Transcript submitted by a reader
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsAk2E2YWl0
Diesen: 0:00
Hi everyone and welcome back. We are joined today by Gilbert Doctorow, historian, international affairs analyst, and also author of
_War Diaries: the Russia-Ukraine War_. So welcome back to the program.
Doctorow:
Well, very good to be with you.
Diesen:
So China, they used to be a leading power in the world for a few thousands of years until the mid-19th century when they were defeated by the British and they went from being the leading power to a country pillaged and purged by others, great powers. So this is what the Chinese refer to as a century of humiliation from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th.
0:44
Now, we’ve had now Europeans being quite powerful for some would put it as 500 years, if not dominant. And it appears that Europe is falling down pretty quickly. That is some concern that Europe might be entering its own century of humiliation. I’m not sure how you see the situation, what is going on in Europe these days, because one can look at the security problems, one can look at the economics not going well, the political stability, but in the overarching picture, one gets the impression that Europe no longer has a seat at the table, but it’s looking at the risk of becoming mere pieces moved across a board. How do you see the situation of Europe at the moment?
Doctorow:
It is lamentable. And for a number of reasons, a number of dimensions, the ones that you touched upon, of course, are highly relevant. The question that we discussed in the weeks gone by was the low level, low political intelligence, the low level of competence, which is very distressing. I’m speaking now of the leadership.
There’s 25 of the 27 member states of the European Union plus the United Kingdom where you have the same display of very low level people running the show. Institutions that were built, but I’m thinking now of the European institutions, going back to the 1990s, when you had brilliant socialist-minded, let’s be open about it, intellectuals like Jacques Delors who were working to create a united Europe, a future-looking Europe, a harmonized Europe, and they created institutions without paying– to my understanding today– without paying enough attention to balance of powers and to ensuring a genuine democracy. They assumed that people like themselves, highly intelligent, highly educated, well-meaning, outgoing, would succeed them. And here’s where there’s a great fallacy. We had institutions in Europe which can be abused and which violate all the principles of democracy. And that’s what we have today, when someone like von der Leyen has grabbed all the power, and around her there is silence.
3:19
And there’s reason for the silence. Sadly, it comes from the way that the European institutions were engineered in the early new millennium to sacrifice the sovereignty of individual member states. That was done consciously to the point where, as one former Belgian prime minister said publicly, the level of power of a head of state in Europe today is equivalent to the powers of a mayor in the past.
Now that is bad enough within Europe. What we see currently, what is particularly, say discouraging, is that Europe as a whole has given up its sovereignty, not just individual member states passing to Brussels decision-making, which had in the past been at this national level, but the whole of Europe has given up sovereignty to the United States, in the hope of buying off Trump and ensuring the backing, the military defense backing of the United States for Europe against Russia, since all of these gentlemen and ladies were scared out of their boots at the start of the Special Military Operation, when they realized, very correctly, that they had no armies, that they had no air defense, that they were totally at the mercy of Russia if the United States did not step in and provide all of the equipment that Europe doesn’t have to protect Europe.
5:14
So that is the present situation. That explains the economic damage that we see as well. Because in sacrificing everything to keep Mr. Trump on board, the leaders of Europe have compromised the future prosperity of the whole continent.
Diesen: 5:41
The French, though, for a long time, for many years, they talked about the prospect of a common army as a reason for the point of integrating Europe.
And they called for greater autonomy from the United States, again, something that they did all the way since the 1990s. They did recognize that if they wanted stability, they would have to find a role for Russia in Europe, not simply say that they have to stand on the sideline even though they’re the largest country and they shouldn’t have a say. So they seemed to recognize all the right things. But these days, they seem to have gone a bit off the rails. They no longer pursue a clear policy of strategic autonomy or European independence. And how do you see the political crisis raging now in France? Because it’s hardly stable. Is this rooted in economics or is it internal politics? Is it a security issue? How can we understand these tremendous changes?
Doctorow: 6:51
There are fragile governments in the locomotive countries of Europe, both France and Germany, and in the now outsider, but still very important partner in European defense in the UK.
All three countries have fragile situations, but they are fragile largely for domestic reasons. Domestic fight for power, for banned policies that are unpopular and have brought down, in the case of France, brought down several governments and probably will soon bring about the newest government that Macron installed, for his defense minister to replace Beyrou after that prime minister faced and lost the vote of confidence.
7:41
What is the volatility in France is largely on domestic issues. And the same can be said in Germany. The only area where geopolitics and what interests you and me and most of the viewers of this program, the only weak spot, but a very important weak spot in Europe right now is the European institutions, and particularly the European Commission.
There is now pending, I believe it’s a few weeks from now, one or possibly two different votes of confidence against Ursula von der Leyen. And the most important one was introduced by Viktor Orban, by his group called the Patriots for Europe. I think about a quarter of the members of the European Parliament are, announced themselves, as members of this bloc.
And it comes from– his confidence in making this direct attack on von der Leyen– comes from a victory he was given by the European Court of Justice over the punishments, withholding funds, the kind of blackmail that von der Leyen has used against Hungary to punish them for violating Brussels’-made rules on immigration, which are very lax and which Hungary, the Orban government disagrees with, and has established in Hungary much harsher rules for admitting immigrants or refugees or whatever you want to call them.
9:38
He won that. And this was quite dramatic. And since this is not the first time I mention this, nor is it the first time I’m mentioning on air the pending votes of confidence, I want to explain since people have asked, “Oh, Mr. Doctorow, where’s your source? The _Financial Times_. So I’m not relying on alternative media for these basic facts, that he won a victory, Orban, and that he’s pursuing her. It’s not the only case, but having spoken about 10 days ago with a very well-informed and non-aligned– that limits the possible people I’m talking about to 30 in the European Parliament. One of them spoke with me and said that he believes that Ursula will be thrown out of office within six months.
It could be she’ll be thrown out of office within two weeks or three weeks. What that means is the whole Commission will go. Now, I don’t mean to say that the European Parliament would change from its present globalist anti-Russian, very censorious policies to something more civilized and looking for peace on the continent. That isn’t going to happen overnight. But Ursula von der Leyen has assembled a group of incompetents who are coming from the most viciously anti-Russian part of Europe, the Baltic states, and who are totally dependent on protection from her, which she deals out in good measure.
11:28
Therefore, these people will be swept away. And perhaps in the fighting for commissioned seats, the larger members of the European community who are less radical and more reasonable will assume seats. That isn’t a dramatic change in Europe, but it’s an important step towards revival of common sense and a less hostile view towards the neighbor to the east, and perhaps a step back from the militarization that is now the official policy of the EU as led by von dert Leyen.
Diesen:
Well, we always have to look at the extent to which some of these policies are coming from the EU institutions or the member states. But to have people like Kallas, so in a key position as the EU foreign policy chief, is quite concerning.
I’m sure you watched the recent speech she made where she argued that the Russians and the Chinese believe that they defeated fascism, that they had a leading role in this. And she was saying, well, this is what people think when they don’t read books. I mean, it’s quite extraordinary that you can have a person in such a prominent position who doesn’t seem to be aware of the leading role that the Chinese and the Russians had in defeating the fascists.
But I did want to ask you though about von der Leyen, and to what extent her involvement in the EU is, for example, influencing the efforts of stealing, or seizing they say, Russian sovereign funds. Because what we read now in the _Financial Times_ and other papers is that the EU would like to take the money, but they want to pretend to still abide by international law and not stealing the assets of the Russian central bank.
So they are looking at what they call creative legality or legally creative measures, which entails taking the Russian money, but using it to buy zero interest EU bonds. And somehow this will make it legal, the theft. So, I mean, this is, again, a great exercise in self-harm, but is this coming from the von der Leyens, or is this something that is being pushed by member states?
Doctorow: 14:19
Well, some member states indeed have been behind this, but I would look at von der Leyen. She is a law unto herself. And I say not just because she is so ambitious, but because everyone around her are cowards.
They are cowards. They’re the leaders of Europe by and large are cowards. Now when you mentioned the policies in Europe, and we’re speaking about EU member states, I want to take a step aside and what is the UK doing? And I want to reflect on what King Charles said in the banquet, the state banquet with 160 invitees that took place yesterday in honor of Donald Trump. King Charles said that we, Britain and the United States, have stood shoulder to shoulder, well, I’m not, I’m paraphrasing what he said, in two world wars.
15:16
Now we stand together to protect Europe from, well, what was his word? Tyranny. Tyranny, exactly right. Tyranny. There you have it in a nutshell.
England, this is the coming from Starmer, but it’s not just from Starmer. Most of the British elites and governing class, whether they call themselves Laborer or call themselves Conservative, they have this deeply distorted propagandistic approach to security in Europe.
So when you look at von der Leyen, she is not unique, except that she has the authority, absent any protests or challenges, to direct where Europe is headed, in the absolutely wrong direction, of course. And that is what– the fulcrum may shift if she loses a vote of no confidence. I’m told that she held on by her fingernails in the last vote of confidence, which is over her handling of contracts for the covid vaccine.
And then lack of transparency in negotiations and actually the violation of her authority as Commission President. So this vote which will also have transparency among the non-transparency as a fundamental accusation against her, It may go against her. We’ll see. But looking at France, yes, the French government may fall and indeed, even Mr. Macron, who according to the French constitution has royal powers essentially for five years, theoretically he cannot be removed.
17:18
But he may go, because his unpopularity is so overwhelming. It all depends on the intensity of the demonstrations that have begun in France over the new government and over policy, the budget and so forth. They will not name militarism and his increase, his budgetary plans to increase spending on arms and on Ukraine while everything else in the budget is slashed, it may not be over that. But at the end of the day, who cares? If he falls, he will not be replaced by anyone who is so pigheaded and unrealistic as he is. And that can only be to the good.
18:10
As for Mr. Merz, he is, of course, doing better. They just had state elections in Germany, in the Western Lander. And for his party, they claimed great satisfaction that they hadn’t lost any seats. They held their own in percentage of the votes. However, their coalition partners, the SPD, the socialists, took a beating. And the main beneficiary of the lost seats of the socialists was the Alternative for Deutschland, Ms. Alice Weidel, who was picking up more power. And the question is, at what point will the fragility of the coalition be its downfall and the Chancellor be forced to call new elections, as a result of which it is very likely we’ll see him removed from office, simply because it became apparent not long after his taking power that he is deeply unpopular.
19:20
So a change in Germany, of course, would also be a great benefit to those of us who are hoping for a return to samity, as opposed to what he’s been saying of late about Russia, generally, about Europe’s needs, defense needs. Indeed, Europe needs defense needs. And going back to your remarks, the question of European Army, indeed, that goes back decades. I was looking not long ago at, I think it was 2014, 2015, there was a study by CEPs, a think tank, a major think tank in Brussels, which had Solana, the former head of diplomacy and military policy of the EU, he headed it and other people of great experience in the EU institutions were on the team performing this study of a European army. A result of which was the conclusion that, yes, we can try to proceed with this, but we don’t have the money.
20:35
This sounds very familiar judging from 2025. They don’t have the money and they also didn’t have a consensus of what they need because going back several decades, the issues in Europe over a united army were who’s the enemy, where the threats coming from? Spain and France looked south traditionally. Germany looked east traditionally. And the needs, the military needs for these different threats [are] entirely different.
That was a major impediment back then to creating a European-wide army. And I don’t know that has been resolved or can be resolved.
Diesen: 21:18
Well, that is a key problem though for Europe. I mean, this, the unity or relative unity we’ve had across Europe since World War II, it is unusual for our continent. And it’s worth looking at the distribution of power it actually happened because in the bipolar world the Europeans had to unite under the leadership of the United States because of the obvious threat from the Soviet Union.
And then that was replaced with a unipolar world after the Cold War. And this, I think, was organized around the principle of collective hegemony or unipolarity for the United States with the Europeans aspiring to be its equal partner through the collective bargaining power in the European Union. And also this was the reason for the United States to prioritize Europe and its foreign policy, which would prolong the relevance for Europe. But I guess it looks as if one of the key challenges for Europe is how can it have a role in a multipolar world where the key centers of power are the United States, Russia, China, lesser extent India. And did Americans want to pivot away from Europe?
22:34
I mean, in such a system, what actually unites Europe? Can we live without a Russian bogeyman or even in the security issue, as you said, they see threats from different areas. But if we would unite around economic issues, collective bargaining power, do we even have the same economic interests? Surely if the Germans would look at their national interests, they would seek to patch up with Russia very quickly. While, yeah, the polls will be more concerned about both the German and Russian power. You would have the Spanish Portuguese looking in completely different directions.
I mean, did you see Europe surviving without, Russian bogeyman? I mean, what happens after this war is over? Is this the end of the European unity?
Doctorow: 23:23
No, I think Europe can survive very well without the Russian bogeyman. It has to take a step back. The idea of Europe playing a geopolitical role is new. The European uniting forces were economic. Now if that sounds weak, let’s remember that until the United States started poking the Chinese in the eye, China was very happy to be an economic force and not a military force. Now, same thing with Europe. There is nothing to be embarrassed about by not looking to be a self-standing worldwide policeman and to be one of the world’s largest economies and most attractive and vital economies.
24:14
Not to mention the cultural factor. I’m speaking to you today from Venice, and the cultural factor is all around me, and it’s not bad. It’s brought in hordes of American tourists right now, even at the end of the season. That’s what Europe was until they got into their heads, and this is partly the achievement of Ursula van der Leyen, that Europe has to be a geopolitical force. Wrong.
They don’t need a bogeyman in Russia. They can do very well just being one of the world’s biggest economies, biggest and most attractive markets and a center of global civilization. That’s my answer to your question.
Diesen: 25:09
Well, one of my favorite scholars on European integration is David Mitrani, who wrote back in the 1960s that, well he predicted that Europe could take two paths towards integration. He called one the functionalist, where they would integrate in areas where it delivered specific benefits in terms of good governance, security or economic competitiveness.
And in other words, the form would be dictated by the purpose and then the alternative model he called the federalism, where he already had a goal in terms of form. He would want to centralize power and create the United States of Europe. And in this area, you would look for areas to integrate for the mere purpose of integrating, irrespective of serving economic or security interests.
And I guess his, well, his prediction was that many of the Europeans, especially the Germans, would push for the federalist model, that is the United States of Europe. And his prediction was this would not actually look like the United States of America, but more like Soviet Union, because it would force the integration through.
So if it doesn’t make sense, if you can’t convince the public that this delivers better economic benefits or security benefits or better governance, then it would have to be more or less forced and not responding to the national interests. And this would then fuel a lot of resistance over time. It seems at least to me that some of these predictions seem kind of fair. But do you see any signs of a pre-revolutionary moment in Europe, that is, the political leadership lacking in legitimacy, people willing to experiment with radical alternatives? I’m not sure I put AfD necessarily in radical, but what are you expecting, I guess, over the months ahead?
Doctorow:
When you read the literature, the federalists that you’ve mentioned in passing, it all seems reasonable and may sound very progressive. That’s how they position themselves, as being progressive, to take Europe one step higher and one step further. But when you look at how that plays out in practice, these are our class enemy. They are, all of these, they are globalists. Who are they?
To name names. All right. My home state is Belgium, and one of its former prime ministers, Kiefer Hofstad, was one of the leading personalities in the Federalist movement, and head of a group, a bloc within the EU that was called Aldi. And that group, after Mr. Macron came to power, merged with Macron’s reform group, forming a very significant block in the present day parliament, and they are all federalists.
28:25
Now, when you look at what those federalists want to do and what Kiefer Hofstad wanted to do, he and their group are [a keyword] who are talking exactly the talk of von der Leyen. It’s a continuum of all of the ideologically driven, anti-Russian, uniting around the enemy, about opposition to that enemy, that we see around us today. So these principles, which sound very nice to a political scientist, are not self-standing. They are attached to a whole worldview in other domains. Economics and sovereignty and open immigration, as no borders.
29:21
All of these things come together in the persons of the champions of federalism. Now it may be an accident or maybe there’s something deeply philosophical uniting these trends.
Diesen:
Well, I’m glad before you mentioned Britain, because it takes me to my last question that is with this comment of tyranny, we see that, well, historically when countries are ramping up for war, they like to present conflicts very much in one-dimensional terms of black and white, good versus evil, to rally support and discredit any dissent. But once there’s defeat or doesn’t look like it’s going our way, you would expect the rhetoric to change a bit along the lines of the United States now, now that the recognizing the war hasn’t gone that well.
30:23
You would then begin to humanize your opponent. You would identify legitimate security concerns of the other side and look for ways to harmonize interests, because you can’t really harmonize when it’s a struggle between good and evil. Yet as you mentioned from the United Kingdom that they’re still talking about tyranny, the fight against tyranny as if this is some cosplay or replay of World War II. How do you see the possibility of, I guess, new political forces emerging in this climate? Because at the moment, anything is seen as treasonous. Any political force coming up opposing the war rhetoric would be seen as more or less traitors, Putinists, apologists for Russia.
They don’t care enough about Ukraine. Do you see anyone in Europe possibly breaking through this? Because anyone who seems to want to have a serious chance of challenging the status quo kind of has to fall in line with this rhetoric, that they’re fighting against the most recent reincarnation of Hitler.
Doctorow: 31:39
Well, we know that there are at least two personalities. I spoke of 25 out of 27 European leaders who are incompetent or caught happily living in a bubble of propaganda, I didn’t include two. That is Mr. Urbán and Fico. So they are sane people who appreciate what you’re just saying. Coming back though to Britain, it is a really sad case. They are the biggest foot-draggers in a return to realism. And the remarks which King Charles was hand-fed by his government, which is normal, that’s the way it goes.
It’s been going in Britain for a couple of hundred years, and the speeches are written by the government. But I suspect that Charles himself deeply feels the same way. And this is, they are going to be last to be pulled screaming and shouting into the new world which is possibly coming rather quickly, if the Russians continue their acceleration of their offensive against, in Ukraine. I am hopeful that these things will come together, but as I said there are different levels of the cause for optimism. The greatest one, because it’s directly on a geopolitical issue, is in the EU institutions.
33:09
The luck element of Europe turning away from its present policies to something more reasonable and realistic [is] in the three key countries that we discussed. I really have nothing further to add on that issue. We keep our fingers crossed, but then frankly speaking, I’ve been keeping my fingers crossed on various hopeful signs, either in the US or in Europe, for the whole duration of the special military operation. These hopeful things have not panned out, but I think we’re coming to the end where this optimism will finally be rewarded.
Diesen:
Well, on that, let me just add the last follow-up question here, because I’ve listened to people like Alastair Crook, who’s also been a British diplomat for a long time.
And people like him, they expect that what is required for Europe to essentially wake up from its 30-year slumber or dreaming away about this end of history and its enduring central role in the world is an actual, well, a big defeat or at least feeling the consequences of its wrong policies. Essentially forcing some of the key politicians to have to be held accountable and to reconsider some of the policies. [He] and others suspect that this would likely come from defeat in the proxy war in Ukraine.
34:54
So since you mentioned that we might be reaching the end of this, do you see a critical shift on the battlefield? Given, I mean, there’s been this gradual disintegration or collapse or weakening at least of the Ukrainian army, but it does appear that this, what we’re witnessing now is something quite fatal.
Doctorow:
Well yes, I’ve said for some time, that I expect the war to end in a political collapse in Ukraine, not in the whole army running the other way and or holding up white flags.
I don’t think that’s going to happen. But the losses are so considerable, the inability to cover the holes in the front are so obvious to everyone now, that I think the end of the war is nigh. How the war ends, in what kind of a document, to what extent there will be general recognition of Russia’s basic objectives as legitimate, that remains to be seen. It is very hopeful that Mr. Trump has done as you said, has begun to humanize the enemy and has denied the latest false flag operations, these drone attacks in Poland and Romania.
36:23
This is all to the good. It doesn’t solve all problems. But just to take a step back, just looking at European history and the Dickens’ famous line about the French Revolution, the best of times and the worst of times, it always was that way and probably always will be that way, so long as human beings are around. And again, what I see around here in this hub of European culture is something so attractive and so sublime that it addresses all people who have open ears and open eyes. The collapse of European civilization is certainly exaggerated as an issue.
And I believe even in Russia, of course, any Russian viewers watching this will immediately attack me over this. But it’s not just fifth- column people in Russia who have great love for European culture and feel themselves to be Europeans. That is an absolute truth. So it’ll take time to heal the wounds, but they will be patched up. And therefore I’m not pessimistic for the long run about Europe coming to its senses and saving for itself a place in the world, not a geopolitical place in the world. That’s clear.
Diesen:
Well, I hope you’re correct. I would like to see some revival in Europe, but I do think that the secret, though, is to start with, look for, ways of reviving Europe as a non-hegemonic power, not out of some idealist aspirations, but simply as a recognition of reality, because I think this ignoring reality is coming at an increasingly high cost.
38:28
But I’m, rarely we end on a very positive note, so on the possible revival of Europe, it looks like a good place to wrap up.
Doctorow:
Well, we’re in completely agreement.
Gilbert Doctorow 