Transcript submitted by a reader

NewsX World: 4:10
–secure supply routes and push back Russian infiltration. Russian forces have been advancing towards Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region for over a year, seeking to consolidate control over eastern Ukraine and push into neighboring the Dnipropetrovsk region. We now are joined by Gilbert Doctorow. He is a Russia affairs expert, and he joins us live from St. Petersburg in Russia.

Okay, let’s start with the Vlodymyr Zelensky statement that we just heard, Gilbert. Of course, Zelensky describes the fighting in Pokrovsk and Kuryansk and says Russia is turning Ukraine into destroyed cities. Now of course Russia pitches this war as liberating the country of Ukraine. How would you respond to the claim that Russia’s operations in these areas are liberating, rather than coercive?

Doctorow: 5:13
Well, they are very destructive, of course. But the important thing to note is how this is proceeding over a long period of time. They have not staged, the Russians have not staged any massive assaults on major defended cities like Pokrovsk. They have encircled them. In the case of the latest news, they say that they have completely encircled Pakrovsk. And the remarks by Zelensky are an attempt to counter the image of a city where 5,000 or more soldiers are facing slaughter as they are surrounded.

5:53
The fact is that the war is dominated by the move to drones. Mr. Zelensky is unable to resist the Russian advances with manpower. He is short of manpower in many of the critical points of the more than 1,500 kilometer long line of confrontation and Pokrovsk is one of them. But what we see, or I see, watching the Russian state news reports from the front and interviews with soldiers at the front is that the Ukrainians are trying to prevent Russian advance not by putting soldiers on the ground, because they are short of soldiers, but by using very intensive drone attacks on the advancing Russian forces.

6:44
In fact, as a result of the ever-present “birdies” as they call them, Russian forces are using small units, not full front lines of advance. And this is the peculiarity of the present stage of the war, that there are five, six, eight soldiers forming an attack unit, not a whole brigade. The effectiveness of the drone counterattacks is considerable, let us not underestimate it. Nonetheless, it remains true that the Ukrainian forces are surrounded and if– and that Mr. Putin is satisfied that this is so and has invited Western media, Western press to come and see for themselves.

NewsX Wowld: 7:37
Gilbert, assuming Russia eventually controls Pokrovsk, what is the vision for the area? Full integration into Russia, autonomy under Russian patronage or something else possibly?

Doctoorow:
Well let’s look at the borders. We’re speaking now of a fortified town, part of the effort of the Ukrainians to have a series of retreating points as they had been pushed back by the Russians. But this is not the whole of Ukraine. This is an important city in the oblast or province of Donetsk.

8:19
Donetsk has been, is one of two oblasts or provinces that constitute the so-called Donbass, a largely industrial base that was predominantly Russian-populated when it was first incorporated into Ukraine, shortly after the Russian Revolution of 1917. So this is a Russian-speaking part of Ukraine which was being subjected to very harsh discrimination of the Ukrainian nationalists who took power in 2014. It is not the whole of Ukraine. The Russian advance from Pokrovsk will be to the next two points of fallback for the Ukrainians, which are Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

These names may not mean very much to the global audience, but I’d like to point out an important fact. They are about halfway or two-thirds of the way towards the River Dnieper in the oblast of Donetsk. And they were, in 2014, what is called the cradle of the Renaissance of Russian nationalism. They stood for, I forget, 85 days, I think, these little towns with just local militia. They stood up against the Ukrainian army in what the Russians could describe as their version of the last stand of the Alamo.

9:53
This is a term that has great significance to any American viewers of this program. It was a show of heroism in a hopeless cause. In fact, the objective of the Russians is to return to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk from which there was a clean sweep straight to the Dnieper River and to the reconquest or conquest of the entire Donbas.

NewsX World:
Yes. Yes, Gilbert Doctorow, thank you very much for that insight and for joining us and taking the time here on News X World. And of course you can follow us here on the channel for all your Russia-Ukraine updates.

10:36
But next we move over to North America for our next update.

Transcript submitted by a reader

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ttYcjybLWBY

Diesen: 0:00
Welcome back to the program. We are joined today by Gilbert Doctorow, a historian, international affairs analyst, and also the author of the “War Diaries, the Russia-Ukraine War”. So thank you for coming back on the program. I understand that you are in St. Petersburg now.

Doctorow:
That’s correct. My wife and I maintain an apartment here. And so it’s like living at home. Of course, when you’re away from a place for five months, you forget how this apparatus or that apparatus works, how do you work the dishwasher here, that sort of thing. But otherwise, those little inconveniences are nothing compared to the pleasures of being here.

Diesen:
Well, what I wanted to discuss with you was the decline of Russia’s deterrent or at least the credibility of its deterrent. And this is quite an important matter, that is a credible nuclear deterrent kept at peace during the Cold War as both sides knew that they shouldn’t step over certain lines. Once those lines are no longer respected, one risks going further and further down the line and the further one waits to restore one’s deterrent, the more it risks to upset the entire balance. But one of the key criticisms within Russia or concerns at least within Russia has been that the Kremlin has let their deterrent become less credible. That is, over time, Russia didn’t really respond forcefully to any of NATO’s escalations, especially the long-range strikes deep into Russia, both military and commercial targets, but also what we saw back in June, the attacks on Russia’s nuclear deterrent. It appears to me that there’s some push now for a major course correction. I was wondering if you were hearing the same thing.

Doctorow: 2:06
Well, it’s obviously being debated in the highest circles of the foreign policy establishment in Moscow. And I want to make a point clear that wouldn’t be obvious to the general audience. What you and I are about to discuss is a matter of very considerable importance and attracts the attention of foreign policies professionals and defense professionals.

The general public, in light of what I’m about to say about Mr. Putin’s conduct, view him differently. They speak about the man’s gentlemanly behavior, his tolerance for the juvenile behavior or the insulting behavior of American presidents, I use the plural here, and of European leaders. And they find this credible, they’re very comfortable with that, they’re happy that we’re farther away from a war as they see it. As people who are professionals, and you certainly are the most professional, but that is really your your first speciality, We are of a different view, and the world that we live in is “might makes right”.

3:21
And so that– I’m not making a judgment, I’m making a statement of fact. In the world of geopolitics, might makes right. And the meek and the timid tend to be crushed. That is not something the general public likes to understand. They also don’t get the idea that when people are introduced to a public event, which we are told brings together the great and the good, that very distinction is foremost in the minds of the organizer of those events.

There is a distinction between great and good and powerful and people who are decent. They are not necessarily the same people. This is what we face today. And the problem that is arising now, and you’re describing it as a failing deterrent value of Russia, And we discussed this last time, as you said, there are the three components to it. And what Russia seems to be missing at present is the demonstration that it’s willing to use the wherewithal it has and the communication of that determination, both to its adversaries and to the broad public.

4:35
So this seems to be going down. It didn’t just happen yesterday. I take this back, when we’re speaking about Mr. Trump, to the period before he even took office in his first mandate in December of 2016 when the outgoing Obama administration presented him with a poison chalice when they confiscated Russian diplomatic properties in the United States. And they were expecting that that would elicit a violent response from Moscow and which would spoil relations from day one.

Well, there wasn’t any response from Moscow, any credible response. They didn’t do what they should have done then. So the weakness and the failure to respond in a traditional way and according to diplomatic tradition and rules of behavior was being violated by Mr. Putin and his administration back then. It didn’t just start yesterday and it just accumulated over time with more strategically important assets being put in jeopardy, as you just described in the introduction, without Russia providing an adequate response.

5:54
All that they have done is to emphasize from 2018 that they had world-beating military hardware, which was being put into mid-serial production and entering the armed forces. When it came to proper response to demeaning acts that were wrought by Biden, nothing happened. And so there was a confidence that built up in the United States and in Western Europe, which only Mr. Trump recently said, when he called Russia a paper tiger. Of course, all the pundits started talking about the Chinese reference, where it came from.

That’s really irrelevant. That exists as a term that we all understand today. It is a country that projects power, but is unable or unwilling to use that power or to wield a big stick when it needs to defend itself. And that’s where Russia is today. I’m perplexed.

I’m perplexed because Mr. Putin from the day he came [into] office was praised or denounced as an alpha male. The whole feminist movement at once hated his guts because he was clearly with his– bare- chested, riding horses. This man was a man of great physical presence, even if he’s small in stature. And he certainly, when he spoke about his childhood in Leningrad as a scrapper, a guy who was in the courtyards and was challenged by bullies who were always, this always happens among kids. And he stood up and struck first.

7:42
Well, where is that Mr. Putin today? Gone. Now, we’ve all, all of us who’ve been watching this war have been called out, have been shown to be false prophets repeatedly.

And we are rightly criticized by readers or viewers who point out that we have been saying and saying and saying that the end of the war is around the corner when each time a new level of escalation is introduced, which made irrelevant and inaccurate all of our projections of a near-term end to this war if it were being fought on traditional military values, where certain losses are considered to be decisive and you just withdraw from the contest, pay your fees, and look for another day.

8:40
That hasn’t happened. And so it is, I finally became very tired of making false projections. As some of my peers are still doing, that “Oh yes, the Russian economy is crumbling, the Ukrainian army is being bashed.” Well, it is being bashed, but it’s been bashed from the first month of the war.

For the first month of the war, the Russians had a 10 to 1 artillery advantage and presumably a 10 to 1 advantage in deaths and casualties. But the war didn’t stop. And as I see this confiscation of 145 billion euros in frozen assets now in Belgium. If this indeed is realized, which it may well be because the Europeans now are desperate to continue the war at whatever costs in violation of international law. And if that happens, then the war will go on for three or four more years.

9:36
You mentioned I wrote volume one. I expect to have volume two and three published in Q1, 2026. But I don’t want a whole library shelf of these volumes. I don’t think anybody wants this to go on three or four more years. And the latest statements coming out of Vladimir Putin, he’s done– we speak about the flip-flops of Trump– well, he has flip-flopped from the Thursday evening phone conversation he had with Donald Trump on the evening before the arrival of Zelensky for his latest visit to the White House, when he was stern. Oh, we were told he was stern. We, of course, didn’t have a public reading of the words, but what he said was repeated by Trump the next day to to to Zelensky, the words which we assume that he received from Putin. Because before Putin said them, Vladimir Salovyov said those same words on air. And certainly those words came to Salovyov from Putin’s people.

10:44
So those words were, “If you dare to provide Tomahawks to Ukraine, we will destroy Ukraine.” That’s pretty strong stuff. And then a week later, Putin is backtracking. And yes, he’s saying, “Oh, yes, well, we’ll no longer destroy Ukraine.” It’s “Well, that will be a real dent in our relations.” So this is not serious. If I were any of Mr. Putin’s enemies in the United States Senate, or elsewhere in the US government, or sitting in Brussels, I would say, “My goodness, that man is weak.” And weak is the opposite of deterrent force.

Disen: 11:41
Yeah, this, well, I can understand why, especially after Trump came to power, there would be some desire to favor reducing tensions as opposed to upholding the deterrent. Because in the diplomatic sphere, Russia will never see another Trump. One that has spoken friendly about Russia, said he wanted to get along, recognized that NATO expansion, on more than one occasion, he recognized this is the cause of the war. Again, there seems to be a pathway there to peace. And well, it seemed, let’s use past tense there, but also those reasonable concerns about escalation and given that the war was going Russia’s way, they didn’t want to make any waves.

But of course, the situation today is very different. We see, as you said, the pressure on Putin to do something, to retaliate is growing. I think it’s fair to say that diplomacy is dead now. Trump for all his talks, everything that was talked about in Alaska, about dealing with the underlying causes of the war, well, now he’s back on the ceasefire again. So everything they talked about, everything is now out the window. And also the sanctions on the Russian oil or, well, technically secondary sanctions, because they’re going to go after Russia’s partners, India, China.

13:18
And as you said, the Europeans essentially legalizing the theft of Russian assets to further fund the war a few more years. This is all the indicators of preventing the fall of Ukraine and keeping the war going for a few more years. But not only is the pressure on Putin, and I think there’s recognition more widely now that diplomacy is dead, but Russia stands on much firmer ground now if they now decide to go up the escalation ladder. I’m thinking then a few months ago, the Oreshnik was a, you know, a test missile. Now it’s in industrial production.

The Russians are in a much stronger place now it seems if they do want to start to restore their deterrent. But do you think this would trigger a direct war between NATO and Russia if Russia escalates or would it prevent it?

Doctorow: 14:22
First, let’s take one step back. You said everybody agrees that diplomacy is no longer an option. Everyone except Mr. Putin. In the last day, he has repeated that, well two days ago, he was speaking and saying that talking is much better than confrontation. And then he sent Mr. Dmitriev to the United States on a fool’s errand that has the image that the United States and Russia are still talking to one another and are thinking about big business in the future. This is absolutely empty show and it only demonstrates a complete lack of understanding by Mr. Putin and the people who are advising him of who Mr. Trump is, what the American administration is, and how do you deal with them. He is dead wrong. This Mr. Dmitriev’s mission is empty of content, because everything– Dmitri is a brilliant man who is very ambitious and is serving the boss of bosses with a view obviously to where his political career will go in the future.

15:35
I have no objection to that. But what he’s doing now is utterly stupid for the interests of Russia. He rewards the United States by pretending that they’re still in talking terms and have great business plans for the future, the day after the United States has slapped secondary sanctions, which– this was discussed with Trump, it was discussed with Putin, what is the outcome or the likely result of these sanctions? And Putin said, oh, we will get along, it’s not a deal. And Trump said, we’ll see how you’re doing in six months.

Between the two, I agree with Trump but I disagree with Putin. What has happened– I just did a little diversion here, we’re speaking about the secondary sanctions on the two biggest consumers, buyers of Russian oil, that is India and China. These sanctions against China are almost without effect, not just because China will stop supplying rare metals to the United States and the US industry will shut down the next day, but because China has most of its oil coming to it by pipelines, which are really in no way affected by the sanctions that have been imposed, because they are directed against seaborne oil.

16:56
India is the opposite case. India does not have a stranglehold on rare metals. It has no cudgel to use to beat back the Americans the way the Chinese do. And its oil, which is roughly the same volume as what China’s importing, is all coming by sea. And yesterday, I think it’s called Reliable. It’s a privately owned single biggest importer of Russian oil into India. And they said they’re not going to buy any more oil.

Now, that isn’t the end of the game, of course. The Russians and the Indians are probably scrambling to find workarounds for this, but there will be a loss of sales. And what does that mean for the Russian budget? Mr. Trump is right.

If we just say that the Russians cannot bring around the Indians to maintain the same level of imports, they will lose 10% of the state budget. 10%. Now they are not running a deficit because the Russian government is jointly prioritizing guns and butter. That is all social benefits are rising, indexation is going up, the standard of living of the grandma is better than it was last month. All that’s going forward.

18:18
And they have a deficit in the budget. You make a 10% hole in the budget and Russia is going to be suffering enormously. And Trump knows that, and Putin is denying it. He also knows that.

So they’ve got a big problem. He is not dealing honestly with his own people and he is not making decisions that are rational in light of the behavior of the Americans. The worst thing he could have done was to send Dmitriev to the States just after these sanctions were introduced. And the whole Dmitriev affair in general, just to back up for a moment, is total nonsense. It’s only that “We, Americans and Russians, will have great business together. We do big business.”

Yeah okay. I’ve heard that since 1975. In 1975 on, I was very deeply involved in all the big business that the United States and Russia would have. And frankly speaking, it was nil. Not because of bad will, but because the different structures of the economy.

19:35
And they simply are not, there’s nothing to harmonize, the way there was and is with Europe, where the two fit together very well. Supplier of raw materials. United States doesn’t really need Russian raw materials. And this project, this mega project, this again shows a very poor understanding of Mr. Trump. Oh, Trump is a big real estate developer. So we’ll propose to him, we’ll build an $8 billion dollar tunnel connecting Alaska and the Russian Far East.

To carry what? Nothing. There’s nothing to carry. So they were, they thought they were being very very clever with Mr. Trump and they have not been very clever. And that carries over to this question of deterrence. I think that Putin has made some very bad choices.

Sending Demetriev was the worst thing he could have done. Making that lame speech a day ago that we still have an option for diplomacy and we don’t want to confrontation. That is exactly the– directly against what you were saying, what I am saying, and what people like Dmitry Trenin and Dmitry Simes, who are really very well plugged into the power structure on foreign affairs in Russia, are saying. So there’s a problem there.

Diesen: 20:52
Yeah. I don’t understand quite why the Kremlin still thinks it has a peace president in the White House because I mean, when the United States approaches countries, the ideal scenario it has is where it is allowed to bomb other countries a little bit, like most of Middle Eastern countries. So moderate attack every now and then. And with the understanding if there’s any retaliation, then it would escalate dramatically. Now the only way you don’t end up in a situation like that is if you have a deterrent who is, that is credible. So Iran, for example, made this very clear.

Any attacks on it, it will respond and they know they will respond. So doesn’t mean a war isn’t coming, but nonetheless, it creates some caution. But we created this strange scenario now where initially it’s kind of open that the NATO countries were backing Ukraine within the war, confined within Ukraine. But then came this idea that, well, why should the war be confined here? Let’s bring it to Russia.

Now you see, again, not only did Trump put sanctions directly on Russia, which even Biden wouldn’t do, the oil, but now also having all these NATO countries, because you have now Zelensky in London with the coalition of the willing as they call themselves, discussing what long range missiles, how NATO can assist probably using these weapons and what targets to pick. And well, essentially, there’s hardly going to be any Ukrainian engagement at all. This is– we’re now in direct war. And while they’re being punched in the face, they are essentially saying, well, let’s let’s talk instead. I mean, the whole point of the turns is if– there’s a one-way hostility here, where NATO can strike Russia but Russia doesn’t respond, why would NATO talk to Russia then?

22:59
I’m just saying in political theory you often assume that countries will push and push and push until they’re pushed back. Once there’s a balance, then you start to talk and find a way of enhancing mutual security. So it is strange indeed to see that Putin hasn’t, that he still behaves as if he buys into Trump’s rhetoric, that it’s not his war, he’s trying to end it. The fact that Trump hasn’t once over the past few months now mentioned an end to NATO expansion, it just makes the whole thing look like a fraud, especially now walking back this whole idea of addressing the underlying causes. But if the Russians were to restore their deterrent now though, again, it seems like a good chance we could end up in war exactly because well, at the moment, the Europeans at least, they seem to be almost looking for a reason to pick a fight.

24:08
Every time we have a little drone near a German airport it’s defined as a hybrid war you know even though they’re arresting Germans for it. But what do you think a possible conflict could arise though? Because as the, as well, Keir Starmer is celebrating Trump’s sanctions And he said that we will keep, we will help to take Russian oil off the market. Now that we can name in many things, it could be in sanctions. It could mean start seizing Russian ships.

Again, it could mean assisting more with long-range strikes on Russian refineries. How do you see the escalations coming forward? Because it looks like NATO is preparing another round of the attacks on Russia.

Doctorow: 24:57
Well, I think that Mr. Putin’s team understands the concept of window of opportunity. The opening of the special military operation in February, 2022 was precisely based on a window of opportunity, based on the technological advantage in strategic weapons systems that Russia had satisfied itself, was operational, and could be used at any moment. Russia for the first time in 70 years was technically, strategically ahead of the United States, not three steps behind. Now that consciousness of window of opportunity, which determined the timing and the manner of the special up military operation, is exactly what’s missing now. In answer to your point, this is the moment for Russia to strike. The Europeans acknowledge that they have nothing and they are putting out and publicizing 2029 as a date when they will be ready.

26:06
Why in hell do they think that Russia’s going to sit around waiting to be struck by them because the Europeans are finally ready? If Mr. Putin’s team has any strategic thinking, they will recognize that fact and wipe out Ukraine now, before Europe can do anything. Europeans will be left wringing their hands. The Americans will say, we told you so.

And that’s where it will end. If Ukraine’s military potential, decision-making centers are taken out now, which those Oreshniks make manifestly possible, end of game, or game and match. I am dumbfounded that Putin’s team has forgotten the notion of window of opportunity. Russia will never have the same advantage it has over Europe militarily that it has at this particular moment.

Diesen: 27:13
But the whole, the ideal of a deterrent is exactly that it shouldn’t have to be used. That is, if it’s credible and communicated properly and these capabilities are evident. Now everyone knows that the capabilities are there, but it’s not credible any more. And the communication is poor. I mean, if the language would be firm to the point where NATO would read it as Russia would not have, well, the Kremlin wouldn’t have an opportunity to essentially walk it back if red lines would be violated, then it would be credible. But this is why I’m looking, one would expect a speech where President Putin would say, you know, if long range strikes with missiles operated by NATO countries strike our our land or soil, then we will do A, B and C.

If it’s made clear and they know that the Russian public wouldn’t accept anything else or the military leadership, the political leadership wouldn’t accept any walking back of very clear commitments, then they wouldn’t have to use any of their deterrent. There wouldn’t have to be a strike on Ukraine’s decision centers. They wouldn’t have to do this escalation, but I guess my concern is, as long as they don’t communicate it, you walk further and further up the escalation ladder, and when they finally do strike back, then you end up in a war situation.

Doctorow: 28:46
What I was suggesting was not a war with NATO. I was suggesting destroying Ukraine. They’re two different things. The destruction of the political elites in Kiev would be a warning. It would establish or reestablish Russian’s deterrent.

Let’s go back in history a little bit. There was 1956, there was 1968. Russia had at the time all kinds of deterrent powers in its military arsenal. But it invaded both Czechoslovakia and Hungary and it hit a fly with a hammer, and it worked, and that’s what I’m saying now. I’m not saying that they should– and there are Russian hotheads who are saying, well, we have to bomb Germany, we have to wipe out London. I’m not saying this at all.

What they have to do is go to the heart of the problem, which is the antechamber of the Russian-NATO war. It is not creating a Russian-NATO war. If Ukraine is eliminated, by the method I’m saying, and it’s not my idea, I’m repeating what is on– the words of well-respected Russian thinkers. All right, there is disputes over how well-respected Mr. Karaganov is, but nonetheless, He is a major figure in the political establishment of Russia.

30:19
And so at that level, and I say even less than that level, because he was speaking about using a tactical nuclear weapon in Western Europe to demonstrate Russia’s willingness to go all the way if necessary. I think the sword is needed. Oreshniks destroying a few hundred people in downtown Kiev who are the regime, could do the job and reestablish Russia’s deterrence to all of the war-hungry people who happen to be the heads of government in Western Europe.

Diesen: 30:59
This is the risk though, when you let your deterrent become weakened, if not undermined completely, suddenly you do get these proposals from quite respected people who argue for use of tactical nuclear weapons against European countries in order to restore the deterrent. This wouldn’t have been an issue.

I mean, I think if … they would have upheld it, that’s what I meant at the onset, that is, I think the whole, both sides, the world in general, it loses when one of the great powers lets its deterrent slip. This is when there will be an overcompensation later on. It just feels like, based on the shift in rhetoric and also the situation on the ground, the accessibility now of the Oreshnik on a much larger scale, it looks like we’re reaching that point where the retaliation will come. But if this is the case, one would expect to see a change in rhetoric because if, if, President Putin stepped up the rhetoric, then perhaps, they wouldn’t have to go to the extent of actually using this weapons.

Doctorow:
He doesn’t have to personally step up the rhetoric, but he has to stop calling, rebuking the person in his government who was best able to do that. I’m speaking about Sergei Ryabkov. Ryabkov is the one who in December 2021 presented the ultimatum or the draft agreements which were in fact an ultimatum to Washington and to NATO. That either go back voluntarily, withdraw your establishment of NATO, the structures, to where they were in 1997, or we will push you back. Now that’s pretty tough language. And the same Ryabkov is the one who was slapped down by Putin less than a week ago for saying what you just said at the start of this conversation. That diplomacy has outlived its usefulness.

So these people like Ryabkov, and there aren’t too many like him. He’s really quite outstanding and brave because he knew what he was heading into when he said that. He knew that he was putting his career in jeopardy when he said that. They’re there inside the government, not on state television.

And the– what worries me most of all, is something that’s going to sound a bit peculiar, I think, to viewers. We have been living with the neocon stories about appeasement. We cannot deal with this dictator in Iraq. We cannot deal with these people in Libya and so on. We cannot appease them and so forth. And always with a reference back to Chamberlain and his speech of “peace in our time” after his meeting with Hitler, and the surrender of the Sudetenland. All of that was rubbish. It was pure propaganda. But what I heard Mr. Putin saying a day and a half ago was a Chamberlain speech. And that got me very unhappy.

Diesen: 34:41
So that’s, I guess, a final question. Do you have any predictions where we’re heading now though? Because you make it sound like Putin is standing his ground. I got the impression that he was making a bit of a shift, that a response could be coming again. I’m not certain in this, but that’s the impression I was left with.

Doctorow:
Well, I hope you’re right. But I’m dismayed that he sent off Dmitriev, because that undermines any such notion of his move from expectation of productive diplomacy to restoring Russia’s deterrent power by communications and by show of grit. I don’t know. None of us knows what he’s going to do next.

But he has been inconsistent in the last two or three weeks, and I think you’ll agree with me. As inconsistent in his own way as Trump is. One of the criticisms I have from colleagues, confidentially on the side, not in a public dispute, is that Putin has to behave this way because he gets reports from Russian psychologists who have done readings on Trump and his volatility. And the man is unpredictable and such a dangerous person has his finger on the nuclear start and therefore they are playing with Trump in this way.

36:33
I don’t believe that at all. From my way of thinking, Mr. Trump is a good Christian, a real believer, a family man, and the last thing he wants to see is the United States, including his own family, incinerated. So I wouldn’t worry for a minute about Trump rushing Hegsteth. I don’t believe any of this. I think people are trying to cover their backsides for being apologists for Putin.

I’m not an apologist for anybody. We’ve gone through this question before. I’m just trying to keep reading it as I see it. And maybe you’re right, I hope you’re right, that he has definitely seen the light and will be tougher and a better protector of Russia’s interests, but I’m not persuaded yet.

Diesen: 37:25
Well, my impression of the Trump administration was that they are quite transactional but also pragmatic, that they do assess their policies based on cost-benefit analysis.

So previously, people like Marco Rubio was asked, why don’t you push more sanctions on Russia? And his response was, well, that would derail the possible possibility for diplomacy. But then the Russians removed this cost. So I’m saying, no, no, no, you can sanction all our oil companies and we’ll send Dmitriev the next day over to the US to discuss a peace tunnel. I mean, it’s– you would think they would be communicating more costs by escalating, but no, this is very, it’s very dangerous.

Again, people often interpret this as Putin, you know, being trying to preserve the peace or something, but as we discussed, when the deterrent weakens, you know, peace becomes more fragile. It’s more likely now that there would be war. One, again, everyone would lose from. But yes, let’s see what happens. I get the sense now that something is shifting in Moscow, but it remains to be seen. Anyways, thank you so much for taking the time.

Doctorow: 38:51
Well, very kind of you.