk achieved nothing is a bit unfair to those who hatched this harebrain scheme.

29:02
There were some very bad judgments about the nature of the Russian government and state and Russian public. They misjudged entirely the reaction of the Russian public to an invasion of their own territory, which was a still higher consolidation of society around its leadership, rather than treasonous voices calling for those who could not properly defend the country to be thrown out of government. So the whole incursion was rather complicated. But I say the underlying problem was the utter inability of the, I think, those who are formulating policy in Washington and then imposing that policy on Kiev to understand whom they were up against.

Alkhorshid: 30:01
And the question right now would be who’s going to replace Jake Sullivan and Anthony Blinken? Waltz and Marco Rubio if they get the approval of the Congress. But At the end of the day, do you see these people capable of helping Donald Trump’s position or you find some sort of attrition within the government that may make some sort of barriers, some sort of obstacles for Donald Trump? Are these people in line with Donald Trump in your opinion?

Doctorow:
There are many very highly regarded commentators and interviewers who have spoken about Rubio, and Waltz, and others named by Trump as indicating that his team consists of yes men who will not have innovative and constructive contributions to make within their official capacities. There may be some truth to that, but I think it is being said with an intention to indict Mr. Trump without justice. Considering the biggest failings of his first administration were precisely that he was compelled to appoint people who did him a disservice rather than a service, who sabotaged and undermined his policy intentions wherever they could —

31:37
given that history, it’s entirely understandable that he would appoint today people who have their own following and are widely regarded by members of his party in a positive way, but who will heed what his policy lines are and not try to be creative or to stymie him. He will get his inputs on what those policies should be elsewhere, not from the people whom he has appointed to be implementers. There’s a difference between being an implementer and being an author. And he is not, Mr. Rubio, of course, he is not, has no experience relevant to his position.

32:30
However, let’s look back at American history. The secretaries of state, very common, over the last 80 years, have been people with no relevant experience in foreign affairs. They were mostly lawyers with an in-basket, out-basket mentality. That’s not my judgment. I’m repeating the words of Henry Kissinger, who knew a thing or two about this very question. And as he was justifying himself as a person who had no administrative experience and was not running a state department until he was appointed to that, but a person who brought to it historical perspective and breadth of understanding, which are essential to formulation of good policy.

33:20
So, I think it’s unfair to attack Rubio. “He didn’t do this, anything relevant to his new position.” And so what? Look, I spent five years working for a company called the United Parcel Service, a company which is the world’s biggest delivery logistics company of its kind, in all kinds of both serving consumers but mostly serving industry. And within that organization people are moved from one department to another every six months or nine months. A person who has had some knowledge, who could add and subtract and had a good mind for numbers would find himself moved from the finance department to the logistics department, or then maybe to marketing.

34:09
And each time he was moved, people would say, my goodness, this fellow has no experience whatsoever. He would have a two- or three-week little course. He would give him a little diploma to put on the wall, he’s now had taken a course in marketing. And there he is, he’s the new director of marketing in a given region. This is very common, both in large organizations and in governments, that people without immediate relevance are given assignments because of their general ability to manage people, to manage communications, and to be effective leaders, even if they don’t have personal experience. This question comes up when you look at Tulsi Gabbard. How could she possibly run that organization? Well, she can if she has a good subordinate.

34:59
And this is an element of large organizations, whether they’re private or governmental. This is a very widespread practice. So I don’t hold Mr. Rubio as being inappropriate, neither because he lacks the information or the knowledge base to be creative in the position and so to assist his boss. His boss doesn’t want a creative person there. He really wants somebody who’s going to follow orders and not have any experience running a big administration. I think as a senator, he probably had a dozen people under him, not a cast of thousands. No matter; he’ll probably cope. And he brings to the job a certain following that he had nationwide, he is a very visible personality, which will– and he is serving Trump. So it’s all xxxxx xxxxx.

Alkhorshid: 36:07
You think that he’s going to be totally different from Mike Pompeo? Because most of the time in the first administration, he was trying to manage Donald Trump.

Doctorow:
No, exactly. Pompeo came in knowing too much, including knowing the vulnerabilities of his boss. And so that helps you manage your boss, if you’ve had several years, to see his vulnerabilities. And that was not good for Trump, because Pompeo was rather ideological, whereas Trump was pragmatic. And ideological was in the wrong way, in the neocon way. So I think Rubio for all of us, is a much better man in the job than Pompeo was.

Alkhorshid: 36:54
Yeah. And we’ve learned from “New York Times” last week that Elon Musk had a meeting with Iranians in New York. Do you find it– in your opinion, does it have anything to do with the reality? Because it seems that both sides are just rejecting the idea of having any sort of meeting.

37:22
Look, Musk is not a dependent of Trump in the way that the gentleman who conducted meetings with the Russian ambassador was dependent on Trump at that time. So you can say that this is arm’s length playing at foreign policy.

And that ensures Trump against touching a live wire and finding himself under attack in Congress for violating the rules, private persons conducting foreign policy. Mr. Musk, the discussions held with Iran officials can be called a private business matter, all kinds of ways you can paper that over, not to appear to violate these general rules. And so, Elon is on safe ground. What they actually– are they headed towards some kind of conciliation?

38:39
I believe, and I’m not the only one to say it. As I said, you have to act tough before you can act as a realist and pragmatist. You start out acting as a pragmatist and everybody calls you treasonous and soft. Therefore, it’s entirely appropriate that there be loud words coming from other members of Trump’s team, like xxxxxxxx and Rubio, about Iran, when the ultimate intention of Trump is not escalation, not attacks on Iran; on the contrary, some kind of normalization.

Alkhorshid: 39:17
Do you find that Iran, in your opinion, Iran and the United States with what we’ve seen so far from Donald Trump and his interview, he said the only problem he has with Iran is nuclear program of Iran. In your opinion, is he going to negotiate with Iran or make some sort of agreement on maybe based on JCPOA that Obama’s administration did during those days?

Doctorow:
I think that’s exactly what will happen, but not in the first days in office. You cannot do that in the first six weeks. He first has to establish himself as being a tough guy and fulfilling first the domestic program that he set out. Let’s remember that when he started his tenure as president in 2017, it was he had a checklist, and he came back to it day after day. “This is what I promised, and this is what I’ve done.”

40:15
And of course, the predominant agenda is domestic. So I would not see dealing with Iran as having a high priority in the opening weeks or months of the administration. First, not to appear to be soft, too conciliatory. He wants to look strong as he forces his domestic program and as he forces his rather mixed group of candidates for his administration through the Senate.

After that is done, and after he has his cabinet filled, cabinet-level posts filled, after he has acted on some of his promises for domestic policy, whether it be tariff policy, there’s a whole checklists of things that he said he would do. After that, then Iran comes to attention.

Alkhorshid: 41:11
In your opinion, the way that Netanyahu right now sees the situation in Washington, is he going to, let’s put it this way, in your opinion, in the mind of the Netanyahu administration, that Trump’s position on the war in the Middle East is much more aggressive. Is it less aggressive in their mind? Because at the end of the day, we know that final goal of the Netanyahu and his administration is a bigger war. It’s not between Israel and Lebanon or in Gaza. It’s between the United States and Iran. Is he in his eye, is he going to achieve that with Trump in office? We haven’t seen so far that Donald Trump is talking about a big war, any conflict, and J.D. Vance was just rejecting this idea. But how do you see it right now with all these people, pro-Israelis, in the Trump administration?

Doctorow: 42:21
Let’s remember several words that Trump said that have been held against him, because it looked like he was encouraging Netanyahu to do the most vile atrocities. He said, get it over with. Get it done. Well, “get it done” is not something that implies that Trump will support Netanyahu definitely in an ongoing orgy of murder. There’s another factor here, quite apart from the question of one’s moral beliefs, strength of one’s religious beliefs.

The other element is the military one. The United States cannot keep its aircraft carrier with escorts and heavy manpower presence in the region indefinitely. And therefore, it is incumbent on Trump to pressure Netanyahu to claim victory and climb down. And that is all I think we will see. It’s not pretty. It’s not pretty, but it’s not ugly either.

Alkhorshid: 43:44
Thank you so much, Gilbert, for being with us today. Great pleasure as always.

Doctorow:
Thanks so much. Good to talk to you.

Alkhorshid: 43:51
See you next time. Bye.