Transcript of interview with Glenn Diesen, 12 June

Transcript submitted by a reader

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kBZhtB0Kx4

Diesen: 0:00
Hi everyone and welcome. I am joined today by Gilbert Doctorow, a historian and an international affairs analyst. Welcome back to the program.

Doctorow:
Good to see you again.

Diesen:
Likewise. So I guess the big issue still remains the aftermath of this attack on the Russian nuclear forces. I find it personally frustrating that many people, especially in the political media establishment, do not seem to appreciate how dangerous this is, not only about not avoiding a nuclear disaster, but also the retaliation which seems almost required on the Russian side. However, the Russian response so far has been limited. Of course, it doesn’t feel limited if you’re living in Kiev, but there’s many good reasons, I guess, for why Russia should have retaliated in a much more powerful way. And many people therefore expected that there would come a response effectively heard around the world. How do you explain for this reaction or the muted one? Or Do you think the worst is yet to come?

Doctorow: 1:18
We don’t know. And there are a lot of things we don’t know. In my new book, you’re aware that I’m saying in the introduction that we are living in the fog of war. And that certainly applies to the question you’ve given. I was personally very disappointed with the weak, _ne adekbat_, the inappropriate or unsuitable response that the Russians have given so far. That’s more of the same blowing up more arms caches and blowing up more drone manufacturing and hitting the Dubno tactical aviation air base in western Ukraine — that’s all child stuff. How many hundreds of billions of dollars in armaments the West shipped to Ukraine?

They can spend another five years blowing things up and not get through all of it. So this is not a change, a step change or an escalation that you would expect given the escalation from the Ukrainian side in attacking the nuclear triad, part of the nuclear triad of the Russian Federation. However, I’m beginning to turn this around in my mind and think maybe I’m being unfair and unreasonable because I’m uninformed, as everyone else is, about what exactly Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump were talking about in their hour or hour and a half long phone conversation.

2:59
People were, the general, if you look at the independent media, alternative media, everybody was speculating on whether or not Trump was being asked how much he knew or didn’t know in advance or in real time about this attack. I don’t believe that now for a minute, in particular because of a stunning article that appeared in “Financial Times” today, explaining further how this was carried out. I mean, the first impressions we all had was “My goodness, the Ukrainians have struck 4000 kilometers into the Russian Federation. Boy, this is drone warfare.” It took us a while to understand that those drones were probably 20 or 30 kilometers away from the air bases when they were only 50. Anyway, they were close to the air bases in these trailers, special trailers with roofs that would open up on signal and so forth.

3:58
So that already put in question how much outside assistance you would need for this. And then today’s “Financial Times” raised a dramatic issue that these drones are the Mercedes of their class. They are highly advanced, they’re using AI, artificial intelligence, as self-targeting. So after they were– their release was done long-distance by remote, of course.

And they were launched. And then the last part of their trip to target was done by themselves. They had onboard sensors and cameras, and they had AI to identify what they should be going after, what they should be striking. There was no, this means that there was no satellite intelligence, which is what everyone’s talking about, people who are really military specialists. They’re talking about this drone strike as if it were a missile strike. It wasn’t. And it wasn’t coming from 1000 or 2000 kilometers away. It was coming from 50 kilometers or 100 kilometers away. And it was guided by itself. So the British and the US involvement was nil.

5:25
And yes, all people will say, “Oh, Doctorow was quoting the “Financial Times”. That’s just an English rag. And so–” Hey, wait a minute. I’m quoting it because it coincides with what I see on Russian television every day. But the Russians are doing it.

The point of the matter is that the Russians and Ukrainians are peers. This is a battle between equals in terms of technical competence in certain domains. Certain domains, not all domains, obviously. And drone warfare is what the game is today. The artillery warfare exists, but it has been overtaken by drone warfare, where the Ukrainians are equal to the Russians.

6:10
And they are both way ahead of the Brits and the US. How are we speaking about this nonsense to talk about assistance coming from the United States or Britain? Moreover, well, I mean, let me just explain because it’s not obvious from my last remark about what the Russians are doing. They are guiding their battlefield attacks, not by satellite intelligence, but by what their drones, their reconnaissance drones tell them in real time. Now, you don’t have to be a genius or military expert to understand that information that’s coming from a drone that is 10 kilometers away is much faster.

than the information coming from a satellite that is 500 kilometers away. Therefore, real time is real time when it’s done by drones. That’s the game today. And if the Russians have it, the Ukrainians have it, and talking about British or American assistance for the execution of it, it’s not the planning of it, but the execution of it is nonsense.

Now, if that is nonsense, then surely Mr. Putin knows that, and surely he never would have wasted time in a precious phone call with Donald Trump to talk about what the Americans knew or didn’t know. They would have been talking about something else and hopefully they were talking about finding a resolution to this war and moving the talks to Moscow, which seems to be the case right now.

Diesen: 7:46
But the Ukrainians made the point that this attack had been planned 18 months in advance. And as we’ve also learned from this New York Times article, was it a month or two ago, that almost all the military planning had been done by the United States. It is hard to imagine though that, I’m not sure about the extent of involvement, but that the US and the British at least, they must have had some knowledge of this, given that the drones have been shipped in, stored and they’ve been coordinated and planned in this way.

If not, only if not to you know, bite the hand that feeds you, because if the Ukrainians would do this without the knowledge of the Americans and keeping them in the dark, wouldn’t this have created a lot of divisions?

Doctorow: 8:40
Let’s go back to the start of your question, because it’s very important. I didn’t say that the Brits and the Americans were not involved in this. Of course they were. And just exactly as you’re describing, in the planning and the preparation for it. But preparation, who knows when the preparation ended? Could have ended a year ago. Could have ended two years ago. No, two years ago, no.

A year ago for sure. Someone had to bring in those drones and these trucks crossing through Belarus, as I understand. But more importantly, somebody had to locate them near the bases. Now, American intelligence, CIA presence in Russia, is not so much. The British presence in Russia is big.

9:25
And they had been involved in every scandalous false flag operation that we’ve seen in the last three years. They were deeply involved in Bucha. They were even not directly involved in the war, but to disgrace the Russians and Mr. Putin’s group in particular, they certainly were the ones who killed Navalny. And how did they do that? How could you reach Navalny in this remote location where the Brits have got their fingers everywhere?

And so I believe that they were deeply involved in the preparation of this attack when the drones were brought in and they were stored near bases. So there is a reason why Mr. Lavrov was singling out among the Anglo-Saxons, the Brits. The Russians have got it in for the Brits, and with good reason, because they have been really the barking and the biting dogs, unlike the poodles and lap dogs that we knew from Tony Blair’s time.

Diesen: 10:35
Well, I was wondering though how, to what extent, the, I guess, the muted response of Russia, do see this, you know, because it does create a lot of tensions within Russia. You know, the usual discussion is between those who argue that, you know, they’re sick of this. Let’s get it just done with. I’m not sure if that’s possible, just to get it done with quickly, even if they would want this without again blowing up entire cities. While the others are making the point that they’re doing everything right, what they’re doing now that is gradually wearing down the opposing army so you can have objective indicators measuring the lack of manpower, reduced equipment, increased economic problems, lack of social cohesion, desertions, I mean casualty levels.

11:29
You know, we have all these different measurements. You can assess the extent to which they are reaching their goal. But do you think this impacts how they responded? Because many thought this would give an excuse, if you will, to Russia to just turn up the violence to 100 and just push through and get a faster end to this war.

Doctorow:
You’ve omitted one factor in that list of measurements and parameters: will. And that is of vital importance. People can be losing, the attrition can be taking effect, they can be losing men, they can be losing equipment. But that doesn’t answer the question of will, will they fight for the last Ukrainian? Maybe they will. I think it was relevant that Mr. Medinsky said in his first discussion with the Ukrainians in Istanbul that he made reference to Peter the Great’s Northern War in 21 years, and we’re ready to fight for 21 years. Is he ready to fight for 21 years? Is Mr. Putin going to be there in 21 years? This is totally illogical.

And how long can the Ukrainians hold on? That is a really, that is a number one question in everyone’s mind. And it’s good that you raise it, I don’t have an answer. But I do say that the Ukrainians are far more capable, are far more determined, are less deserting and running from the field than a lot of my peers are saying or suggesting. And that at the same time, the whole logic of the timing of this war, starting in February of 2022, was based on window-of-opportunity logic.

13:14
That Russia understood that it was that Mr. Putin and his associates understood that they were sanction proof after eight years of preparing their financial system and trading partners and so on. And that they had strategic advantage over the West with their new weapons systems that were not only tested but also deployed. Now, we have to apply the same measure today. Is Russia, does Russia have an unlimited window opportunity?

I say no. When the West is throwing hundreds of billions of euros at it, was beginning to assign hundreds of billions of euros to ramp up military production, it will take effect. Not tomorrow, just speaking about a five year time horizon. Well, if Russia doesn’t solve this way before the five years are up, then we’re going to have World War III. Yes, indeed, I agree with you.

But it’s not tomorrow, because the West isn’t ready for tomorrow. Russia is. Therefore, if Mr. Putin is to follow the logic he used when he launched this war, he will strike now in a dramatic way, unless I’m dead wrong, which is possible, and he has reached some accommodation with Donald Trump that we don’t know about. It’s possible. I leave that open.

Diesen: 14:41
Yeah. Well, this is it. It’s very difficult to know what they’re talking about behind closed doors. And well, I would just add this comment: that they fought for 21 years. This was the Great Northern War from 1700 to 1721. So it’s been over 300 years. So the way society is structured, the willingness to fight prolonged wars, the economy that supports it, the nature of international relations, a lot of this changed over time. So I’m not sure if that would, 21-year-long war would be pulled off today, simply because it was pulled off three centuries ago.

15:21
But I guess it’s important to signal the willingness to keep on fighting until the objectives have been met. Again, especially if you consider this to be a war for survival and to signal clearly to the opponent that there’s no intention of at least making compromises on these key issues. But this attack on Russia’s nuclear forces, well, with these new powerful strikes now being launched against Kiev and other cities, it doesn’t just impact the way the war is fought in terms of the amount of force which is being used, but surely it will also have an impact on the peace which the Russians will demand. Do you see them, I guess, preparing to set higher demands now or– because the rhetoric became quite, well, much harsher, it seems now. Again, they talked about destroying Ukraine before, but now it’s becoming, I guess, louder.

Doctorow: 16:28
It would be better if they didn’t talk about destroying Ukraine, but talked about destroying the decision-making centers, which is also going back to February 2022. Why? Are they walking away from that? The implications are clear. If they want to be consistent, they should send the Oreshniks against wherever Mr. Zelensky happens to be with his close associates, and against Mr. Budanov and all of his associates, and leave the rest of Kiev alone. Because the broad population, even those who are working in these military organizations, they’re not the problem. The problem is the decision makers. And they’re being left untouched.

17:13
I find that very hard to understand. Here’s where I– Then the other question is, what are you doing for the West? Mr. Karaganov is coming back and back again with his remarks of the need for a dramatic strike in Western Europe to sober up minds. And yet to be sure you would think that this is implicitly very critical of Mr. Putin, but he is invited back and back again by Vladimir Putin. So that’s also a little bit hard to understand. Are the Russians going to make military strike against Britain? I don’t know.

Diesen: 17:53
Well, he’s more of a, I guess, hawkish element, but Karagonov, he also attends this Valdai meeting every year. And I saw him over the past few years, every year at Valdai making the same comment that perhaps we should change our nuclear doctrine. And Putin pushed back against it every year when we met in Valdai saying, “No, this is, you know, we have to keep it the way it is with predictability and stability,” all of this.

But then, of course, at the end, he ended up taking his advice, given that, well, what he argued that the West was becoming more and more irresponsible in terms of American long-range strikes into Russia. So at the end he took the more hawkish advice, if you will, and I guess now Karagonov is suggesting the same thing, like let’s take it one step further. We have to strike inside Western Europe to send a strong signal after all the attacks they’ve done on us.

18:57
But then I guess it makes sense to have him around in case Putin decides that, when it’s time to take that extra step. I did want to ask about your comment on not striking the political leadership in Ukraine, because I noticed recently that the Russians began to use the word terrorism more and more. Obviously, there’s some real events, which is the reason behind this, which was the Ukraine’s deliberate targeting of trains which had no military function. So again, deliberately only going after civilians. Now, so this is why it could be framed as terrorism if terrorism is targeting civilians to, I guess, elevate fear for political purposes.

But It’s also true that if this special military operation is defined more as a war on terrorism, it could, I guess, create the legal space for beginning to target political leaders as well. Do you see it in a similar way or do you think I’m reading too much into this?

Doctorow: 20:06
No, no, I think your reading is correct. It’s entirely possible. Look, Mr. Putin is a lawyer. That is a blessing and it’s also a curse, because many of his decisions are made looking for legal niceties in international law. When the United States and many other countries, Israel is an outstanding example, pay no heed whatsoever to international law. And they don’t think twice about it. Russia does, and I’m not sure that it is so wise, but nonetheless, that being said, by calling Ukraine a terrorist state, he’s preparing a way to legitimize the assassination of Mr. Zelensky and his associates. Yes, that’s true.

Diesen: 20:44
Yeah, and in terms of this peace, not only do they see it now more difficult to live with the current Ukrainian state in the future, in other words, any peace negotiation now would have to include at least a regime change. But in terms of any future peace, to what extent do you see the way Russia imagines living next to the West in the future? Because after this strikes, do you think the Russians are giving up on this reconciliation with the West after the war?

Because you keep hearing that once this is over, everyone will benefit from pursuing some reconciliation, start to trade together, have normal relations, which would benefit both sides. But there seems to be a lot of anger now, not just from the politicians and the military, but I also sense it from society that this desire to not kiss and make up, but seek to normalize relations after this war is done with, it seems to be going away. This becomes more obvious that the US has been pursuing the destruction of Russia, you have these very aggressive attacks. Now the Germans are talking openly about attacking Russia with Taurus missiles. Kaya Kallas speaking of how Russia should be broken up to smaller countries, it will be easier to deal with.

22:26
I mean, this seems to be changing some of the collective consciousness in Russia, they don’t seem that interested any more to get along with the West in the future.

Doctorow:
Well, in the comments sections, the Russian language version of your show, of other major video interviews, which are also being put into Russian and which have audiences that are like 100,000 people. Your own audience for some of these programs in Russia is as big or bigger than the English language, original ones.

Diesen: 23:04
Yeah, I noticed.

Doctorow:
And so I look at the comments and a lot of xenophobia, a lot of real anger at the West. And would– but comments are in general, one percent of the viewers. The other 99 percent I would take as an indication of how many thumbs-up there are, which usually outweigh by considerable numbers, the comments. Therefore it’s very hard to reach a firm decision, a firm conclusion, whether or not Russian society is really turning its back on the West. The people I know in Petersburg and in Moscow, they are an intellectual class, and they all would like to go back to Paris. They would like to let bygones to be bygones.

23:56
But I think in answer to your question more broadly, what Europe does will depend entirely on what Donald Trump can [do] and does. If he restores direct flights between the United States and Moscow, the European airlines will die. They will sweep all the politicians aside to have their flights into and over Russia restored. And it will be the same way with other industries. If the United States takes the first step, the Europeans will be tripping on one another to also restore normal commercial ties.

They will not go back to where they were before the operation, before the sanctions, because so many foreign companies have been displaced. Their properties in Russia were sold off and taken over by Russian entrepreneurs. And there’s no way back as it was, but there’s still room for substantial restoration of trade ties and certainly restoration of energy supplies and other critical raw materials, which Russia was providing Western Europe at bargain basement prices in the past. So I think there will be a way back.

25:17
That comes up in little things. I follow culture very closely. We just had the Queen Elizabeth piano competition, once-in-four-year event here in Brussels. Our whole Belgian society was– high society, of course, but not all, but cultural society was there vying for tickets to the … competition proper and then to the performance of the … winners, of the [six top-placed] people. I, we went to one of these, the ones performed who received the awards of four, five and six. Number six was a Russian.

This, despite everything, despite all of the … hostility I’d say towards Russia, the, his, this man’s exceptional talent was acknowledged. When the concert came, he didn’t receive any encore requests. The two others, a Frenchman and a Japanese, they were, ah, everyone rose to their feet, and they demanded an encore.

They got it. So the cancel Russian culture is over. That wave is gone. Russian culture is slowly crawling back into everybody’s consciousness, but there is a certain coolness, okay? That’s what I see will happen in other domains where the West and Russia have exchanges.

26:56
There’ll be coolness, it won’t be the overwhelming joy of sometimes in 1990s on the part of Westerners visiting Russia, xxxxx xxx xxxxx, but things will somehow restore. I think airlines will be the first thing.

Diesen:
I remember the first year of the war, everything had to be canceled. There was, I think it was a tree competition for old trees, and they canceled the Russian tree as a nominee. I was hoping that would be peak hate and after this we would start to let the cool heads prevail and return to something of normal behavior.

But we might hopefully be going back, because a lot of this seems to be irrational. A lot of the things have been done. But I was wondering how do you see, because we’re not going back to the old world anyways after this is over. This seems to be gone. Indeed, I think the world even that existed before the attacks on Russia’s nuclear forces also probably won’t go back.

But how do you see then the extent to which Russia’s foreign policy could be militarized as a result of this? I mean, to some extent, it already has. That is, the military might of Russia, its expertise in drone warfare, you can argue military culture, something has been built up over the past three years. Do you see this impacting future foreign policy, I guess? Having incentives to find military solutions to political problems.

Maybe not so much as speculation about the nature of the Russians, but instead as a historian, do you see, maybe it’s too specific, but the capabilities influencing the intentions? So in other words, if you have all this military power, then if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Do you usually see this through history, or… ?

octorow: 29:03
I think Russia will not be on a war footing economically, but the military component of its general economy will remain at a very high level, not just for its own needs. But when the war ends, Russia will begin to conclude contracts for sale of its advanced … equipment.

All of that has been suspended. India did not receive equipment that it contracted for, because everything the Russian factories are producing is going to the front, their own front, and they couldn’t care less about selling the stuff abroad at this moment. But once peace is concluded, then I think the Russians will start to commercialize very successfully what they have demonstrated to be superior to American and West European military equipment. And they have the videos to show it. And they have the trophies to show it, because they’ve hauled back Leopards and American equipment as trophies to Moscow.

30:01
So they will be in a very good position to have massive sales of arms and to be a real competitor to both Western Europe and the United States. So in that sense, the Russian economy, even after the war ends, will have a much bigger military component than it ever did before the war. Otherwise, I think the, you say militarized foreign policy, I don’t see that happening, because Russia’s foreign policy now is within the constraints of its agreements to Shanghai Organization, its agreements with its Central Asian neighbors, and of course, BRICS, and all of that will not support Russia being visibly militaristic in its foreign policy. I don’t believe that.

Diesen: 31:04
Well, that makes me think if obviously the Russian military industrial complex will be much greater and more competitive, that obviously will have an impact on geopolitics as well.

It kind of takes me to my last question, which is perhaps a bit too big in nature, but what will be the, I guess, wider geopolitical consequences of this war coming to an end? I mean, It seems as if we’re going to, there’s going to be a lot of resentment for many years to come on both sides. So I’m guessing this won’t come to a complete end. Even if it would in Europe, we won’t end up quarreling over Georgia or Moldova or the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic. We have a lot of possible areas of conflict.

31:52
We can have Belarus in there as well. But in other parts of the world, we’ve seen during the war the Russians pushing out the French. Well, they haven’t necessarily taken credit for it, but there’s other variables, but I’m sure the Russians had had their say in it. But how will the rest of the world reorient after this? Because this is, I think we’re moving towards a very humiliating defeat for NATO.

I mean, at least Europe, America’s been pulling back a bit, but Europeans, we really bet everything on this war. So what do you think will be the wider geopolitical ramifications of this war, assuming that it is being lost now by NATO.

Doctorow: 32:40
That’s a safe, I think that’s a safe assumption. But once again, I think we have to look at just what Donald Trump does, how, and– because he has the capability, the United States has the capability of really influencing what Europe does and how long the detritus in power today, by that I mean Kallas and der Leyen and our wonderful NATO boss, chief, how long they stay in their positions. The United States has the ability to influence their removal.

But for that, Donald Trump has to keep his political capital at home, has to score successes in his domestic policy. There are a lot of things that are unforeseeable or can’t be, which you cannot plan. I wouldn’t look for Europe to save itself and remove itself from the conflicts that we see today, the pro-war movement that it has become in the last several years under the guidance of von der Leyen. It will all depend on Mr. Trump, frankly, as I see it.

33:54
Like it or not, of course, many people don’t like him, but he has it within his power, or may have it within his power, to find a beneficial result, a change of political landscape in Europe that will facilitate the negotiation of a new security architecture. With the people in power today, it’s impossible. I don’t see any chance for Merz and Macron. They were so invested in their personality and political power in the war with Russia, which was for them, the unifying element for the new Europe, that I don’t see that they can stay in power. But the only one who has the strength to sweep them from power by one maneuver or another is sitting in the Oval Office in Washington.

Diesen: 34:50
Yeah, I think this is a key problem. The Europeans have gone down because they accepted, you know, not just throwing away all their weapons, but accepted this deindustrialization. The whole economic, I guess, utility or purpose of the European Union has been severely weakened. Indeed, the EU itself is now talking about itself as a geopolitical block. If you’re going to be a geopolitical block with internal cohesion, you really need that external threat. I mean, it’s a very different animal, the European Union, if you want it to be a geopolitical union instead of an economic block. So it remains to be seen what kind of problems they have, what kind of corner they have painted themselves in.

35:38
Anyways, as always, thank you for your time. I greatly appreciate it and hope to have you back very soon.

Doctorow:
All right. Thanks. Thanks for the invitation.

Diesen:
Thank you.

Doctorow: 35:51
Bye bye.