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Diesen:
Hi everyone and welcome back. We are joined again by Gilbert Doctorow, historian, international affairs analyst and author of “The War Diaries – The Russia-Ukraine War”. So yeah, welcome back. It’s always great to see you.

Doctorow:
Good, a pleasure.

Diesen:
So as the Ukraine war appears to be entering its, if not final stage, at least the final stages, at least some things appears to be moving in that direction, It’s worth exploring what the relationship between the Europeans and Russia would look like after the war. And I guess a good case study would be to look at some of the comments coming from Finland. That is, the meeting between Trump and Europeans in the White House was interesting for a variety of reasons. But the interactions with President Stubbe of Finland was interesting, I guess, because he made several comments. He referred to Finland’s own historical experience with peace with Russia, but also the possibility of renewing relations with Russia after the end of this war. I was wondering what you read into this comment.

Doctorow: 1:19
I think Stubb’s remarks got far more attention at high levels in Russia than it did in the West. In the West, well, I for one was confused by what he meant. Is this supposed to be a recommendation to Ukraine to see how well Finland had done after a nasty war with Russia? … Finland’s participation on the side of Hitler against Russia was ended by a 1944 peace between the Soviet Union and Finland in which Finland ceded a lot of territory to Russia.

So that could sound like it was a recommendation to Kiev as to what to do. On the other hand, as after some thought and with reflecting on what Sergei Lavrov had to say about it the day after Stubb made his remarks, I come to a different conclusion that bears on your question, how Europe will deal with Russia as the war closes. It is important to note the remarks, the comments on Stubb that were made by Lavrov in an interview that was on Russian state television the next day. In this he reminded everyone what was that 1944 agreement all about? What did it contain? Why was it concluded?

2:37
It wasn’t just that Finland was changing alliances in an abstract or formal way. It is the fact that Finland was an active participant in the atrocities that the Germans oversaw and encouraged in the siege of Leningrad, that they did various acts of barbarism, which the Russians have slowly taken out of their archives. The Russians have a lot of goods on many countries in Europe, including the level of participation of the Belgians or the French in the military forces of Germany on Russian territory, which outweigh in their figures anything resembling the forces of the opposition resistance movements in these countries which everybody has celebrated, including the Russians, formally till now. Well, so they’re taking things out of the archives, which are not very pretty, but would have gotten in the way of reestablishing normal relations with the various countries that participated with Germany in the assault on Russia.

3:50
In the case of Finland, he was mentioning, yes, they committed these atrocities and some images of this were put up on the television screen, on Russian state television. And they concluded in 1944, seeing which way the war was going, which was coming to a conclusion against Germany, they decided to change sides, which they did at a considerable price. But that agreement, that peace treaty had conditions which Mr. Stubb didn’t mention, but Mr. Lavrov did.

Precisely, Finland was obliged to maintain in perpetuity neutrality. It was obliged not to enter into any military bloc directed against Russia. And there you have it, they joined NATO. So, Mr. Stubb did not go into that aspect of what his country had agreed to.

4:42
But let me move on from that to further consideration of what he may have meant. It came out a day later when he said, without any particular reference why he was saying it, that Finland sought to reestablish relations with Russia. One could read between the lines “normal relations with Russia after the war ended because after all we are neighbors, direct neighbors”. Well, that was quite a signal of a change in position.

The Russians immediately pounced on it and asked, well, why do you wait? You can reestablish relations with us right now. We’re not the ones who broke them off, you are.

He didn’t respond to that challenge. But it does indicate something that I think we will see a lot of in the coming weeks as the war comes to its conclusion, which will be a military defeat that is universally recognized and even in Ukraine. So some sort of treaty will be negotiated.

5:50
And that is that the smaller countries will probably be the first ones to leave this 27 nation wide consolidated opinion on Russia that the EU has maintained for most of the last three years. They are the ones who are most to suffer by the weakened economies resulting from the sanctions and their impact on inflation and on jobs in Western Europe. I live in Belgium. And I can tell you that right now, the country is experiencing severe economic pain. We’re not far from one of the premier commercial avenues, boulevards in Brussels, the Avenue Louise, and there are a lot of empty restaurants and storefronts.

I am sitting now in Knokke. Knokke is the most elegant, most prestigious resort on the North Sea, on sea coast of Belgium. And there are vacancies on the digue, on the seafront, and on a few of the major retail districts. This is unthinkable. This is the most prosperous part of Belgium, and there are vacancies.

There are restaurants that have gone out of business. Some of them are rather large. So I have a relative whose employment has been related to as a son-in-law, whose employment is related to marketing. And he was meeting with his confreres, with his fellow practitioners in marketing, preparing films for advertising and marketing. And they’re all suffering. Marketing is the first thing to go in the budget lines of corporations when they see the economy is sinking.

7:53
So here in little Belgium and in a place like Finland and in many of the smaller countries which have been dependent on Germany as a locomotive to keep them all doing well, now that Germany is officially in recession, continuing in recession, they are all suffering and they cannot afford to continue the sanctions on Russia, particularly after the war ends and there’s no logical reason for them to continue it.

Even in France, I wonder how long Mr. Macron can sing his aggressive songs about Russia and the coalition of the willing and so forth. He’s about to face the fall of his government as Prime Minister Beyrou has announced that it’s impossible for him to accept changes to the budget, which he has prepared, a very strict budget because the country now is experiencing a severe decline in its creditworthiness and is paying a premium price, even above Italy and Greece and other rather weak economies that we traditionally speak of as having high bond rates, because the markets do not give them good grades for managing the economy, France is now above, paying higher rates of interest on its bonds than those countries.

9:31
This cannot continue because France will be penalized. It may find itself in the arms of the IMF if this goes on much longer. Therefore, considering these weaknesses, France among the big countries is the worst case, although Britain isn’t doing very well. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is facing severe criticism because their budget is going into serious deficit and they have been unable to cut costs. And so they face the very unpleasant task of raising taxes. So these are two out of three countries that are facing up to credit problems, all resulting from a weak economy and from the enhanced military expenses if they are assuming to wage war against Russia in 2029.

10:34
These are, I say the big countries are just beginning to see it. The smaller countries are feeling it. But now Mr. Stubb, I think, is the first swallow here to fly by, a new changing direction of politics within the EC, the European Union over relations with Russia.

Diesen:
It’s certainly interesting that after the war is done and everyone, the overly hardened position has to be loosened up. This could be something that fractures the Europeans as well. It’s often pointed out that once the war is over, the Americans might leave, but it’s also interesting that the Europeans might end up taking very different approaches. But who do you think would be the most hardliners within Europe and who would run fastest to try to mend some ties?

Doctorow: 11:30
Well, the … mending of ties, as I say, will be the small countries who are badly hurt by the weakened economy of Germany in particular because they were so dependent on its maintaining the GDP growth in Europe as a whole. The hardliners, well, two days ago, there was a two-page broadsheet interview with a professor of European, a specialist in European security at the University of Lille in France, that was featured on the most important economic or finance daily in Belgium, the “Écho de la bourse”.

12:18
And there you had the logic for the hardliners. Note that Belgium always French- speaking Belgium, always looks to what the French are doing and saying. They take them as the etalon, as the high standard for what should center in public discussion in Belgium itself. This Leo professor was saying, he was very quite intelligent and quite open with his observations on Mr. Trump and Europeans’ handling of Trump, which was interesting because it contradicts what many of my peers and myself included have thought about the European understanding of Trump. That they were taken in, that they don’t see that he is using them.

No, no. This professor was acknowledging that Trump may very well be trying to deceive them and trying to string them along, but their response to that falls within certain limits what they can do. One is they can turn that back on him or they can directly oppose him or two, they can humor him and throw carrots to him as the professor said and show him every politesse, every sign of respect, which they did.

13:57
But without themselves believing that this would change his course, that there would be a pivot back to the pro-European, anti-Russian positions. The logic is different. The logic is: don’t do anything to upset his plans. Let Mr. Putin do that for us. Because they don’t believe that Putin will follow the recommendations or diktat of Trump regarding a meeting with Zelensky and an early conclusion of what will now be a peace treaty rather than a ceasefire.

So they expect that to fall through and they want Putin to take the brunt of Mr. Trump’s dissatisfaction rather than to point to them as having spoiled it, something that would have happened if they hadn’t stood in the way. So that is a more nuanced approach to what Europe is doing than I have seen anyone else say, and I take my hat off to them. At the same time, his overall logic I think explains very well what’s going on in the mind of Mr. Macron and people around him or Mr. Stammer, namely that in no way should this war end in a treaty that compromises Ukraine’s sovereignty, its ability to conclude alliances with anyone it wants, its ability to maintain an army of the kind that it wants for its security and so forth.

With the idea that Ukraine will always be a reserve force of 800,000 man army ready to help Europe at any moment. That is to say, very close to what Mr. Zelensky has been saying, that he is a defender of Europe. If, for example, says this professor, the Russians should move on Estonia, but we could open a second front with the help of Ukraine.

So that is the logic that I have. And it’s exactly what Mr. Putin had in mind when he opened the special military operation: to make that kind of relationship impossible by imposing neutrality limitations on the Ukrainian size of its army and de-Nazification, that’s to say regime change.

There you have it. As I said, I take this professor from l’Ille as being a very good exponent and explainer of what is probably going through the minds of many of his peers in the academic advisors to Mr. Macron and possibly, probably their equivalents in Germany and in England.

Diesen: 17:01
Yes, Stoltenberg, when he was a NATO secretary general, said something similar to that. If the Ukrainians are victorious, then the benefit would be to have as a partner state an army with hundreds of thousands of men who would be battle hardened on the Russian border who would then function as a shield more or less. So I think this is what Europeans want at the end of this war. They can’t accept a neutral Ukraine which can’t be used as an instrument possibly to deter.

But this is why I found the comments by Alexander Stubb interesting as well, because his argument was more or less that Russia cannot be appeased, it must be contained. And this was kind of the lessons that they had with, historical lessons they had with Russia. But it seems that it would be the opposite because from my perspective, the main lesson that should be learned is the security competition you should avoid on the borders of other great powers because a lot of Finland’s experience with the Soviet Union was exactly back in ’39 when the Soviets feared that Finland was too close to, well, Leningrad which is now St. Petersburg, and the Germans could use this in the future as a northern flank against them.

18:20
So they had fought in the winter war. But after this, the Finns indeed, they did join the invasion of the Soviet Union on the side of Hitler, partly to regain their territory, of course. But when they were defeated, they accepted a peace that entailed territorial concessions, but also permanent neutrality. And the whole idea then would be not to be an instrument of security competition between the great powers. So take yourself out of this and by doing this, the Soviets wouldn’t have anything to fear from Finland and they wouldn’t have to go against the Finns.

And to a large extent, the story of Finland is a great success story of neutrality. This massive border, yet no more problems through permanent neutrality. I mean, it’s pragmatic, it shows neutrality works, they ensure their independence, sovereignty, peace. So often people would then look to Finland, why wouldn’t this be a good model for Ukraine?

19:22
But instead of making Ukraine into Finland, we’re doing the opposite. Finland is becoming a frontline like Ukraine. And this is the whole point. When Finland joined NATO in 2023, they changed this power balance. I guess when President Staib says that they want to revive relations after this war, to what extent is it possible to go back to the same? Because now Finland is the largest NATO frontline against the Russians and the Russians are rebuilding the Leningrad military district. It’s a response to this reality, which means that the border with Finland as it’s ended its neutrality will become more militarized.

We have countries like the Baltic states, Poland talking about Finland in NATO allows the Baltic Sea to become a NATO lake. We’re seeing more preparation for a fight or confrontation in the Arctic. It does seem that Finland is becoming a frontline state though. So how possible is it to actually go back, try to restore relations as they were?

Doctorow: 20:32
Well, Russia has had relations with NATO countries. It has very good relations, or reasonably good relations with Turkey, which has the largest military force within NATO. So I don’t think that being in NATO by itself excludes having a normalization and even very good commercial relations with Russia. That’s to hold up Turkey as Exhibit A. As for what has happened to Finland by, I think they were probably the biggest losers economically in this conflict with Russia. We speak about Germany, that is always brought up because of the cheap energy resources that it received via the gas pipelines and also petroleum pipelines.

How will Finland as a case of many times over dependence and profitability from its commercial relations with Russia. This goes back to the Soviet period when they were selling, to be honest about it, quite shoddy consumer items to the Russians in exchange for very fine energy resources and not only. Look, Finland has a very big lumber processing industry, a paper industry. And these were heavily dependent on cheap Russian raw logs. There was a big discussion of course in Russia about the practical benefits or losses in this type of exchange, and there’s no question it was losses.

22:17
The Finns got the logs and then they turned it into a typing paper or anything else you want to think of and cellulose and for rayon and the rest of it. And the Russians got small change and then they received in return leather shoes, which nobody could wear without getting blisters. So I know this a practical matter. That’s what it looked like when you looked at the consumer goods from Finland. They were on sale in Russia in the Soviet Union. They were quite shoddy first by the level of what Bulgaria would ship. The Finns’ economy in every respect was profiting from Russia and that is inside Finland; and their operations in Russia were profitable.

And the Russians wanted it that way. They weren’t stupid about this. They were buying the, this they did with their own Warsaw Pact countries, their control over Eastern Europe, all of these commercial relations were disadvantageous for Russia. And they, again, not because they were stupid, but because they were buying the passivity, the peace with these countries. And it worked, to a certain extent. But to a certain extent, these countries were unwilling to sacrifice their identities for the sake of cheap Russian resources.

23:54
So Finland has suffered enormously and as I said, taking the example of Turkey, I don’t see any reason why their being a member of NATO means necessarily that they have to be on a war footing with Russia.

Diesen:
Well, you mentioned Lavrov’s comment that “Why wait until after the war, we can have diplomatic relations now. It’s the Europeans who broke off diplomacy, not the Russians.”

This is a good point though, because again, as President Stubb suggested, we can have renewed dialogue with Moscow, but only after there’s been established a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. I guess my first question would be why? Why would the diplomacy enter after a conflict? Also, to what extent would it be possible if we recognize that this war is, as many have suggested from Leon Panetta, Boris Johnson, that this is a proxy war indeed?

Wouldn’t the dialogue be required in order to reach this lasting peace? Because again, from the Russian perspective, the main problem is that we cancel these agreements for pan-European security, indivisible security. So again, constructing this Europe without Russia meant re-dividing the continent, reviving the Cold War, zero-sum logic, and even refusing to then take into account Russian concerns, given that this was a hegemonic peace.

25:31
But if the Russian thesis is correct, that the consequence of this is that the deeply divided states, be it Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, would then be pulled in both directions in order to wrestle control over them, to see what side of the new dividing lines in Europe. All of this seems to be requiring some agreements between the Europeans and the Russians as well. So to what extent can you actually have a lasting peace unless you have the diplomacy before the peace. I mean, I understood the initial logic that will isolate Russia, this will put pressure, but who’s thinking these days that Russia’s isolated with the Americans now talking to Russia? It’s just the Europeans.

The rest of the world is doing business. They’re talking with them. The Americans are trying to improve the bilateral relations. Where does this logic come in then? Because I always make the point, I can understand the Russian position well, I understand the Ukrainians very well, I can understand the Americans, but the Europeans, it doesn’t make much sense why they would still boycott diplomacy.

26:37
Well, I think Mr. Lavrov was making debating points rather than saying what is constructive, what happens next. I don’t think that repairing relations with any of the European countries is really on the top of the agenda for Moscow. I think that its first concern is repairing relations with the United States. And the single most important thing to be fixed with the United States and say urgently is an agreement not to– that the United States not bring over its intermediate range missiles into Germany in 2026, which is five months from now. That is of vital importance. And there you need an agreement with Mr. Trump. After that, they can turn around and look at the European states.

27:35
But on this whole question of who’s who and Russia’s relations with Europe and with the United States, I just go back in time. The whole psychology of Russia, or the Soviet Union, was that there were two superpowers, the United States and Russia and Europe didn’t really count. Despite the fact that Russians on the street may consider themselves to be Europeans, that did not carry over into the thinking in the Kremlin. They measured themselves against the states. All of their descriptions of themselves were in units of the United States. So just as in Australia, I think every distance between cities is measured between, is taken by contrast or comparison with the distance between Melbourne and Sydney.

28:34
It is the basis for making judgments about anything. And our newspapers, so populated by journalists who don’t have a memory that goes back more than a few weeks, don’t understand that this is a persistent element of Russian mentality, particularly official Russian mentality, that the United States is what you measure yourself by, not by these little countries in Europe, even if they’re rather big, even if they’re Germany. They are secondary considerations. So first is repair relations with the United States, get this terrible security issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe off the table, and then go after these countries in Europe.

29:19
I think they will follow what I just observed. They will work first with the smaller countries that are more amenable to reason. And once they’ve facilitated the breakdown, the breakup of the bloc and facilitated the pursuit of national interests particularly among the smaller countries, then they can deal with the larger countries. The real tough nut to crack here, of course, will be Germany because Mr. Metz continues to invest political capital in the confrontation with Russia. And his words are more important than those of Macron because he has the credit worthiness and the ability to build military assets that Mr Macron does not have.

Diesen: 30:13
I guess my last question was on the European strategy, as you suggested that the goal would be for the Europeans to seemingly just nod along and say, of course, Trump, you’re great, we’ll follow your excellent peace initiatives. We’ve never been more optimistic than now. All you have to do is pressure the Russians, you know, to make sure that this is where his negotiation– or threats as this is how he negotiates– goes. You know, I can see a lot of evidence behind this when they began initially to suggest a 30-day ceasefire. I remember all the European leaders, they sent out a tweet which was almost identical.

30:58
They all had the same phrase, ah the ceasefire, “the ball is now in Russia’s court”. In other words, Trump could go over there, you know. Now you have to pressure them, knowing that Russia would never accept a ceasefire because it doesn’t make any sense without political settlement and hoping therefore that, you know, the diplomacy with the Russians would end up in renewing Trump’s commitment to the war and pulling him into the Biden 2.0 or the European camp of a long war with Russia.

But now that the ceasefire is out of the question, this becomes a bit more difficult, or does it? Because the whole thing appears to be premised on the notion that Russia doesn’t really want peace. It’s just prolonging the time so it can gobble up more territory.

But if the conditions of Russia were actually met, that is the territorial concessions and the neutrality, what are the Europeans going to do if the Americans and Russians come to a peace and the Europeans then have to try to fight this tooth and nail. I mean, how can they actually stop this from happening?

Doctorow: 32:09
Well, they can’t, and I think they will simply split, along the lines I mentioned. Mr. Stubb was being very, very careful, very cautious. He’s making baby steps. And if what he said wasn’t entirely consistent, this has to be considered that he can’t go too far out of line with his peers. But we will see more of this as the war grinds on and as the Russians come closer to taking the whole of Donetsk for example, which they’re doing very nicely right now. I think the opinions will change within Europe.

There’ll be some surprises which countries come out first in an olive branch, but there will have to be a split in Europe. To my understanding, the logic suggests that. And it’s not because the Russians are forcing it, it’s because these countries are chafing under the direction given by Germany and by France and by the UK. And finally will revolt against that because it’s so much against their interests and the interests of their peoples and their prosperity.

Diesen: 33:29
But that also makes me think about the expectations for Ukraine, what comes after this war, because what the Europeans appear to want is to have this hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians prepared to die for Europe essentially to be as their active frontline if they have to have a conflict with Russia.

But the Ukrainians, obviously they hope that it would be the Europeans who would come to the aid of Ukraine not the other way around. Of course if there would be a military block, [those] wouldn’t be mutually exclusive, but then the West of course would be pulled into a war, which the Europeans wouldn’t do without America. So I guess my point is there’s been more voices coming out of Ukraine that what happens after this war, because the Europeans seem to be signaling a lot that we need to keep the war going a bit so to protect Europe from the Russian aggression. So people like Yulia Tomashenko has made a point that we just pretty much meet for the Europeans. They just want to throw Ukrainians at Russia to buy time for Europe.

34:36
So in other words, they’re kind of understanding that Europe is there not to protect Ukraine, but to use Ukrainians to protect Europe essentially. So how would that work after a peace? Because based on the assumption, it seems that Ukraine will continue to do this forever, that there will be a political consensus to throw Ukrainians at Russia to help the Europeans. It doesn’t seem like this will be… Well, I can see some flaws in the plan, I guess.

Doctorow: 35:06
Well, in the musical world, going back 20 years, there was a trend particularly strong in the United States called minimalism. I don’t want to propose a one-note symphony here, but I have said several weeks ago that it really is in the Russians’ hands to make a proposal that could solve all of these issues. It would take the Europeans out. It would give an off-ramp to the Europeans because if the Ukrainians agree to a settlement, what can they say? And to make the Ukrainians agree to the settlement, Russia just has to say, liberate the 350 or 250 billion dollars in our assets that are frozen, make them available for the reconstruction of all of Ukraine, including what we occupy. And that would end the war. And that would end Mr. Zubensky and his gang.

35:57
I’m happy to say that I’m not the only one who has been playing this note. It was picked up by a rather reputable and widely read journal in Germany, the Berliner Zeitung.

And they repeated this proposal, happily with attribution to myself. But the point is it is possible to find solutions if you really want to, and to be a little bit creative here. So I don’t think that we are totally blocked. But of course, even if situation looks rather difficult and even if Mr. Merz and Mr. Macron, Mr. Starmer are awfully stubborn and are supported by academics like the one who appeared in “Echo de la bourse” the other day, there are solutions. And there will be an end to this war. The Russians are really approaching Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. They more or less have Pakrovsk surrounded. They have made some sallies into Pakrovsk.

37:00
And so I really think the war on the ground in Donbas is measured in weeks, perhaps in months, but not in years any more. And once the Russians have seized the whole of Donbas, the excuse that Mr. Zelensky gives that he cannot give up territory that hasn’t been conquered will be removed. He can give it all up or he can take the first plane out and let his successor give it all up. So there will be an end to this war. It’s not going to go on forever. I’m looking to publish volume two.

Diesen: 37:42
Well, that’s the frustrating part that everyone recognizes more or less that the Russians won’t give up on Donbass. So they can either appease now or wait until, you know, pull it a few more months until Donbass has been lost and then make the peace. But of course, at that point, Ukraine will be in a much more difficult position because by that time, much more of Zaporizhzhya would have been lost and of course, much more Ukraine will have been destroyed.

Many more men will have died. The ability to reconstruct everything will have been diminished. So if all was completely rational and you would have leaders with some political weight, they would be able to make an unavoidable deal today as opposed to having to choose the worst deal tomorrow just because it’s politically easier to do. But again, everything about this has frustrated me for the past decade. So I think, yeah, they will not go for the best solutions just yet.

Doctorow: 38:41
There are symbolic things that are going on. Kramatorsk and Slaviansk are symbolic because they were the cradle of the Russian Renaissance, what they call it, going back to 2014. Their last stand against the onslaught from vastly superior numbers, the Ukrainian and military forces who were sent in to crush precisely this resistance to the new regime in Kiev. There are also, you mentioned Zaporozhzhye, but I would add to this Dnepropetrovsk, because the Russians had captured their first towns in that oblast. And as they approach Dnepropetrovsk or as the Ukrainians call it, Dnipro, let’s remember what that is.

39:28
That is the home ground of Pellamoysky, the oligarch who owned the largest bank in Ukraine, who owned the Ukrainian airlines and who virtually controlled the government and who financed the Azov batallions and the other violent nationalists. And so it has great symbolic value also that the Russians are marching on Dniepro. The Ukrainians are being battered, which is not to say that there isn’t a real war. There is. And when you watch Russian television and you watch, listen to the reporters, their war correspondents who are traveling along, close to the front, and they have to leave their vehicles and they have to proceed on foot because the vehicles are just a trap for attack drones.

40:20
So it’s not as though this is “Ah, the Ukrainians are all running from the front.” The Russians are not approaching in large contingents. They’re approaching small groups on foot or on motor scooters or motorcycles precisely because of the drone threat. This nature of warfare is still under-reported and it has changed the character of this war dramatically.

That said, they are proceeding in small groups. They are penetrating Ukrainian settlements, taking them by surprise. And while the Ukrainian defenders flee to the next town where they can make a stand. It is a tough war. And all notion that the Russians are doing this according to a fixed schedule, of course that is not happening. They’re moving to where the weak points are, where the Ukrainians cannot cover the whole line and therefore on their way to the weak points to suffer the least losses on their side because attackers always face the threat of greater losses than defenders. It’s a slow moving scene, but where it’s headed is very clear.

Diesen: 41:53
Well, thank you again for your input. I thought this is quite interesting to look at. It’s worth starting to think about what Europe will look like after this war. And I think this question is also one of the reasons why the Europeans are so stubborn in terms of hoping not to end the war given a lot of the uncertainties of what will actually follow. But yes, always thank you so much. Appreciate it.

Doctorow: 42:21
Thanks for inviting me.

Transcript submitted by a reader

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9pivYDY8gY

Napolitano: 0:34
Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Wednesday, August 20th, 2025. Professor Gilbert Doctorow will be with us in just a moment on what does the Kremlin think of Trump now? But first this.
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2:00
Professor Doctorow, welcome here, my dear friend. Let’s start with Alaska. If President Putin’s goal was to appear presidential on the international stage and to educate in private President Trump on the genesis and the causes of the special military operation in Ukraine, it appears he succeeded. Do you agree?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD 2:32
Yes and no. I think that President Trump was predisposed to change his position as he did during that meeting, and it was only partially as a result of the tutorial he was given by Putin. I think everyone, absolutely everyone, including myself, have underestimated Team Trump. I stress the word “team” as opposed to– we spoke about the collective Biden; there is a collective Trump. And that is to say he has some very, very clever advisors assisting him. I believe that in this case, just as in the case of the United States security guarantees that we probably could talk about later, Trump’s position is already made up and he is saying what he needs to say to keep his opponents off balance and to prevent their striking too early when he hasn’t yet got his ducks lined up.

3:30
So what do I mean? He didn’t know exactly whether he could do a deal with Putin until he met Putin. And he was persuaded that he could, and therefore he changed positions for the outside world, not for the inside world. I don’t think he needed Mr. Putin to give him the lessons on the root causes. But that is what was convenient for him to allow to happen.

Napolitano:
You’re telling me that all along he knew that his demands for a ceasefire made as recently as during the Air Force One flight from Washington to Alaska was not something he truly expected to happen or not something he wanted and he was just duping people or lying to people or again trying to keep the other side off guard?

Doctorow:
All of the above. That is the latter part. He knew what he wanted. Just as this whole question of the security guarantees, he is stringing the Europeans along. He has no intention of giving US security guarantees for this, because he knows the Russians are dead set against it. But he is saying that to keep them, well, let them play with their toys. And while they’re playing with their toys, the problems will be solved.

4:43
And I believe that the same question comes up, how stupid or smart was it for him to say the next step is a face-to-face between Putin and Zelensky, without–?

Napolitano:
That’s just not going to happen.

Doctorow:
Yeah. Well, I think it could happen. But there’s something that Zelensky can do if he pays attention that would make it happen.

I refer now to Mr. Lavrov’s interview last night on Russian state television, which was very, very interesting. He said that, you know, we Russians, the territorial side of it has not been fundamental. It has been the human side of it, protecting our fellow Russian speakers, our fellow ethnic Russians in that area. And in that regard, we bitterly oppose, and we discussed this with President Trump, we bitterly oppose the language laws and the persecution of Russian speakers.

5:44
That was the very first act of the government installed after the coup d’état and which turned the Donbas region and the Crimea against the new government. That is to say the ban on speaking Russian in schools, the ban on speaking Russian in public, before public authorities, and the prohibition on dissemination of Russian language media.

Napolitano:
Yes, I saw that clip. He made a very interesting point. This is the only country in the world which bans the use of another language.

Doctorow:
Not true. We’ll get to step two. Step two will be Latvia, because they’ve been doing that since 2004, and the Russians have been quiet. I think when the Ukraine situation quiets down, the Russians will come back and revisit what is going on in Latvia. But Mr. Lavrov correctly said that these laws are in violation of the UN guarantees on human rights. Now, if I were in Mr. Zelensky’s shoes, which I really wouldn’t want to be in, I would take note of that. It was a strong hint by Lavrov, hey, you want this negotiation to proceed? Just revoke those laws. It’s a good start, a show of goodwill, and then we can sit down and talk.

Napolitano: 7:06
It’s hard for me to believe that Putin would be in the same room with Zelensky. Zelensky isn’t even the legitimate lawful head of the government.

Doctorow:
The reason why the Russians have been unwilling to, is partly, what you just said, is a major factor. And of course, the West has turned that back on Putin by saying that Putin isn’t legitimate. He’s a wanted man by the International Court of Justice. So that is all a question of a public spat. But I think the issue is that Zelensky has pushed for such a face-to-face because he knew that the Russians didn’t want it, and he expected that to make it possible to say that they don’t want to make a peace, “You see? I told you, they don’t want to come to a meeting and make a peace.”

Napolitano:
Right, right. How was the Russian trip perceived in three categories? By the Kremlin, by Russian elites, by the average Russian folks — in your view from your observations in Europe?

Doctoorow:
You’re speaking now of the … which trip exactly the one going to Alaska, or…?

Napolitano
Yes. Yes. How was Putin’s trip to Alaska with Trump perceived by and how was it perceived today, four days later, by the Kremlin, by Russian elites and by Russian folks?

Doctorow: 8:38
Well, Russian folks, I think, may have been a bit skeptical about it. Russian influencers in the creative classes were probably 100% behind it, Russian intelligentsia has a lot of anglophiles, people who can’t conceive of a summer vacation without being on the Cote d’Azur, and all of those people were very happy about this.

As regards the entourage of Mr. Putin, I think they were strongly in favor of it. Partly as a validation that all attempts to isolate Russia have totally failed. The economic sanctions failed. The military efforts on the battlefield failed. And now the pariah status that the EU and the United States under Biden was assigning to Russia have failed because now here he is meeting not just with Xi of China or Modi of India or the Kazakhstans and the rest of it, he’s meeting with the president of the United States on American soil. He has a red carpet rolled out for him.

9:49
Russian television played this very positively. And I believe that their positivism was backed by the conviction they received from Putin and the people around him that Trump is genuine, is trying very hard, and is likely to succeed because his people around him are very clever.

Napolitano:
What did Trump accomplish from his own perspective?

Doctorow:
I think– I don’t know if he saw this, but he could have or should have. I’m sure that he has people who also are watching Russian television also. What I’m doing is not unique. We have intelligence agencies who have people in Moscow embassy, have people in Washington DC who are doing exactly the same thing. They just don’t share what they see with the general public. But these people would have found what I found, that the Russians, official Russia was very favorably disposed towards Trump.

They believe– my colleague, Ray McGovern, has called out repeatedly the issue of trust. And trust is there. In case anyone had doubts, Mr. Lavrov repeated it yesterday. They trust Donald Trump.

11:07
As I say, the collective Donald Trump. Nobody has any illusions of the, that he is running the show by himself.

Napolitano:
Well, it’s hard to figure out exactly where Trump is. I mean, at the end of the day on Friday, it sounded as though he was pushing the neocons under the bus. General Kellogg wasn’t even there.

The president says he understands the origins of the special military operation. He understands that NATO can’t be involved in the new Ukraine. And he understands that there’s not gonna be any ceasefire. This will end when it ends, either by a grand peace treaty or by Russian triumph in the battlefield. That rejects everything from Victoria Nuland to then Senator Marco Rubio.

11:57
Then on Monday, he makes the unmistakable impression of boots on the ground or boots in the sky over Ukraine working with European troops in order to secure, in order to guarantee some sort of security. That, of course, delighted the neocons. Put aside what the Russians will reject. You and I know, and everybody watching us now know what they’ll reject. [Foreign Affairs] Minister Lavrov has been very clear. Trump is speaking out of both sides of his mouth. Trump is trying to please whoever is in front of him at the moment. Agree or disagree?

Doctorow: 12:35
I disagree. He is trying to please his opponents who are in front of him. Let’s remember what happened in Washington, DC. He didn’t have to, Trump didn’t have to invite them in. In the past, he’s never dealt with them as a group. He’s only dealt with them one to one, and this was remarked upon as meaning that he would try to play them off against one another. This time he allowed the whole lot of them to come and visit him, and he humiliated them all in front of one another.

When he told them to leave the room during his meeting with them in the White House, to go to the Oval Office and wait because he had to make a call to Putin, because that was very important; then he spent 40 minutes on the phone with Putin, letting them wring their hands in the next room and understand that they had been treated like second-class people, which is what they are.

Now, I do not believe that he has any intention of providing security guarantees in the sense that the Europeans expect it and that he was just stringing them along, just as he was stringing them along on whether there would be an immediate ceasefire. If they don’t see it, then they are very stupid.

Napolitano: 13:56
Well, I don’t think your view and my view are very far apart on that, but I’m looking for President Macron. Here is President Macron the day after, which I guess would be yesterday before he left Washington. Chris, cut number 12.

Questioner:
As it relates to security guarantees, does that mean European troops, and does that mean U.S. Troops?

Macron:
Look, I think for me it’s a very important progress of the past few days that your president expressed a clear commitment of the US to be part of the security guardantees. It’s brand new. And last February, when I took the responsibility to gather a series of European leaders with President Zelensky in Paris, and we followed up in London, and we created this coalition of the willing.

And it was a reaction to the feeling we had that we could see a temptation to go to a rapid peace, but without any guarantee for Ukraine. And we know what it means. It was Georgia 2008, but it was as well Crimea 2014. And there is full certainty that if you make any peace deal without security guarantee, Russia will never respect its words, will never comply with its own commitments.

15:23
So it’s for us totally critical. And this is an essential part of any deal for Ukraine and for the Europeans. This is for our own security. So this is a very important progress of the past few days that the US now is willing to be part of this.

Napolitano:
“The US is now willing to be part of this.” He left that impression unmistakably with them. And it’s an untrue impression, because he must know that the Russians would never go along with it. What difference does it make if American boots are on the ground or if they’re on jets overhead?

Doctorow: 16:00
Well, let’s revisit this. I spoke categorically and I think I should correct myself. It is possible that Trump will participate in security guarantees, but not in the way that any of the Europeans expect or want. I was interviewed this morning by WION, the main, almost the largest Indian global broadcaster in English. And they are pretty close to the Indian government. And the, I was asked, or I was told rather, that the, there is talk that the Chinese are going to be invited in to take part in the peacekeeping mission.

Well, there you have it, Judge. It’s entirely possible they will. And in that case, the Americans can go ahead and provide air cover. But what’s the difference here? The difference is that a strictly European peacekeeping force, which would not be monitors in fact, they would be armed, they’d be ready to go into action. They would be a trip wire for direct European and American intervention in the war and then start or restart a war. They could provoke a new war.

Napolitano:
Right,

Doctoorow:
What was going on before the Russians moved in in February of 2022? The OSCE monitors who were along various parts of the border were reporting finally– because mostly they kept their mouths shut since they were being given instructions by Europeans– about [how] the firing of artillery and missiles against the rebelling provinces had stepped up enormously. And this sent messages to Moscow that yes, the anticipated “final solution” of the Ukrainian rebellion was about to start. And that the, because of 150,000 Ukrainian soldiers amassed next to the border ready to pounce on Donbass. And that that triggered the war.

Now this– what was going on was firing, massive firing of weapons against the East. If these Europeans were there as the so-called peacekeepers, who’s to say that they wouldn’t start firing artillery and missiles? And there you have it. They could end the Russian– yeah.

Napolitano:
What is a security guarantee? I mean, what is being guaranteed? Ukraine’s neutrality, or that the Russians won’t use military force against Ukraine? What’s the guarantee?

Doctorow: 18:50
Well, the Europeans and Zelensky are presenting it in the latter case. That the Russians are aggressive, they’re going to restart the war at the first opportunity, they want to take Poland, the Baltics and France at the first opportunity and so forth. This is, of course, rubbishy propaganda, but that’s what they’re saying, and that’s what the BBC is repeating. So that is their official position, and of course, it’s completely false.

The security guarantees that Trump might take part in would otherwise be called monitors. And they will be consistent– if it happens at all, there will be global-south countries participating. That would be probably acceptable to the Russians because it’s not a first step towards a pseudo-NATO Ukraine.

Napolitano:
What’s wrong with the Austrian model of true neutrality, no military activity, economic prosperity, personal liberty. It may have been you who pointed out to me that when the Austrian Treaty of Neutrality was agreed to with the old Soviet Union and everybody else, the Soviets actually had an official on the Austrian National Security Council and it worked out fine.

Doctorow: 20:12
That’s fine, if the West European countries can be brought around to it. In fact, one country seems to, in a most paradoxical way, the president of Finland, Alexander Stup, when he was in Washington, I’d say rather stupidly, commented that, you know, the end of the war in Ukraine could be similar to what happened with us in 1944 when we concluded a peace with the Soviet Union and gave up territory. And after that, we all lived happily together and prospered.

Napolitano:
Yeah, until they joined NATO.

Doctorow:
Until they joined NATO. And he undid– and he violated– Mr. Lavrov spoke about this yesterday in Russian television and reminded us what that treaty was in ’44. It was a treaty of permanent neutrality in which Finland was obliged never to join an alliance directed against Russia. And that’s what they’ve just done.

Napolitano:
Wow. … Well, I’m of the view that the war in Ukraine is not going to end by any kind of an agreement. It’s going to end when the Ukrainian military collapses. What do you think?

Doctorow:
It’s entirely possible. No one cab say. I don’t pretend to have superior vision on this. It really is, you cross your fingers and it’ll go one way or the other. But the one thing that is outstanding and certain is the Russians are going to win. The Russians will get what they want, the basic things that they want. And here, of course, there’s a lot of confusion about what do they want, but you’ve touched upon them.

They want neutrality, They want the size, they want the nature of the Ukrainian armed forces to be described and certain categories of weapons not to be delivered to them. And they want progress on the well-being of their ethnic co-nationals, you could say, who remain under Ukrainian control to end the persecution of these people, which is ongoing.

Napolitano:
You know, as we speak, this was not mentioned in any of the commentary and that’s American intelligence. If you’re going to have American planes in the sky, Mr. President, that means you’re going to have American intelligence on the ground.

Right now, There are still 20 CIA stations in Ukraine. American intelligence is still helping Ukrainian soldiers aim American equipment at Russian soldiers, and MI6 is doing the same. That’s not likely to stop, is it?

Doctorow: 22:52
Well, it depends on their agreeing on definition of armed forces. The CIA people that you’re describing are for all practical purposes an army, but as you yourself have discussed, they are an army, although they are outside, formally speaking, the US Armed Forces.

That goes counter to the Russian demand that there be no foreign military forces or installations on Ukrainian soil. So, all of this, but this, this, they have gone through all of this with the Ukrainians in March of 2022. And this was more or less accepted by the Ukrainians. So I don’t see something horrible, impossible to achieve now. It all depends on whether Mr. Zalensky can be persuaded to avoid 20, 30, 40,000 more unnecessary deaths of his soldiers. And will sign on to give up the Donbass now, rather than waiting until the Russians to conquer it.

Napolitano:
Professor Doctorow, a fascinating conversation. You always present a very unique viewpoint, and it’s deeply appreciated here and around the world for all the people that watch us. Thank you very much. We’ll look forward to seeing you next week.

Doctorow:
And I look forward to it as well.

Napolitano:
Thank you. Coming up later today at 11 this morning, Max Blumenthal; at one this afternoon, Ian Proud; at two this afternoon– I’m not sure where he is, but he’ll be here with us–
Pepe Escobar; at three this afternoon, Phil Giraldi.

24:27
Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom.