Transcript of conversation with Glenn Diesen, 17 August 2025

Transcript submitted by a reader

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyzGNH5vO0g

Diesen:
Hi everyone and welcome back. We are joined today by Gilbert Doktorow, historian and international affairs analyst and author of books such as “War Diaries – the Russia-Ukraine War”. And yeah, thank you for coming back on the program.

Doctorow:
My pleasure.

Diesen
So, yeah, the big news obviously is the Trump and Putin meeting in Alaska. And, yeah, after three and a half years since Russia launched its a special military operation, well, most of this time, the West boycotted diplomacy in an effort to isolate Russia. We now had a meeting between the Russian and American president. And the immediate reactions of course have ranged from extreme optimism to utter panic, especially then in Europe. And well, the media especially is hostile to their diplomatic efforts. And there’s been these efforts to portray Trump as weak unless he is tough on Russia, which is usually what we demand of all politicians, which effectively translates into prolonging the war, I think. But again, it’s an important summit. And I wanted to ask you, what are your main takeaways from this summit?

Doctorow: 1:20
Well, if we had this discussion 24 hours ago, I would be at a loss to say something that my peers had not already said, because everybody had a microphone in front of them in the minutes following the closing of the conversation. But since we are speaking today, a lot of fresh news has come in, which I hope we can go through, because it answers the question that immediately came up following the press briefings– so I think it was 12 minutes, 15 minutes, it was very short– that took place immediately following the summit talks in Anchorage. The question that arose was what did the Russians and the Americans agree on? Because Mr. Putin said, yes, we’ve come closer to solving the problem. Well, how did they come closer?

It was not– there was no information given out by either party in the minutes following the summit. And all of that has come out both by intent and by a subversive release to the press by people, I’m sure, like Macron. He couldn’t possibly resist the temptation to call reporters in to show how much he knew that was of interest to them. What I’m saying is that the basic agreements that Trump and Putin made have come out in the last 24 hours.

The first shoe to drop was soon afterwards and the most important information only came out I would guess in the middle of the night or early this morning. The last and very important information I read extensively reported in the “Financial Times”, their online edition this morning, talking about the territorial issue, specifically saying that Putin had proposed that Russia would receive or should receive all of the territory of the Donbass, that is, of the two oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk, and that it would compromise on the other two, the other two oblasts which form the new Russia and these are Zaporozhzhia and Kherson. In those two last two oblasts or regions, Russia would agree to a freeze at the line of confrontation. In the first two, strictly speaking Donbass, Donetsk and Lugansk, they would insist that Ukraine would withdraw completely from those territories, so that Russia would receive now a territory that it had not conquered. Our lying press has said, ah yes, the Russians only hold about 50% of the territory they’re now demanding be turned over.

First of all, out of the two oblasts, the Russians have 98%, maybe 99% of Lugansk. Lugansk was the easiest for them to recapture; from the very first days of the Special Military Operation, that was the case. With respect to Donetsk, before this summer offensive got underway, the Russians had about 50% of that. Now they have 70%.

So from the get-go, what our CNN and BBC are telling us is fabricated. The concession is one of time, time and lives, because it is apparent to anybody with military knowledge that the Russians will take the whole of Donbas in a matter of weeks. The story coming out of Kiev is that by giving up Slavyansk and Kramatorsk– these are fortified towns between the present line of confrontation around Pokrovsk to the east and the Dnieper River– Ukraine would be giving up its ability to resist a further Russian onslaught across the Dnieper into the rest of Ukraine.

Well, this is the same lies and fabrication that have been behind the Ukrainian story, which was repeated endlessly by the United States and the European allies over the last three years. I think most of us who have our brains screwed in right understand that Russia would never willingly take any Ukrainian territory in West Ukraine, because that would be really an occupation and not a governance, and they would expect a lot of difficulty ruling that area.

6:34
So the whole story of what the Russians want is now clear. The other, smaller issue which came out, which is the first shoe to drop, which I didn’t mention a moment ago, was that Mr. Trump announced he had switched his view, and essentially he’s aligned with Vladimir Putin, on what sort of an agreement is now before us. He had previously been aligned with the Europeans and with Kiev, saying we must have immediate unconditional ceasefire. And that was about to be imposed on Russia. This summit was supposed to end in the signing off by Putin of such a ceasefire and so forth.

What we have now is Trump aligned with Putin in saying that that is senseless, that is only provisional, it can be reversed, and what we need is a genuine peace treaty. The difference is very great. The Ukrainians are doing their best to confuse the general public about what the difference is and to suggest that a genuine peace is only setting the stage for further Russian offensive against them. The Europeans are trying to rope in Trump to the notion that when we have this peace signed, that we need to have peacekeepers to enforce the peace. These are absolute propaganda and lies.

Then the point of Mr. Putin is: we have to resolve the underlying issues behind this war and we have to remove the issues that separate us and have caused conflict. And if you have that enshrined in a peace treaty, there’s no need for peacekeepers, because there’s no conflict to break out again.

So this is where we are today, with Europe digging in their heels, finding any logic, however impossible and possibly irrational it is, like what I just described, that a peace treaty is only setting the stage for the next war.

Well, this is a very interesting interpretation of what peace treaties are about. Oh yes, when you have peace treaties that are disastrous like Versailles, that’s true. But if you have peace treaties designed with people of intelligence and compromise and diplomacy and goodwill, then a peace treaty is a peace treaty. And you don’t have to confuse it with a truce. So this has happened in the last 24 hours, and it is illuminating.

If I can just go one step further, I don’t want this to be a lengthy talk here, a lecture. I want to say that we really, Glenn, we’re living in a dark age. It’s very sad to say, but I listened to your interview yesterday with the minister, the member of parliament, the German former UN official talking about lack of respect, lack of diplomacy. Let me just change the term for this. We’re living in the Dark Ages.

This is a period of hate, a period of vile propaganda, a period of impunity. And where those who have committed crimes, including high crimes and treason, walk away without ever being brought to court and with no fear that their crimes will be fully exposed and that they will pay for them. This is where we are today, and it is terrible. I take it back in the United States to Mr. Obama who never did anything about those guilty for the invasion of Iraq. Though they all were sitting, Mr. Cheney was out there.

Oh yes, my last comment is on the first response of the British press and also some of the US press. How do they respond to the warmth and cordiality of Mr. Trump’s reception of Putin?

11:23
Well, either that Mr. Trump is being played by Putin, which is peculiar, since they hadn’t even met. The warmth and cordiality preceded the talks. As what do they do, they remind us, hey, they’re meeting in Alaska because there are not too many places where Mr. Putin and Trump can meet because, hey, remember that Mr. Putin is an international, is a war criminal, a war criminal, and he has been condemned by the International Court of Justice. Well, they pulled that one out of the hat, in case any of us forgot, that complete miscarriage of justice over the supposed kidnapping of thousands, or maybe it was several dozen Ukrainian children who were in the middle of the war zone without parents or custodians. Anyway, that’s my lengthy introduction to where we are today.

Diesen:
Well, you’re right on the hate part and the rest for that sake, but the hate part is quite interesting because during the Cold War, when we’re speaking to Stalin or Khrushchev or anyone from the other side, there would nonetheless be some respect. You wouldn’t– you would address them properly. You would have diplomacy. You would be able to discuss what are the real security concerns? How might we be intensifying them? How may we alleviate it? None of this exists today.

12:53
Instead, I get the sentiment that you’re obliged to hate. The hate becomes a source of, it displays our morality. So how can you meet a war criminal? I even had people from the military ask me, how can you have diplomacy when someone has attacked another one?

This is when you have diplomacy. I mean, these are people who are in leadership position, and they talk this excessive moralism, which makes it impossible to actually do any good in the world by talking to the other side. But in terms of what seems as a key achievement though, for the, I guess, achievement of peace would be that Trump, he moved away, as you said, from the ceasefire, which doesn’t mean peace, and moved towards addressing the root causes. And for me, this is interesting because in Europe since the 1990s, we decided let’s create a new Europe organized around the EU and NATO. Everyone should be part of it except for Russia. And also Russia shouldn’t have a veto or say over what we do because they’re not part of NATO.

So essentially we created, institutionalized Russia’s exclusion from Europe, and we kind of wished Russia away. But in reality, all you do is when you deny Russia any voice in international institutions to defend its and represent its security interest, the only thing to do is leave the military option as the only one. And then by now creating the conditions for, well, only a ceasefire, then we put peacekeepers or whatever you might call them there. It’s not going to work.

It’s just, it makes common sense. If you want to end the military conflict, you have to open up a political one, institutions where the Russians can also sit at the table and say, listen, you can’t put your missiles on our borders. We can’t put them in Mexico. You can’t put them there and then find a common agreement. This used to be common sense, but again, it used to be common sense to talk to each other with basic respect and not criminalized diplomacy, but it does appear to be a bygone thing.

15:07
But in terms of, yes, resolving the Ukraine issue is quite important. And I think accepting the Russian premise that we have to address the root causes is quite interesting. We kind of got that confirmed by all the Europeans who are now in full panic. But what I thought was interesting though is there appeared to be also a heavy focus on bilateralism. That is, Russia and the US aren’t simply hostages to what happens in Europe. I was wondering how you read into this focus on bilateral relations.

Doctorow:
Well, I’ll get to that in one moment, but I want to go back to the hate issue and to the issue of respect, the lack of respect that you’ve touched upon. Some time ago, when I was in regular correspondence with Professor Stephen Cohen, he insisted to me when I was about to write something regarding George Soros’s visit to Brussels and his inability to remember anything on stage, I was about to mention the senility in my article. And he cautioned me, this was 10 years ago, the man is still alive. He cautioned me that ad hominem argumentation is really unacceptable in academic discourse.

I disagreed, and I continue to disagree. I, Russians of– you probably noticed, since you spent good time there, they don’t believe in phrenology any more. They don’t take the shape of somebody’s skull as meaning very much. I mean, the top part, for example, or the back part, but they do take physiognomy very seriously. They take facial expression very seriously.

16:58
And Americans, pretend it doesn’t exist. Anybody who was following Dick Cheney must have understood the man was mentally ill just by his crooked smile. But you couldn’t really speak about it because that’s an ad-homonym remark I mean, but his smile, you know, finally, unlike his nose or his ears, the smile is something you make. And it tells you something about what’s behind the face. The Mogherini, she became mentally ill in service. She became, you could see in her face the tension and she lost concentration. She wasn’t up to the job.

All right. I made my point that what can you say about the descent of political culture in the West? We know about the United States descent: never rose very high, with a few exceptions, but even from that medium bar, it’s descended since the 1990s. In Europe, it’s collapsed, an intellectual collapse. When I was growing up in the States, people said, “The British, oh, they speak so well. They always have really upper-crust people running the government.”

You can’t say that now. They’ve had a succession of idiots, which they themselves, which the City of London called out. When they threw out, was it Truss, I forget who, who lasted like six weeks, lasted less time than iceberg lettuce. Because she was intellectually incompetent.

What can you say about Kallas? She’s a laughing stock of Russia. What can you say about Annalena Baerbock? That Germany would have in its cabinet, a moron like that, I mean she’s a moron, is unthinkable. And so how can you look for respect, diplomacy, and the rest of it for people who are savages, uneducated, no knowledge of anything, people who speak about a 360-degree change of opinion?

This is beneath contempt. I think we have to look at the democratic processes that are putting these morons in power. Before we can start saying, well, they see this or they don’t see that. This has to be reexamined. Here in Belgium, we have very good political scientists who spend a lot of time working, talking about electoral processes, because we have to: we have this crazy situation of two nations under one roof, the Flemings and the Francophones. And so they try to find very inventive, progressive solutions to these problems.

20:04
That kind of creativity has to be used more within Europe to find solutions to bring out competent people to the floor. They are not there. And under those circumstances, you have the crazy reaction to yesterday’s summit that we see on the front pages of the European newspapers. They simply are not up to the challenge. I know you have addressed in some of your recent programs this question about Europe becoming geopolitically irrelevant because of the low level of political culture in present-day Europe.

There are no great people. There’s some brave people like Orban and Fico, but there are no great people. I don’t mean to say that great people are always wise people or likable people, but their intellectual capacities, their ability to look at big picture issues, it’s not here today. So that’s, I’m sorry, now that I’ve gone off on this tangent, I’ve lost the line of your question. Could you just remind me?

Diesen:
Oh, no, I’ll, no, I wanted to move on and ask about the focus on the bilateralism. But if I can just first, a quick comment on the … interview I did with Mikael von der Schürrnberg yesterday, again, he’s not just a member of the EU Parliament, but as Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, he spent 34 years in conflict zones. He didn’t live in Germany and fly out. He resided there. He had houses. He lived in the conflict zones for 34 years.

And to now see him, you know, he saw hope in all of those areas, but in Europe now he just seems gutted, like this may, there’s no, he doesn’t see any solutions, because there’s no one addressing the problems. And I got that impression in this country as well, if you criticize, because I’ve been told I criticize Europe a lot, but yeah, I do. I think you criticize for course correction, but if you didn’t like it, then you shouldn’t live here any more. I mean, this is the mentality.

If you like Europe, then you have to support all the policies of Kallas, Van der Leyen and the rest of this insane asylum. Or also if you care about Ukraine, then you’re just going to pump in more weapons, keep the war going. Even though I know that this is just going to lead to the destruction of that nation. They’re never going to be able to rebuild. They’re not going to have the territory, the people, the infrastructure.

I mean, that makes no sense. But this is the mentality in Europe now. Just do as you’re told and support any insane policies. Otherwise you’re on the enemy’s side. It’s just, it’s something — the whole reason has shut down, I think.

22:56
Anyways, yeah, you know, I think the bilateralism was the direction I was going. Well, this has been in the past, going back to the fall of the Soviet Union, the bright new era that opened up in the 90s. I had colleagues who were so enthusiastic about the opportunity for American-Russian friendship, cooperation, strategic cooperation in all domains. For my take, well by the end of the 90s, they were still saying that. And I was saying, my goodness, we’re just lucky we’re not at one another’s throats at this moment. And you want to be strategic allies? It just is unreasonable.

But going back to what underpins such strategic cooperation, sually business is part of it, and trade is part of it. When Mr. Nixon did his detente with the Soviet Union, he was actively encouraging American business executives to go there and do business, to trade, and to invest in manufacturing capacity there.

In the case– my understanding though, is that this basis for bilateralism really doesn’t exist between the United States and Russia. Their economies have never been complementary in the same way as Russian-European relations were. The amount of trade done between the two countries never was very big. It’s not that it fell from great heights. It never reached any heights, not because of lack of will, but because the economics didn’t push people together the way they pushed Germans and Russians together, for example, in energy supply and raw material supply, which was something that Mr. Macron held out when he was still thinking about Russia in positive terms.

25:07
So that very strong foundation for genuine bilateralism doesn’t exist. And those who are calling out the project of train, tunnel, bridge across the Bering Strait, these are toys. This is not serious. That is not how to build a foundation for genuine bilateralism. The US and Russians have interests in world governance, which should be enough to justify decent relations and cooperation in many areas of security, global security.

But to build it out, they’re going to have cultural relations, they’re going to have economic ties of a great magnitude — is unreasonable, looking at the basic conditions for who produces what and who buys what. It’s not there. Still, as I said, the geopolitical common interests should be sufficient for bilateralism. As for the rest of the world, well, bilateralism does not exclude their both participating in regional societies of trade and other interests, including technological interests. It’s not an exclusive thing.

Certainly Russia is not going to close the door on BRICS for the sake of warm relations with the United States. As for Mr. Trump, he’s busy closing the door on the world. So that question for him doesn’t exist. Have I covered that? I mean, in the way that you expected, have I not answered the question in the manner you looked for?

Diesen: 27:11
Yeah. No, well, I think, yeah, there’s of course limits to the economic participation. But as you said, the geopolitical, the arms control, there’s a lot of other things to do. But even with the economic sphere, I don’t think Russia’s going to shift away from BRICS.

I think this greater-Eurasia initiative they’re pursuing now which replaced their goal of a Greater Europe, which included Russia, I think is very much permanent. But the Russians do want, I guess, more of a balance of dependence. So you don’t want excessive dependence on an actor like China, which is more powerful than you, given that Russia will always be more dependent on China than China is on Russia. They can’t be equal economies. But the asymmetry can be offset if they just diversify, have more partners, don’t put all eggs in one basket.

28:04
And I think from this perspective it would be in their interest to have better trade relations with the US, also more predictability, I would say, which would be good for both sides. But no, I think if the ambitions of Trump is for Russia to turn its back on China, you know, I think it’s fantasy, it’s not going to happen. But in terms of what can be learned from the summit in Alaska is, I guess one of the reasons why more can be learned now as opposed to 24 hours ago is that a meeting is going to be set up between Trump and Zelensky on Monday already if I’m not mistaken, which is a few hours from now. But based on what they’re going to discuss, do you know what this will be all about? And does it tell you anything about how the meeting went between Putin and Trump?

Doctorow:
Well, the Europeans are counting on, they’re preparing Zelensky for the meeting with Trump on the assumption that if he’s properly programmed, he can avoid crossing sensitive points with Trump, can avoid the kind of blow up that happened six months ago when they met in the Oval Office, and that he can turn Trump around. After all, we all know that Putin played Trump, that Trump was talking ceasefire, when he went to the summit; he was talking peace treaty when he left the summit. So well, I could tell you again, I think they’re missing the point. What Trump has only let out false information, misleading information to keep his opponents off balance, to keep the press off balance, without his being turned by anybody.

30:05
He’s only very gradually putting into place what he surely had in mind before. This brings up the whole question, what does he know? So many of my peers assume that he is a lightweight, that he has no concentration, that he changes his opinion from day to day, and that he’s ill-informed. When he repeats that the Russians have lost a million men or they’re losing 30,000 a month, they’re saying, “Oh, you see, he’s being fed bad information by his assistants.” I really am stunned by the lack of imagination of former CIA analysts.

It is depressing. Well, maybe it’s good news. It tells you the CIA doesn’t really have much analytic talent at any given moment, which is, I don’t mean to say that the whole institution is that way. But when I look at some of the analysts’ remarks, I’m stunned. To think that Trump would know less than they know is very peculiar.

I’m sure he knows it all. When he said Russia is a war machine, that tells you the whole story. He doesn’t have to go into the figures, the killer figures. He was repeating the rubbish that the press is talking about. Again, to keep them off balance, to let them think that he thinks the way they do, when it is most improbable that he thinks the way they do or that he has accepted any of the rubbish reports on what the battlefield really looks like.

So I think he is well informed, I think he has his own course how this will go and that takes us into the question that you just raised: what’s going to happen tomorrow? I think that he will repeat what he has told Zelensky on the phone, that he has adopted the position of the Russians with respect to how this war should end and in what time. And that part of the war ending is Ukraine conceding once and for all, not temporarily, probably de jure, that it has lost the Donbass and parts of the other two regions that I mentioned, the part of new Russia that is Zaporozhzhya and Kherson, and that it will not have an army above a certain force, and that it will not be part of, enter NATO.

When you look at the comments coming from Europe, as recently as yesterday, that, “Oh, it’s just temporarily they can’t enter NATO”, they’re not listening. They’re not listening to Trump. He has made it clear: never.


Then you’ve got the whole question of the “coalition of the willing” readiness to put troops’ boots on the ground in Ukraine for the sake of protecting Ukraine from further Russian aggression. I think that the news that the Europeans have put out, that Trump is on board, though they don’t know to what extent the United States will participate, I think that is fake news. I think they are trying to, again, to entrap him, putting in his mouth words that he never spoke or, if he spoke them, words that he never intended to implement, because his way of dealing with his enemies is not, generally speaking, not to contradict them directly but to say what they want to hear and then go off and do what he wants to do.

So the meeting tomorrow, I think, will be very tough for Mr. Zelensky. I think the Europeans will not get any satisfaction out of it. And I imagine that Trump is setting up the case for turning his back on Ukraine and the Europeans, when they show that they are putting a monkey wrench into the works, as Mr. Putin said in his press briefing after the summit.

Diesen: 34:46
Yeah, well, there’s, I guess, two different hypotheses in terms of Trump’s rhetoric, which is often shifting. And as you said, the first one, which I hear, I guess most often is, you know, he’s uninformed, doesn’t know what he’s saying, or he’s just stupid. But alternatively, as you suggest, one also has to recognize the reality that he’s in a difficult spot though, because he has to navigate between two positions which seemingly can’t be bridged. On one side you have not just hostile allies in Europe, Zelensky and indeed the Washington political establishment, which wants none of this at all, what he’s trying to do. And on the other side, you have Russia with fairly high demands in terms of what it wants in this peace agreement, given that this has been going on unresolved now for 30 years.

And it did remind me a bit about, I did an interview with Fyodor Lukyanov. He’s got actually several positions. We used to work together in same department in Moscow and well every year at the Valdai discussion club he’s the one sitting next to Putin interviewing him. And he was making the point, because I asked him, what do you make of Trump’s rhetoric shifting back and forth?

And he had a good point, though, which is, well, we have to see at what point he starts, because Europeans, of course, they boycott all diplomacy. They don’t want to talk to Russia. Zelensky, he ruled out talking to Russia. He wants no negotiations, no diplomacy, just more weapons. Anything else is unacceptable. But he was making a point. Well, just look at the gradual steps.

And now two months down the road, you have in France, they’re now discussing whether or not they should reopen diplomacy with Russia. You’re having Zelensky. Yeah, well, he’s sending his team. They’re meeting with the Russians, talking. They’re looking for a way to resolve this.

So there has to be a step by step. So it’s, I mean, maybe it’s a bit of both. Maybe some of the information Trump isn’t really on top of, But I think ignoring, as you say, ignoring this difficult positions between demanding Russians and very unflexible and demanding Europeans and Zelensky that he has to navigate the space, I’m not sure.

But also I’ve heard another theory that, well, which I also see as probable, that the United States isn’t necessarily that eager to give up all containment of Russia, but they rather want to outsource it to the Europeans. I was wondering what you thought about this.

Doctorow: 37:37
Well, this would have been certainly a good interpretation before Mr. Trump and his associates gutted the CIA, gutted the National Foundation of Democracy, before they took all the bad guys that they could find out of the federal government. I don’t know who is continuing this type of intervention, neocon intervention. Maybe it’s just the Soros foundation or similar organizations. Certainly, the Brits are deep in this, probably much more responsible for any of these nefarious developments than the Americans are.

The problem with Trump, and which puts me in an awkward position is the sharp contrast between what he is doing as a peacemaker in Ukraine and what he is doing as an enabler of genocide in Gaza. When I listened, I think it was Politico, it was being interviewed this morning by the BBC about Mr. Trump as a peacemaker and how it pains him to hear about people being killed in war. What can I say?

That is not the Trump that I am an apologist for, so to speak. I am in favor of what he’s doing in Ukraine. I believe it is well planned that he has very able assistance, in Steve Witkoff, to keep him in line, to keep his thinking solid. But of course, he is working with the same Witkoff doing this very, very nasty cooperation with Netanyahu’s government in genocide.

So it’s a mixed picture, a very mixed picture. But to think that he shifts from day to day, well, I can’t abide that. There is clearly a very heavy commitment of that man to find a peace in Ukraine, not because he loves peace and is worried about people being killed, but because of much bigger things, how he wants to reshape global geopolitics. And yes, of course, you’re right. The idea of separating Russia from China is an idee fixe of many people in his circle, starting with Rubio, his secretary of state.

So that is certainly guiding his attention to Russia and his attempts to deal diplomatically and cordially with Mr. Putin.

Diesen: 40:43
I think Russia would have been more vulnerable to be swayed by this earlier, because from ’94 when they established the OSCE, they thought, okay, now finally we have an inclusive Europe. And then came 1999 with the NATO expansion. And then they always tried to find an agreement. Under Medvedev in 2008, they had this proposal for a new European security architecture in 2010. Putin pushed forward this idea of a EU-Russia union, and all the way up to 2014. But 2014, I think this is when things began to break and they began to shift from greater Europe to greater Eurasia. However, yeah, in 2022, I think that sealed the deal for certain. But if this would have been back in 2008, 2007, eight, well, seven, when Putin made that speech at Munich, I think that was kind of the last chance to accept, including Russia into this Europe they were building.

I think it’s just too late at this point. They also don’t see a future in Europe, although this is the important thing as well. It’s not only to see Europe as hostile and stagnant, but also the Russians have less historical baggage in Asia and there’s more giants there. They’re not feared or hated as much. And economies are better.

It’s hard to argue against. If you take the point of departure, what is in Russia’s interest, it kind of makes sense why they’re not really looking to Europe any more.

Doctorow: 42:32
Let’s not speak about Europe. Let’s speak about who runs Europe. Who runs Europe is Germany. And the responsibility for this lost opportunity I put directly at the door of Angela Merkel in 2008. You have mentioned the Medvedev initiative. I followed that very closely when it was made. It was very badly prepared by the Russians. Mr. Lavrov made an attempt to revive that after it was cursorily dismissed by Merkel, to breathe some life into it because the text that Medvedev released, and I think he released it on social media, he was trying to be very, very “with it”, very up to date. America still had public diplomacy as a flag they were flying, and he used that. Anyway, it was badly done. Nonetheless, she dismissed it out of hand.

“We have security done. It’s called NATO. Don’t bother us.” And that was a disastrous, lost opportunity because Mr. Medvedev say he was the stand-in for Putin, but he was the president. And he didn’t have “stand-in here” across his chest. He could do something and sign something and negotiate something. And everyone said, “Oh, Merkel, she speaks Russian. She gets on with them. She is the intercessor with the Russians” and so on.

She hated the Russians from her childhood, obviously. And she was dismissive of them in the most crude way. When in 2012 she ended all talk about visa-free travel saying they just– “We’re not going to let those crooks into our country”, as if every Russian was an oligarch. And those thieving oligarchs all got into the country anyway, but normal citizens were not able to. She was the point of departure for where we are today. I say that because she had control of the appointment of the president of the Commission.

Wienker was put in at her suggestion because he was manageable, in the usual sense. That’s to say they had the goods on him. So he was under her control. The parliament, the European parliament, was under her control effectively because the European People’s Party even back then, in circa 2015, had complete control of the European Parliament. And she missed the opportunity.

The German, why? It wasn’t an accident. Because Germany had done a switch. Germany was no longer interested in the East. Germany was interested in Mittel Europa.

Germany had found very good colonies in Poland and the Czech Republic for very cheap labor to facilitate its export industry of manufactured goods. They never put in to the, particularly in Poland, complete cycle production. They put in “bits and parts” production. So the Poles had nothing, the Germans had everything. They had all the profit coming from the exports.

46:03
And given that the economic interests of Germany, the number of Germans employed, thanks to Mittel Europa, no doubt many times exceeded the 400,000 Germans in 2015 who were said to owe their jobs to the Russian trade, Germany economically decided, the Mittelstand decided that the Mittel Europa friends within the former Soviet bloc were more valuable to them than good relations with Russia. And it so happened that those countries, Poland and the Baltics, they’re Russian-hating. And Germany joined the Russian-hating gang.

So, I say we can talk about Europe’s mistakes, but I think we’re missing the point. We’re missing the point today, considering where Mr. Merz is. He didn’t come from nowhere. He’s in direct line of this German turn against Russia. He’s an aggravated case. He’s an ugly case, but it’s the same line that you can find in 2008, and still better in 2014 with the Minsk Accords, to which she was a party. She was anti-Russian, and she and Germany controlled the European institutions.

Diesen:
Yeah, just as we said, the 2008 proposal by Medvedev for new European security architecture, It didn’t actually call for replacing NATO or disbanding NATO. It recognized solely that we need a wider pan-European umbrella over this because NATO is a military block. It has zero-sum security. It does not subscribe to indivisible security.

So in order not to end up in a situation where the borderline states, be it Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, have to choose between East and West and we rip up the society and pull them in each direction that we have some common security architecture so we don’t end up that everything is zero sum. This was it, and they poured cold water on it.

Doctorow:
They poured cold water on him. And this was a terrible mistake. They didn’t have good Russian knowledge. They should have understood that this is the most optimistic, sunny man running Russia for, I don’t know, 200 years. There was no one like Medvedev. He was very well disposed to the West. He was a very outgoing person. And to confuse him with Medvedev today is a tremendous mistake. He was a potential good friend of Europe. And they spurned him. They humiliated him.

Diesen: 48:47
Yeah, Now I remember then when I lived in Russia, the way they talked about him, “Ah, he’s weak, blah, blah, blah.” You know, he put himself out there and they humiliated him.

So again, it’s indistinguishable from the Medvedev you see today though has become, I guess, learned from his past and become very hawkish. My last question, though, was just, I guess, is a smaller question. What do you make sense of the meeting which took place in Alaska? Is this, as some have suggested, just to get as far away from Europe as possible, unburdened by this conflict?

Doctorow:
No, I think that Trump was advised, I don’t think that he initiated this, but certainly got very clever advisors who did, for symbolism, so many elements of symbolism, taking Alaska. Some of them have been called out, including by Putin at the press briefing after the summit. But others which have not been called out generally, as I said the first thing that I wanted to call out is that it was bought. And it could be a model for how to end the Ukraine War if somebody would like to take it up, but it seems like nobody does.

50:08
And the other thing is that despite its [being] outside of Russian control since 1857– I think that was the year of the purchase, the Seward Purchase– there is a lively Russian community there, including the patriarch, sorry, the Metropolit, whom Putin met yesterday to give him two icons from Moscow, and the how many communities that are, Orthodox church communities, in Alaska, with mostly Eskimos in there as congregants, Inuits it is, properly speaking.

And the physical proximity, to remind everyone that Russia and the United States are not separated by oceans, but are separated by four kilometers of sea. The two islands that they both hold in the middle of the Bering Strait. This is important. It also would be, as it is on American soil, it’s the possibilities of wiretapping.

“Wiretapping”, it’s an old-fashioned term. Simply of snooping on the exchanges if it were taking place in the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Let’s not kid ourselves, it must be bugged like hell. And if they want to have complete confidentiality, until of course, they pass the bomb to Macron for what they decided, when it confidentially ended. Nonetheless, if they wanted to have a few moments of confidentiality, it was best assured of the United States.

It also gave Mr. Trump the opportunity to have a B-2 fly over them. Just to remind Mr. Putin, in case he forgot, the Americans do have a little bit of military technology out there. So in many respects, it was very convenient.

52:14
Also, the issue of flight rights, if it were to be in some places, it would be difficult for the Russians to get the flight passage authorization. Here there was no issue of the sort. They just flew over their own territory till they flew into American air space. These were reasons.

Of course, the opportunity for Putin to pay his respects to the nine Soviet Russian airmen whose tombs are just near that base and whom he visited after the summit. All of these are very important, symbolically, and to separate it from all other meetings that have been had and will be had as the negotiation and the war continues.

Diesen: 53:19
Yeah, whenever the Russians want to reach out to the Americans, they usually point out the shared war effort in the Second World War. But I guess this could be also a positive one, that they have this shared cultural heritage found in Alaska. The fact that it was also purchased in 1867 after the Civil War as opposed to taken by force, it makes it easier to celebrate a common heritage there as opposed to if it would have shifted hands in a more brutal manner.

But yeah, I don’t know. I thought it did take me by surprise. I had my money on United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. So I, yeah, I was mistaken on this. Gilbert, Doctorow, thank you so much for your time.

Doctorow: 54:11
Thanks for inviting me.

‘Judging Freedom’: Alaska Preview

Those in the Community who read my essay this morning on Substack will be heartened by what I had to say a few minutes ago in my weekly chat with Judge Andrew Napolitano. 

I introduced a pessimistic note this morning with reference to the discussions Donald Trump had with European leaders and with Volodymyr Zelensky via video conference. Trump was said to have promised Zelensky not to deal with the territorial issue when speaking to Vladimir Putin, nor would he discuss anything other than the Ukraine cease fire. Moreover, other sources said yesterday that Trump threatens Putin with “consequences” if he does not agree to a ceasefire tomorrow.

All of this sounded as if Trump had caved in to European pressure and reversed his position on the “summit,” essentially depriving it of any reason to be held.

However, in the couple of hours before the start of ‘Judging Freedom’ I listened to the latest broadcast of the authoritative Russian state television news and commentary show ‘Sixty Minutes’ and to a news wrap-up of Rossiya 1. This made it clear that Russia remains optimistic about the meeting with Trump and expects it to be substantive and successful. They named the five members of the Russian negotiating team – Minister of Defense Belousov, Foreign Minister Lavrov, Head of the Foreign Direct Investment Fund Dmitriev, Presidential advisor Ushakov and Finance Minister Siluanov. This indicates that a broad program of discussions is anticipated, including surely restoration of normal trade ties. The Russian commentary indicated that stabilization of global politics has been put on the agenda by the Russians.

As I said to Judge Napolitano, it is clear that Trump is lying to someone – either to the Europeans or to Putin.  I choose to believe that he is lying to the Europeans and that he will come back and put them in their place if he indeed reaches an amicable agreement on the major issues with Vladimir Putin, as his envoy Steve Witkoff seems to have done when the notion of a summit was discussed.

I used the opportunity in the interview to mention that the Russians have made stunning advances of more than 21 km yesterday in their ongoing offensive along the line of confrontation in Donbas.  This greatly accelerated  advance proves that the pace of Russian military action in the war is not dictated by the cautious rules of war of attrition alone but is susceptible to political scaling up as the geopolitical situation demands.  Should these talks tomorrow fail, I have little doubt that the Russians will make a very fast advance on the still untouched Ukrainian oblasts of Nikolaevsk and Odessa, reducing Ukraine to a land-locked rump state in preparation for its military obliteration.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2025

Transcript of RT Interview, 8 August

Transcript submitted by a reader

RT: 0:00
Let’s discuss this topic now with author, historian and geopolitical analyst Gilbert Doctorow. Gilbert, thanks a lot for joining us on the program. I just want to ask you, what do you think about this, your thoughts on the upcoming Putin-Trump meeting?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD:
Well, as your colleague at RT said a little bit earlier, this whole event is filled with symbolism, and I would like to unwrap some of the symbolism.

Some of my colleagues have tried to parse the language of Mr Ushakov when he was describing the agreement to meet with the American president. I say that the skills needed for this are not criminology. The skills are those of someone entering the Easter egg hunt. And what I mean by that is that we have to look at who initiated everything that is about to happen. That is Mr. Trump. Mr. Trump is known as a real estate man. And I haven’t heard anybody pay attention to what that means in a given instance other than to say that territory will be swapped. That’s the least of it.

1:04
As you just pointed out, swapping a little bit of Sumi, a little bit of Kharkov against a substantial amount of land in the Donbass that is not yet occupied by Russians, that isn’t a very interesting swap, is it? However, the swap will take place because something else is involved. Now, before I get to that something else involved, I want to look at another symbolism, the date. The date is the 15th of August. To most Americans, that doesn’t mean much.

To Europeans, it means a lot. To Catholics, it means a lot. The 15th of August is known as the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary. However, it all goes back 2,000 years to the Emperor Augustus, from which the month of August is named. And this date, 15th of August, is the Feira Agosto.

That is the celebration feast day of the Emperor Augustus. And who was Augustus? He was the founder of the Roman Empire, and he was the founder of the Pax Romana, the perpetual peace enforced by the Roman Empire. Mr. Trump is today’s Emperor Augustus, and he would like to be known for his Pax Trumpiana.

The point is that the day was not arbitrary. It’s highly symbolic. The place was not arbitrary. It’s highly symbolic. And the fact that it’s only two miles away from separating Russia and the United States is coincidental, but not decisive.

2:35
What is decisive is how did this territory become American? I haven’t heard a word about that. By the way, it was bought. It was bought. It was sold by the Russian Tsar, and it was bought by the Americans.

And that’s what we’re going to see now in Ukraine. And nobody’s saying a word about it. But let’s use our minds. Let’s expand a little bit. Let’s be extravagant like Mr. Trump is. The Russians have $350 billion worth of assets that are now frozen in the West. Practically speaking, they have written that off. In their bookkeeping internally, they recouped most of that money by the extraordinary profitability of selling hydrocarbons in the first days of the war. So $350 billion, well, you can buy a lot in Ukraine with that, can’t you?

And the opinion of Mr. Zelensky about refusing or accepting the $350 billion in exchange for all of the territory of Ukraine that Russia wants, which is the whole Donbass, the four oblasts that were named. Well, that’s a deal. That is Mr. Trump’s great art of the deal.

And I haven’t heard anybody talk about it yet, but it’s just hanging there, low-hanging fruit in front of our very noses. So I expect that there will be a deal. And I expect that whatever Mr. Zelensky thinks, if he doesn’t like it, they’ll be overthrown at once because the Ukrainian people would like to have that money to rebuild.

RT: 4:04
That’s a fascinating take, to be honest, about Augustus; and of course you have a deep understanding of the history of Alaska and Russian-US relations obviously. But I want to ask you, why do you think Zelensky himself, all things considered, wasn’t invited to this summit in the first place?

Doctorow:
His opinion is not wanted, because the decision at the end will not be his. It will be the decision of the Ukrainian people. Either he goes with what the polls are saying, which is that 70 percent of the Ukrainians now want the war to end, or he’ll be overthrown.

So to invite his opinion is useless. In fact, it’s counterproductive. The parties, the United States and Russia, will tell him what his deal is. The Ukrainian people will go for that deal, because it’s fantastic for them. And that will be it, whether Zelensky stays or goes, that will be his decision, but it will have no influence on the outcome of this war.

RT: 5:01
Well, you mentioned the art of the deal, how obviously Trump is approaching this as a businessman in large part. And the Kremlin also pointed out that these two countries, they’re neighbors, right? And both Alaska and the Arctic, they both hold great potential for joint projects. So do you think that this could be in part an attempt to come to a peace agreement, but also in part to expand some sort of joint projects there?

Doctorow:
Joint projects, of course. Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Direct Investment Fund, has been an integral part of all discussions. And everyone knows that he is a backer of the old idea of a tunnel bridge connecting Russia and the United States over the Bering Strait. So that, of course, is an element that cannot be excluded. At the same time, the real possibilities for further development of whatever is reached on the 15th of August are on a different level. They are at global security.

6:00
The time on the New START treaty, the arms limitation treaty, is expiring in ’26. It is entirely predictable that if the parties reach an agreement on the 15th in the little petty business of the Ukraine war, they will move on to the big global issues of arms control, removing the threat of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which would come with the introduction of American missiles in ’26 in Germany. These issues will then be next on the agenda. So what we’re looking forward to is a big rollout of a global realignment for which the first step will happen on the 15th of August.

RT: 6:48
Well, you brought up a lot of good reasons for why this meeting is set to take place in Alaska. But also, there were other options that we heard about before, right? The United Arab Emirates was brought up. And of course, there are other more neutral countries that could have been chosen. Again, Alaska is not neutral territory. It’s a state of the United States. What do you think was the main factor in them choosing Alaska over these other potential venues?

Doctorow: 7:13
Well, Mr. Trump’s a showman, first of all, and nothing could be showier and more symbolic than having it in Alaska, which was purchased by the United States from Russia. And that is what he probably has put on the table to Mr. Putin, that Russia purchase the land that it now occupies and that it claims as part of the Russian Federation from Ukraine on condition that there be a complete and permanent peace between the countries, which puts an end to any Ukrainian claims against Russia, and puts a big “Nyet” on all the hopes of warmongers in Europe to continue this conflict.

Now, why Alaska? There are other reasons, one of which nobody has mentioned, security. To reach this meeting in Alaska, Mr. Putin flies only over Russian territory. That’s not a bad solution.

He doesn’t have to cross anybody’s territory and doesn’t have to have 20 jets accompanying his jet so he isn’t shot down. This is reality. This is the world we live in today. And I believe that was another factor.

RT: 8:30
All right. Well, we have a little bit more time left, but if you could give me a pretty short answer to this next question, right? Donald Trump ran on peacemaking. I mean, the Ukraine conflict was one of the main things that he said he was going to fix during his campaign trail. But he’s put a lot of things on the back burner in terms of things he promised on the campaign trail. So after, let’s say this is done with in Alaska and a peace deal is reached, where do you think Trump is going to go next in terms of promises that he made on the campaign trail or different foreign policies that he’s looking to establish?

Doctorow: 9:03
The big outstanding contradiction to his peace mission is, of course, the genocide in Gaza. And that is an issue that will not go away even after this deal is signed or is reached on the 15th of August. It won’t go away for a little bit of time because the general accommodation with Russia, that is Mr. Trump’s intent, and I would say possibly also, however paradoxical it may sound, an accommodation with China, which may come in September if the next Yalta meeting is held there for the celebration of the 80th anniversary in Beijing of the end of the war in the Pacific.

9:51
These accommodations have to go through Congress. And Mr. Trump is very dependent in Congress on the Zionist majority in both houses, pro-Zionists. People say the Israeli lobby, well, the Israeli lobby was a factor, but there are also other factors. There are these born-again Christians who are Zionists also.

And so Mr. Trump has this problem of navigating Congress, and he is stuck with this Zionist presence in Congress. And he cannot, he doesn’t have much wiggle room in dealing with Israel for that reason. For this very reason, it is incumbent on Europe to do something and to take a lead and do something of importance on the world stage and not just kick the tires about Trump’s policies here and there. So, Europe has a great opportunity to lead peace in Palestine. I hope they take it. Mr. Trump, unfortunately, because of political realities, cannot do that on the other burning issue of world peace.

RT: 11:07
All right, Gilbert Doctorow, author, historian and geopolitical analyst, thanks a lot for joining us on the program.

Doctorow:
My pleasure.

Transcript of Diesen interview, 8 August

Transcript submitted by a reader

Prof. Glenn Diesen: 0:00
Hi everyone and welcome back. We are joined today by Gilbert Doktorow, a historian, international affairs analyst and also author of books such as “The War Diaries: The Russia-Ukraine War”.

So I tend to be more pessimistic than you in terms of the future of this war, the ability to reach some peaceful settlement. But I was struck a bit by some optimism now with this recent meeting, that is Witkoff going to Moscow. And again, anyone familiar with the NATO-Russia relations over the past 30 years is probably aware that deception has been a key component. But what we saw is the deadline expired. That is what began as a 50-day, then became a 10-day deadline.

Instead of sending weapons and sanctions, at least for now, Witkoff went to Moscow and his peers were getting a meeting between Putin and Trump. What are you reading into this quick development? Do you see something which has happened behind the scenes, or is this just noise?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD: 1:15
Well, a lot of things clearly have happened behind the scenes, and for that reason it’s difficult to judge the degree of agreement that Witoff reached with his Russian counterparts, Putin and this Shakov and who else was there, Mikhail Dmitriev. Look, in my recent interviews, I look at comments, one of them was, “Oh, Doctorow has become really an apologist for Trump.” I consider this progress, because before, six months ago, they would have said Doctorow was an apologist for Putin. So we’re getting there.

I tried not to be an apologist for anybody. And if Trump is doing something stupid, I will not hesitate to say that. If what he’s doing is unlikely to succeed to my knowledge, I will also say that. There is one troubling note here in the brief information that has been sent out as to what was discussed and how our preparations are being made for the Trump-Putin meeting in the near future, meaning possibly in the coming week. That is the– what I find disturbing is the notion that Zelensky would have been invited. Because that goes contrary to what I understood was the hopeful sign coming out of the Witkoff- Putin talks.

2:51
The hopeful sign being that the discussions would go far beyond the particulars of the Ukraine crisis, the territories that each side would retain or have to give up, the question of Ukraine in NATO and the rest of it. And they would talk about bigger issues, constructive discussion they had. I think Ushakov said it was, there was the probability, likelihood, of discussing strategic cooperation.

Well, yes, that would definitely interest the Russians and would bring Mr. Putin together with Mr. Trump, but Mr. Zelensky doesn’t fit into that at all. And so if indeed Zelensky were to be invited, that puts in question the first point. Are they discussing only Ukraine and only the terms of the ceasefire, or are they discussing the issues which the Russians really want to talk about?

3:50
Now what are the issues the Russians want to talk about? One of your recent guests put out some ideas. And he is well informed; I’d say he’s probably a centrist person within the American foreign policy establishment. And he was saying, yes, they would talk about cooperation in the Arctic, and they would talk about ending the sanctions and reintegrating Russia into the greater world, the Western world. Because as he said, Russians in general consider themselves to be Europeans, to be part of Western civilization, and they are very disappointed that they are excluded from that context, from that place where they believe they belong to be, by the sanctions which are caused by the war.

4:44
Here I disagree completely. Five years ago, yes, that would have been an accurate statement. As I have been saying for some time, and this is not just my own observation; the Russians have been talking about it with great insistence. The war has brought forward new elites. The war has made even among the intellectuals who are almost by definition not supporters of the Putin regime, so to speak, that they had become patriotic and that they were less concerned that they couldn’t spend a summer vacation in Paris or elsewhere in Western Europe or even visit the States. So if they could come back with a lot of stories to discuss with their friends.

5:36
That’s over. Russia may not feel comfortable with Chinese cars. That’s now being discussed, how these cars are being accepted or rejected by Russian consumers. They may not feel comfortable with spending a summer vacation on North Korea’s latest tourist beaches, But they certainly will not exchange the loss in treasure and in life of the last three years for the sake of going back to the status quo ante and being integrated into Western economy and society.

6:15
That’s gone. That is over, and it will not come back. There will be some accommodation with the West, but not in the sense that existed before. No one talks about it, but I’ll say it right here and now. Russia had a big inferiority complex across the board. Anyone you spoke to, other than a handful of super patriots, before this war, the predominant feeling in Russia was, “we can’t make anything”.

This takes me back to late 1990s. I remember a very smart taxi driver was taking my wife and me around downtown Petersburg and he remarked, we Russians, we make very cute babies, but we’re lousy at making cars. Now, that was a widespread belief. And I think that the last three years and the re-industrialization of Russia and the import substitution in Russia and the takeover of Western companies by Russian entrepreneurs or the Russian state producing virtually the same products under a different name. That’s changed it all.

Russia didn’t produce any cheese before. Ridiculous. They didn’t produce cheese. In 1912, Russia was supplying butter to Denmark. This is not my guess. I have a yearbook on my library shelf. A 1912 yearbook was published in the UK, all describing all the trade relations between Russia and UK and the West, and they were exporting butter to Denmark. Well, they can’t, they weren’t making any cheese. Well, they’re making all kinds of cheese now. The, as I said before, what Mr. Trump wants to do with his tariffs is to imitate what the Russians have done, thanks to Western sanctions, to re-industrialize. So the game has changed. The idea that this could be an issue for discussion that would bring Mr. Putin, Mr. Shakov, Dmitriev to the table and, “Yeah, well, let’s get on with it. We’ll have an immediate ceasefire, and you’ll put us back into the European and American markets.”

That’s gone. So what could they talk about? What is the big issue that would have persuaded Mr. Putin and his close advisors that they should meet with Trump now? What could Mr. Witkoff have brought with him? Well, I think he had to have addressed the core issues. What he could have done to make the whole thing palatable to all sides, meaning also the Ukrainians if they are strong-armed and the Europeans, is to speak about phasing in what is essentially the Russian solution and presenting it in such a way that it would not look like what it is, which is virtual surrender. Virtual surrender is not acceptable to NATO, is not acceptable to the United States.

9:20
Mr. Trump will be pilloried if he does nothing to sweeten the settlement and to make it seem as though he’s in control. All the news we see on every possible subject these weeks has one newsmaker, and his name is Donald Trump. It gives you the sense that he’s in control of things even if he absolutely is not. And he is certainly not in control of how this war will end.

But he has to have the appearance of that. And so he has decided that he should meet with Mr. Putin. And Mr. Putin has responded.

Although if you read yesterday’s and today’s “Financial Times”, oh, no, sorry, if you listened to the BBC this morning, you would understand that Putin was eagerly pursuing Trump for a meeting, because that will restore his prestige as an international player. That’s how they turn everything on its head.

Well, coming back to this answer to your question, I’ve been a bit long-winded, but the answer to your question: the Americans probably brought a phasing in, stage one, stage two, stage three, which makes it possible to sit and negotiate. The end result will be very much in accordance with the Russians’ demands, which are not maximalist. They haven’t changed one iota from where they were in June 2024, when Mr. Putin reiterated what he first said in February 2022, what Russia’s ambition is, although he put it more clearly and in easier-to- understand terms. But essentially it came to the same thing, what this denazification, well that’s regime change, the demilitarization, well the Ukrainian army goes, but mostly it’s evaporating in front of our eyes. So these things are being achieved and now they want to codify it, but they cannot do it in one session. That will be too awful for the West.

11:28
So I think the issue to discuss is how to phase this in, in a way that leaves Mr. Trump at least with an off-ramp that’s respectable and the Europeans can go to hell. They’ll have to accommodate to whatever the Americans and the Russians agree, because they will have no weapons to supply to the Ukraine and Ukraine will sink.

So that is what I see coming, a discussion of the timetable for arriving at the Russians’ Dzerak, their requirements for peace treaty.

Diesen: 12:04
I was told by a credible American source that not only was Washington becoming much more eager to find a settlement because of the disaster happening on the front. That is, it looks like a total collapse could happen within the next few months. But I was also told that Zelensky, that he had apparently changed a bit as well. While in the past viewed himself as being this new Churchill who will bring back the glory of Ukraine and defeat Russia, all of this has now begun to fade away. And if the Americans put something in front of him and pressured him, he would likely sign. So it’s again, it’s none of the certainty.

12:53
And indeed the Russians are asking for a lot. But now this, yeah, Kremlin advisor Yuri Ushakov, he was in the news arguing that the Americans had put forward a proposal, which they, which he said was seemingly acceptable to Moscow. This is, I never heard this language before. And given how far the parts, the two different sides have been apart, it seems as if something significant must have shifted. Because my first impression was perhaps this Witkoff going to Moscow, talking about a Trump-Putin meeting is just a way to get Trump, well, save face after he made this silly, you know, 10 day deadline, which I don’t understand.

But there seems to actually be some substance in place here. But did you read the comments by Oshokov the same way? And if so, what do you think such a deal must include? Because again, the Russians aren’t going to, after 30 years of struggling over the European security architecture, more than three years of losing men on the front lines. Now, finally, at the cusp of victory, it’s going to just throw it away.

14:14
I assume that there’s a reason why they’re able to put these harsh demands. So what do you think might be in this deal that Osakoff is referring to?

Doctorow:
I’m not quite sure, but there are sticking points here. Again, to address that question with being an apologist for Trump, I have no illusions about the humanitarian motives that are absent from his peace seeking. Nor do I accept the notion that the man is so vain that he’s doing everything for the sake of getting the Nobel Peace Prize.

I don’t think even Mr. Trump is that vain, to put aside national interest of the United States and the lives of all the other parties to this conflict, for the sake of getting that piece of paper, that little award which Obama received for doing nothing whatsoever, just for not being Bush. I think there’s much more to it, but it’s in conflict in my mind. What exactly? The overall overarching concept could be “separate the Russians from the Chinese so we can proceed with taking on China”.

15:31
However, that falls flat. There is no way conceivable that Russia is going to betray China. No way. When I said the other day that one, that Mr. Witoff could have been talking to Dmitriyev about getting access to Russian-produced rare metals, rare-earth metals, as the point for negotiation or preparing for negotiation with the Chinese in the coming week or two, where the Chinese are withholding those urgently needed materials to frustrate any plans of punishing tariffs or any limitations on export of technology to China by Mr. Trump. It is inconceivable that Mr. Putin will give free access to Russian rare-earth metals to spite China. That is off the table.

16:37
So what exactly Mr. Trump hopes to achieve considering that Russia and China are inseparable, I’m not quite sure. So we really have to look a little bit further. And I’m not sure that Mr. Trump is, his advisors are blind to that reality. I also have mentioned the timing coming back to why 10 days or what 50 days because September 3rd is inconvenient.

It’s too close to the convening of this end of the Pacific war for World War Two the 80th anniversary celebrations will be in Beijing, to which Mr. Trump presumably is desperate to be invited. That is possible. It suggests that the Yalta type meeting that we all thought might possibly happen, when Moscow celebrated the 80th anniversary of the end of the European war, and didn’t happen. Maybe would happen now in the Pacific, in Beijing. It’s possible.

17:46
As I’ve said recently, I don’t have a microphone under Mr. Putin’s pillow. We really don’t have a microphone under Mr. Trump’s pillow. And there are contradictory objectives when you look at what he says and even what he does, to complicate our reading of these tea leaves, our attempting to make sense out of it all. It could be that they still have some illusions or delusions with respect to separating Russia from China. I find it hard to believe, but Americans can be peculiar. What else could be going through their minds? What else [could they] be using to reach a quick accommodation with Mr. Putin without looking like they’ve lost the war?

And I think Putin will be very amenable to helping them off the off-ramp. He’s certainly smart enough. He did that with Obama with respect to the bombing Syria over the alleged use of chemical weapons. So he knows how to let his opponents off the hook, getting what he wants without embarrassing them to the point where he’s got enemies. But for me right now, it’s a bit hard to say just how this trick will be done.

Diesen: 19:16
Yeah, I would have been more reassured if I heard some talks about actually the European security architecture, because so far there’s been too much reference to an unconditional ceasefire and Trump still in his language. I mean, there’s a contradiction. His language still refers to this as as if it would be a war between Ukraine and Russia, which is problematic for the peace efforts if it takes NATO and America’s role out of this. On the other hand, he calls the war Biden’s war, which Biden began by pushing NATO.

So it’s not very consistent. If it’s Biden’s war, how is it only limited between Ukraine and Russia? But again, with Trump, you never know what is the noise and what does he actually know. I was wondering though, how you read his, if you think Trump is misinformed either deliberately or just out of ignorance by his advisors, because from Trump we hear these comments such as, I think he said, there’s 20,000 Russians dying a month, which is, it doesn’t make any sense in any way. It’s quite outlandish.

And also when he was asked about what’s happening in Ukraine, people elderly people being dragged to the front. And he said, Oh, I don’t know anything about that. And now of course, putting this deadline to begin with, the 10-day deadline … if he knows that Russia considers this to be an existential threat, they’re willing to fight this all the way, why would he think that they would capitulate now, in other words, accept freezing the front lines and allowing NATO to revive the conflict in the future if they would need to put pressure on Russia. I mean, it doesn’t make any sense that this was always ridiculous, that the Russians would accept this. Is this misinformed or is it just, you know, talking to his own base or what is he? I have a very hard time understanding some of the strange information and decisions which are coming out.

21:35
Well, they’ll confuse the other side, but don’t confuse yourself. I would take as an operating assumption that he is not confused and that all of these confusing and oftentimes very bizarre statements that come out of him are intended, are a demonstration of his contempt for the press and for his opponents who are the most vocal elements of society at large. The silent majority doesn’t say much. His opponents say a lot and are hurt a lot and what they say is picked up by media.

22:11
There are contradictions here, and I think It’s much too early for us to present with clarity what is going to happen when they meet and what is the intended outcome, why the Russians would have agreed to this meeting when it goes against all of their rules. Russian television is informing us that yes, contrary to the general rule of preparing in great detail and over considerable time for summit meetings, the Russians are prepared this time to make an exception and to hold this very quickly, and they’re working like mad. The Americans are working like mad to observe this shortened schedule. Supposedly it’s about agreeing a ceasefire, but I don’t believe that.

23:07
There’s no way that the Russians can accept a ceasefire when the Europeans are not present at this. The Americans, by definition, are not going to be supplying further weapons to Ukraine. The Europeans are. And the Russians do not accept under any condition that a ceasefire will take place while weapons are being dispatched into Ukraine. So that is a non-starter.

There’s something else going on in Ukraine. We don’t know it. But I think it’s best not to assume that people are ill-informed, that some maliciousness is at work. The advisors to Putin, to Trump, or I should say even to Putin one of one very well-known former economist and at a high level in American politics is insisting that Mr. Putin is being deceived and misled by his advisors.

24:04
I think it would be safe just to hold back and let’s see what happens at this meeting. But there are definite contradictions in the structure of the meeting, which is what is called out now. How can you agree on a ceasefire when Europeans aren’t present? The only person who was called out, the need for Europeans has been Urban, who came out yesterday with a statement that Merz and the French Macron should go to Moscow now, or after the meeting that Trump has with Putin, and present the European position to Moscow, because the EU institutions are totally incapable of doing that.

24:47
Well, I agree with him on that point. But whether or not much will be achieved by Macron and Merz going to Moscow … well, better to talk than not to talk. That can’t see a solution on the ceasefire without the Europeans being brought in. But obviously not at the first meeting, just as it’s senseless to have Zelensky there when the only thing that could have motivated the Russians to agree to a meeting has nothing to do directly with the Ukraine conflict. It has to do, as you said, with revising the security architecture of Europe, for which Mr. Zelensky has no place at the table.

25:26
So there are confusing signals that you and I have detected, and I suppose others as well, which make it difficult to predict what the outcome of this meeting would be.

Diesen:
I got that impression both from some Americans and Russians that they need to first get the big pieces in place, that is the European security order, which effectively means the relationship between the Americans and the Russians. And then once this is an order, then the Ukrainian issue can be resolved. So you want to deal with it in the right order and also been told that yeah that they have the same both the Moscow and Washington have the same views of the Europeans, that yes, they have to be brought in, but first after the decisions have been made.

So, and then, you know, if you can get the Washington, Moscow, and then get the Kiev to sign under then the Europeans will just be a formality, I guess. But let’s say this, I wonder what the post-war settlement might look like when the war is done. Because in terms of the wider European order, if you thought about this, let’s say next week they hash out the deal, I’m not so that optimistic, but the war can come to an end within a few weeks.

The Russians make the point that they have to deal with the Americans because they have to. America remains a very important part of the international system. And also, if you want the world to function and have stability, Russia and America always have to work together. But as you suggested before, there is a longing to return to Europe. It seems to be gone.

27:15
Indeed, when you talk to migrants from Russia in Europe, many say that they were initially surprised. They knew that Russia was always a bit mocked for being an economic mess, but they were surprised about how much hatred there is towards Russians. But now, of course, this inferiority complex, it’s more or less gone. I guess this is what happens when you defeat NATO on the battlefield, but it’s also the sense of admiration for Europe, which is gone. I mean, throughout the Cold War, yes, there was some animosity towards Western governments, as you would [think], but overall there was some admiration for the way society was organized.

The economies we had, the social systems, the technologies, there seemed to be some moral or values. But now, of course, a lot of this is seen as decaying and indeed the culture wars we’re having where everything has to be deconstructed. This has become a source of mockery in the Russian media. What do you think, or your sense, what kind of relationship do you think the Russians want with Europe once this war is actually over?

Doctorow: 28:28
Well, I think they would be very happy to go back to their position as very close economic partners of Europe without taking it to the embarrassing extreme that Macron described several years ago, that Russia was a big, great supplier of raw materials.

I think that notion is not satisfactory or sufficient for restoring economic ties with Europe. But let me just make an attempt. What could they possibly have said to President Putin, what Witkoff could have brought with him, that would be considered constructive and could justify this meeting? And let’s take, put it in the historical context. What did the Americans and the Russians, who disliked one another, who didn’t necessarily respect one another, always put forward as the first topic for discussion? Arms control.

29:26
Arms control. That is the most value-neutral thing that they could discuss next week, which would set the tone for solving all the other issues, which would receive the undeserved acclaim in Europe and the United States. If they were to discuss restoring the intermediate and short-range missile agreement in a new form and preventing or removing the advance-positioned Russian missiles and the plans for stationing American missiles in Germany next year, that would be hailed by everybody. And from that good atmosphere, they could proceed to the really tough and miserable discussions about concluding the Ukraine war.

So there might be something, I say this completely off the table, but nobody’s talking about it because it’s all been kept very highly secret from all of us, whereas it should be till now.

30:37
So I wouldn’t eliminate the possibility some concrete positive and promising could come out of a meeting between Putin and Trump in a week’s time, one which has no need whatsoever for Mr. Zelensky or for the Europeans to be present. And that could set the tones I’d say for dealing with the really tough questions of resolving the Ukraine war and also revising European architecture. If you take off this five-minute long delivery strike times of missiles within the European theatre, life gets a lot easier. You can breathe much easier, and the tension over European security would be toned down considerably. So that could be it, but it’s a guess, nothing more than a guess.

Diesen: 31:31
Well, you know, this is a problem when the diplomacy, of course, is behind closed doors. Just my last question though is, if this peace agreement goes through, if they actually deal with the European security architecture, what happens to NATO? Again, I think that one of the reasons why the Europeans are or seem to prefer keeping the war going is as long as you have a conflict, then NATO will still have a purpose and it will keep the Americans on the continent. You and I discussed before that the fear of the Europeans is once the Americans get to leave Ukraine, they will also likely leave Europe to a large extent, both resource priorities and everything going to Asia. So do you think peace in Ukraine could destroy NATO?

Doctorow: 32:27
Again, if it’s taken by itself, yes. If it’s put in a broader context, such as I just was mentioning, just on the arms control or also with regard to new technologies and putting a lid on drone warfare, putting a lid on AI warfare, robotics, putting a lid on these new technologies, which are awesome, frightening, and drive the anxiety on all sides, then these other issues, the traditional issues of territory and language rights and the rest of it, become much easier to deal with. And NATO’s fading away is almost an afterthought rather than the first urgent concern, which it is today for Europeans. So I don’t know how smart these people are. I don’t know how wide, broad their perspective is, whether they’ve taken it in, in a sense that I just presented it or not.

33:41
But I would give them the benefit of the doubt. I don’t think, unlike Craig Roberts, I don’t think Mr. Putin is being managed by his advisors, who are all lovers of foie gras and the Mediterranean coast. I think that there are some serious people on the Russian side. I hope they’re equally serious people.

I don’t consider Witkoff to be anything but a very serious man. And I don’t think he would have wasted his time on this mission if he saw it as hopeless. I’m being an optimist. I don’t deny the right of pessimists to also claim the same territory.

Diesen: 34:34
Well, this week at least, we’re much closer to your optimism as, yeah, there seems to be some movement, which you suggested in the past as well, that there are things happening in the background.

But yeah, well, as you said before, you used to be referred to as a Putin apologist. Now you’re a Trump apologist. I do think this is one of the wider problems we’re having though. It’s always during wars. So you see that if you’re not sufficiently, for example, anti-Russian, then you can be accused of being pro-Russian.

So everything is so polarized. It’s either black or white and all gray is just eliminated. So this is one of the things I’m most fearful of now in the West as well, the inability to consider the security concerns of opponents. I always make this comment that the media, the politicians, I never hear anyone talk about the Russian security concerns, the Iranian, the Chinese. It’s always, it’s always colored in the language of just being belligerent and evil, essentially.

I think this is a, makes it much more difficult to understand our opponents. But unfortunately, if you try to understand Trump, that label fits as well, then you’re a Trump apologist.

Doctorow:
Well, as we gather today, the tea hasn’t even been poured. One week from today, we can read tea leaves.

Diesen:
Well, as always, thank you so much for your insights, and have a great weekend.

Doctorow: 36:10
You too, thanks.

‘Judging Freedom,’ 6 August 2025: Is Moscow Optimistic?

Today’s chat focused on the visit of Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow in which he spent just under three hours with President Putin. The very length of their meeting suggests that there was a lot more going on than the delivery by Witkoff of Trump’s ultimatum over ending the war at once. This is further confirmed by Witkoff’s walk yesterday in the Zaryadye park next to Red Square in the company of Kiril Dmitriev, head of Russia Direct Investment and the man best prepared to discuss with the Americans prospective cooperative projects, not escalation of the confrontation.

I made the point that the seemingly bizarre actions of Trump in the past week – namely the dispatch of two U.S. nuclear missile bearing submarines closer to Russia, the delivery of nuclear weapons to the U.K. and the declaration by the senior U.S. military officer in Europe Christopher Donahue that the U.S. has ready plans to seize the Kaliningrad enclave of the Russian Federation – were just posturing to appease Senator Lindsey Graham and other radical politicians supporting Trump in Congress and were seen as such by the Kremlin. None of this creates new existential threats to Russia.

However, my main point, which Judge Napolitano now plans to put to Scott Ritter for comment later today is that the more pressure Trump & Co. place on Russia by introducing new sanctions, such as those directed against the shadow fleet of oil tankers delivering Russian oil to India and other global markets, the faster the Russian armed forces are taking territory and destroying the military assets of Ukraine. The attempted bullying only has a perverse effect of bringing peace nearer by hastening the Russian victory.

I enjoyed the opportunity to pass along to viewers speculation in Russian news today that a young parliamentarian in the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, 35 year old Anna Skorokhod is being mentioned as a possible candidate to replace Zelensky now that the Americans are intent on his removal. Skorokhod has been loudly criticizing the forcible recruitment of youths and seniors into the Ukrainian army. She has said to the press that there are 400,000 deserters from the Ukrainian army today and she supports them. They say that Skorokhod has the support of a close business associate of Donald Trump. Could this be Witkoff?

Jeffrey Sachs is back to selling snake oil

Jeffrey Sachs is a magnificent orator.  His speech in the European Parliament a couple of months ago denouncing the decades-long destructive behavior of the United States on the world stage was a tour de force. I take my hat off to him for that.

However, by professional training, he is an economist not an orator and it is my intention to address that side of his activities in this brief essay.

In the 1990s, Sachs was a key foreign adviser to Poland and Russia in their transition from Communist-led planned economies to market economies.  In Poland, this transition was overly long but reasonably successful in the end as measured by growing prosperity if not by economic sovereignty as the country became a colony of Germany. I always considered that Poland’s success was due less to the sage advice of Sachs and other carpetbaggers from U.S. universities and more to the return to Poland of Western trained Polish business cadres from London, from the USA after the fall of Communism. It is they who took leading positions in the economy.

In Russia, Sachs’ advice on drastic reforms, taken up by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and his followers, resulted in catastrophic collapse of the economy, in generalized pauperization of the population while a very few foxes among the sheep became fabulously wealthy – those whom we in the West came to know as ‘oligarchs.’  The entire process gave democracy and free markets a dirty name in Russia that the population has still not outlived.

To be sure, Sachs at the time and ever since has said in exculpation that he had also advised the U.S. government at the time to extend massive financial assistance to Russia to see it through the painful period of transition. This Washington did not do, of course.  Nice words, but they do nothing to mitigate the real damage, meaning the closing of most factories and production facilities caused by the shock therapy urged by Sachs and other Liberals. They came to Russia with an inflated sense of their own skills, ignoring the fact that no one, NO ONE in the 1990s had relevant experience to see any country the size of Russia through the shift to a market economy. In ordinary parlance, we call that hubris.  Hubris is not just monopolized by the President and his entourage in Washington.

Let us now move forward to today.  Jeffrey Sachs’ latest interviews, which are watched by vast audiences on youtube, persuade me that, as they say, the dog has returned to his vomit.  He is selling highly partisan anti-Trump economics.

There are in this Community those who will object to my criticizing so sharply and publicly another upstanding member of the Opposition Movement to U.S. hegemonism.  I ask that you hold your fire and hear me out.  First, because Sachs himself is directing ad hominem attacks against others in public space. 

The commentators in The Washington Post are ‘idiots’ he tells us.  They may be wrong-headed. They may be paid well to lie. But I don’t think they are mentally deficient.

The analysts producing papers promoting ‘American primacy’ are not analysts at all, Sachs tells us.  Really?  Misguided, I would say.  Dishonest, I would say.  But that they are not analysts?  Really, Mr. Sachs, do clean up your language if you expect others in the Movement like me to be more indulgent towards you.

                                                                       *****

The interview which got my attention yesterday focused on U.S. relations with China, which, said Sachs, were splendid from the mid-1970s up to 2010 when America’s foreign policy elites decided that China was growing too fast and was threatening America’s national ambition to retain global ‘primacy.’  From that point on, the demonization of Beijing set in. Defense alliances were constructed to ‘contain’ China. Trade alliances were designed to isolate China. And so forth, and so on, taking us to the present day when the American foreign policy establishment is preparing the broad public for the idea of a military clash with China that will remove the threat to American global hegemony once and for all.

So, China was no threat to the American economy? 

Says Sachs, it was all win-win.  American companies prospered by manufacturing cheaply in China and participating in global distribution.  California did stunningly well from the China trade, he tells us.  OK, he concedes, sotto voce, the American Mid-West took a hit and industries there suffered, but the problem could have been addressed by assistance from Washington, if Washington had an industrial policy, which it stupidly (per Sachs) does not have.

Dear Mr. Sachs, I ask you to follow the current rules of transparency when you issue your sweeping commentary like the foregoing.  You are wedded to globalization, which was, above all, an economic policy backed by the Democrats and has been their chief point of pride in economic policy.  Think of al those multilateral free trade agreements that every Democratic president had to have on his CV.

No matter that the Dems are supposedly the party of the working class while globalization has and always will strip away well-paying manufacturing jobs that allowed working class people to live normal lives and to prepare their offspring for middle class professional jobs, if they so wished. Those manufacturing jobs have been replaced by part time work, gigs, delivery work for Uber Eats, at best jobs in McDonalds flipping burgers.  All of this is not my personal discovery. It has been called out long ago by many, including by the incumbent Republican president.

I am not saying that imposition of crippling tariffs on Chinese exports is justified. Moderation always makes for better statesmanship.  But directionally, the USA has to undo the excesses of outsourcing and to repeal the tax legislation that made production abroad more profitable for US corporations than production at home. Such carve-outs always provide greater advantages to certain industries and to certain companies within those industries than to the economy as a whole.  While my peers all speak in unison about the bribery of Congress by the military industrial complex, so far I do not hear a word about the bribery of Congress by industries and by specific companies within those industries seeking or enjoying the terms of multilateral free trade pacts and the tax benefits of producing and retaining profits abroad.

Mr. Sachs, where are you on all of those issues?  Or are they also just the tomfoolery of ‘idiots’?

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2025

Transcript of Glenn Diesen interview, 1 August

Transcript submitted by a reader

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEO16V1X7Fg

Prof. Glenn Diesen: 0:00
Hi everyone and welcome back. We’re joined today by Gilbert Doctorow, an international affairs analyst, historian and author of books such as “War Diaries: the Russia-Ukraine War”. So welcome to the show. I want to ask you about the state of relations between the European Union and the United States, because as we all know, von der Leyen and Trump, they reached a US-EU trade agreement. And for many people, myself included, it looks more or less like a complete capitulation and subordination, and something that could, I guess, change the relationship between the EU and US, but also something that can undermine the internal cohesion of the European Union itself. So given that you’re located there in Brussels, what does this agreement actually include? And can you make any sense of it?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD: 1:03
The agreement that was reached in Scotland has two important sides to it. One is what everybody is talking about, the tariffs. And the tariffs are now set at generally 15% down from a tentative 25% before an agreement was reached. But that doesn’t cover all products and services. Airplanes or airplane parts, for example, are not included in this. They are at a much lower tariff rate. There are other products which will be negotiated still.

For example, wines and liquor, which are of great interest to one of the leading countries in the EU, that is France, and that probably will be negotiated at a different level, lower level, in the wishes of the French. But looking at the tariffs, that is severe. It is compared to where we were at the start of the year. It is less than the dramatic and ruinous tariffs that Trump had spoken about before he would negotiate a deal.

And will this bring European manufacturing across the ocean to the United States at the expense of jobs in Europe? It’s not quite clear. There is very little discussion of what Europe actually sells to the States and how vulnerable it is to loss of market share due to price increases. That’s something we can perhaps get into, but what I have in mind is that mass products, products that are bought and used by the vast majority of the population, they are not typically European products. They are Chinese products. European products include a lot of luxury goods, and luxury goods are being sold to wealthy people for whom a 15% tariff won’t make a big difference.

3:07
So the real impact on European sales in the States from this agreement in Scotland still has to be refined. One cannot make definitive statements yet, because it’s not complete. There are these negotiations at the margins. But what was most outstanding and of course what impressed observers of all political stripes by the way, not just observers who are anti-American or pro-American. No, no.

All observers came to one conclusion. It was, as you say, a capitulation. To put it in other terms, it was an enormous humiliation for Europe. Von der Leyen went to Scotland, cap in hand, as more or less a beggar without any, not negotiating from strength, as I like to say these days. On the contrary, she’s negotiating from weakness and from the fear that the failure to reach an agreement would end in a tariff war that could cost Europe five million jobs.

So she was under enormous pressure to ingratiate herself with a man whom she knows despises her. Trump has never made that a secret. And she came away with something that isn’t too terrible. That’s the consensus, again, of observers here in Europe. It’s not too terrible, but it’s bad and it’s particularly bad for the way it was reached, because it demonstrated that there is no leverage from the European side.

4:40
But that is one side of the story. The other side of discussion was the commitment by Europe to purchase 650 billion dollars in American hydrocarbons, that is, liquefied natural gas and petroleum, over the next three years. That is potentially a far bigger impact on Europe from this whole tariff discussion, because it locks in the non-competitive situation of European wares on world markets. The single biggest factor in the deindustrialization of Germany that has gone on for the last three years at least, when the Nord Stream pipelines were destroyed, when Europe swore off buying more Russian pipeline gas and cheap oil. That was a decisive factor making the German economy uncompetitive.

5:47
It was a decisive factor in whole sectors of industry shutting down completely, those sectors that were highly dependent on cheap energy, like glass manufacturing, for example. And fertilizers, of course. These were hit enormously. And the fertilizers being hit, of course, has passed along to consumers in higher prices for all fresh produce, which is produced with less efficiency, with lower yields when the fertilizers are used more sparingly because it’s more expensive.

So this aspect is not in the featured news, when it deserves to be. As I said, it locks in the uncompetitive status of European products on world markets. Now, can that figure be reached? That is another question. Will they actually reach it? Will they actually achieve that over the three-year period?

These are quite big question marks. The United States now exports 80 billion dollars a year of hydrocarbons to Europe. To go from there to 215 billion dollars a year is a big stretch, particularly since it’s not obvious that America has the production capacity to fill orders should they come in. So that is all debatable.

But if it were to be exercised, if in some way the United States could achieve these exports and Europe could absorb them, that will be a big dent in the European economies. And Europeans, the middle-of-the-road supporters of Atlanticism, had been searching hard to explain why they were so disadvantaged in the negotiations with Trump, how he was able to vanquish and have von der Leyen kneeling before him and kissing the ring. This is something that they’re debating. The Belgian leading French-speaking newspaper, “Le Soir”, blames the problem on Europe’s over-dependence on exports to drive economic growth. That is not a convincing argument to anyone who is aware of global trade, since that is precisely the formula that China has used and continues to use so successfully to achieve its enormous growth, presently 5% per annum, whereas in the first quarter of ’25, the Europeans were displaying great pleasure to have 0.1% GDP growth.

Diesen: 8:33
Well, isn’t the real dilemma of the European Union then not that they’re dependent on foreign trade, but that they’re excessively dependent on the United States as a partner? Because it seems as if the EU wants to have a reliable dependency on the United States as it had in previous decades. And in order to do this, they have to win over the … I call it the good will or affection of America by doing as they’re told, which includes reducing their economic ties with countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and well, American adversaries. But by trying to win over the love of Washington, they isolate themselves more in the world and become more dependent on the United States.

9:25
So is this, by committing themselves solely to the US, will this strengthen the relationship with Washington, or will it undermine it by giving the Americans too much leverage in this partnership?

Doctorow:
If “strengthen” means for both parties, of course not. Strengthen the American leverage over Europe, definitely. The question is why did Europe submit to this? Did it have to? What was the overriding consideration?

I think there is a certain understanding among many observers that the driving force was defense. And they hope that by staying close to Trump, by submitting to his will, they could maintain an ongoing conversation with him and persuade him to do what they want most of all, which is to continue to support Ukraine in its war on Russia, because they have made that, arbitrarily they have made that an existential threat to themselves for the sake of the leadership staying in power. That is to say, they’re singing and dancing and moving from the story of last three years that “Russia has to be defeated” to the story of the present, which is “We have to stay united. We need the present leadership in power because this is the only way that we can rearm Europe and prepare for a war with Russia that may take place as early as 2029.”

That is the current story that the present leadership in 25 out of 27 countries of the EU is putting forward to the press, to the public at large, as their re-election bid and as their bid for support. This is based on the same delusion that we’ve seen in their understanding of the Russia-Ukraine war from the beginning. The delusion here is that they can persuade Mr. Trump of anything. They can’t.

And they’re listening to what he says, which is a terrible mistake. Mr. Trump has nothing but contempt for the press. He has nothing but contempt for most of the European leadership. He knows that they are weak, that they are cowardly, they are conformist, and that they will be bullied.

And that is essentially what he is. He is a bully. He’s a bully who is successful at this trick. And he is telling them one thing and doing something else. What he’s doing is stopping supplies to Ukraine.

What he’s doing– this is something we can get into– is probably aiding and abetting the eviction of Zelensky from office and his replacement by somebody who is capable of negotiating a peace treaty with the Russians. So they are going to be bitterly disappointed. They’ve made a bet, they have allowed themselves to be humiliated, for the sake of continuing a war with American help, which will not happen.

Diesen: 12:43
Yeah, this is a comment I made all the way back in Munich when Vance gave this speech. And I was making the point that the Europeans’ efforts to show their loyalty to the United States instead of being rewarded, I think not just Trump, but at some general level across the political class, they’re getting some contempt for the Europeans for the, well, their spinelessness or the inability to stand up for their own interests.

So, and again, this is something I’ve heard from many people as well, so the assumption here is you make a deal, a humiliating deal, a bit of subordination and then somehow this would be rewarded by the United States locking in its presence in Europe. But we also had the Ukrainians making the same assumption with this minerals deal. If we just sign this deal, then Trump will be locked into the Ukraine conflict. But a counter-argument would be then that he can come home to his own people and say, “Look, I got our money back. Now we can leave.” I mean, do you see this? You said they make a mistake by trusting that he will stay there. But how do you see Trump’s commitment to Europe in the months to come, because he has been making a lot more aggressive rhetoric towards the Russians. Is this essentially what the Europeans bought themselves with this horrible trade agreement?

Doctorow: 14:17
Well, he keeps everybody guessing, including those who have bet the House on the unsuccessful relationship with Trump by the handshake agreement this past weekend in Scotland. He keeps them all guessing. Even yesterday, there was this expression of horror that was picked up by major media here in Western Europe that Trump was about to do a deal, cut a deal with Vladimir Putin, that would be vastly destructive of all the ambitions of the EU. I don’t think he’s going to cut such a deal. I don’t think that he has anything to offer the Russians that could persuade them to yield in any way on their conduct of the war, when the victory on the ground is so close to being achieved.

So that is also nonsense. But they are uncertain. The Europeans here are hoping that they have him on line and can persuade him by pointing to these terrible acts of bombing that the Russians are committing now in Kiev and elsewhere. They can persuade him using Melanie perhaps, all kinds of levers that they believe, want to believe, can get Trump to change his mind in the hope that he is not a serious man, that he does not have long-term vision, and that he can be changed from one day to the next by somebody whispering in his ear. That is all false, completely false.

Nonetheless, it persists as a widespread notion of who Mr. Trump is, here in Western Europe. And then you have the special relationship with Keir Starmer, which would seem to demonstrate the validity of such assumptions about Trump. But also, Starmer went to Scotland. Trump didn’t come down to London.

16:33
He was also a supplicant, and the relationship there with the British, they have the most-favored tariff deal out of all countries with the United States at present with a 10% tariff. And they’re gloating over that. But they still have 50% tariffs on steel, which were a very important export product to the United States. And so the British have been given the hope that they have a favored position with the United States as against Europe. But it can change at any moment.

And I think that, again, looking at politics, who stands where? Mr. Starmer, head of the Labor Party, which is to the left, shall we say, of Mr. Trump’s politics. I don’t think he enjoys real respect.

Trump has it his way. And he gets a meeting with the king, that’s fine. He likes pomp and circumstance. But I don’t think that he is genuinely influenced in making policy on these superficial acts one way or another with this or that state leader. He has his own determination to self-impose sanctions on the United States by way of tariffs for the sake of re-industrializing the United States. And I don’t think it’s a vain proposal.

Diesen: 18:00
No, but some of these threats, though, they seem to become actions. Well, I’m thinking then especially what Trump is doing with the Indians, that is putting this additional tariffs on and justifying it by their trade with the Russians. And this is why I was wondering as well, these 10 days, which he has put on, well, it was 15, now it’s 10. Obviously, this could become another 50 again.

So these deadlines doesn’t necessarily have to mean anything, but it does beg the question why he would make himself vulnerable in terms of putting these deadlines to begin with. What is the thought process here? What is it that he’s trying to achieve? And not if, when Russia predictably ignores this, what will happen on day 10?

Doctorow: 18:52
Well, let’s, there’s speculation about day 11. But let me add to the complexity of the analysis, by bringing in what Russians are talking about on their talk shows. I think it’s a different perspective from what is being said by any of my peers in the United States and Western Europe. And that is: why the 10 days, what is it all about? It’s because 50 days, inconveniently, inconveniently expires on September 3rd.

And that is much too close to the celebration of the end of the World War II in the Pacific, which will be marked by the visit of heads of state from all over the place in Beijing. Putin will be there, I think 20, 30 or more heads of state from around the world will be there. And Mr. Trump wants to be there. He wants to have his face-to-face meeting with Xi during that time.

And possibly he could also have this, use that to have a face-to-face meeting with Putin. So I think in consideration or reconsideration of how inconvenient the September 3rd closing was in light of the new aspiration to meet with Xi in Beijing, which is supported by a number of other things, namely his refusal to allow the president of Taiwan to visit New York. I think their whole visit to the States was scrubbed with the intent to avoid any embarrassing conflict with the Chinese that would interfere with his being invited to the festivities in Beijing. So with that in mind, there’s a different focus entirely on what his deadlines are about. There’s more than one consideration when he sets these deadlines.

Diesen: 20:57
When we look though at the Europeans, there is a strange development. That is, they seem to solely focus on foreign policy these days. This is as you mentioned with Starmer, this is seemingly especially the case in the UK, where he spends very little time on domestic issues. I guess you can say the same about Macron. And again, this trade deal as well seems to sacrifice a lot of domestic priorities, that is to develop an economy, deal with social issues.

All of this is being, well, reduced in priority in order to instead buy some favor with the Americans to, again, for foreign policy objectives, no matter how foolish they might be, such as continuing the war in Ukraine. But how long do you think this can go on for the Europeans? Because this kind of doubles down on the disaster of first cutting themselves off from Russian energy and then of course destroying, the destruction of Nord Stream. Did you see the political instability permitting such an agreement to be passed, or not really?

Doctorow: 22:12
Well, one thing I wanted to bring up is what we mean when we say “Europeans” and who makes European policy. I’ve been rereading my materials going back to 2015 in preparation for the volume three of my memoirs.

And I was very focused on Germany in 2015, spoke about it at several conferences, and wrote about it in what I consider to be a very important policy analysis that was published in comparative politics of Megimo, the Russian university that prepares diplomats. What I was saying then is the European policy is made in [Berlin], And this is a well-kept secret. In 2015, just as in 2025, all the top posts in the European institutions are German designated. They were appointed by Germans. And they have appointed in this present case, von der Leyen has appointed people like Kallas, people from Lithuania, people from Poland who are under her thumb.

23:33
They are representing small countries, insignificant weight compared to the 450 million population of the EU. They are often people with– intellectual lightweights like Kallas who can be dominated by a strong and willful personality like von der Leyen. And that is to say, the commissioner, the head of the president of the commission, the head of the parliament, the president of the parliament, yes she’s Italian, but she’s appointed by the majority which is dominated by the European People’s Party which is dominated by the Christian Democrats. It all goes, but the strings all go back to Berlin, just as they did in 2015 when Junker was there. Yes of course, he was a Luxembourger, but he was a weak man who was … nominated and supported by Merkel, because she knew she could controll him, because there were scandals around, just as Tusk at that time.

24:37
He was made the president of the European Council. Tusk, who could hardly speak English, but spoke very good German by the way, was– she appointed him. And nobody bothered to think about what the German connection was there. He was under her thumb. So that was how it was in 2015. That’s how it is today.

And just as– the only thing that’s changed is that Europe, is that Germans today have come out behind, from behind the apron strings of EU institutions and are saying openly that they want to become, for example, the main military force in Europe. So the, who is Europe? Europe is Germany. Mr. Merz is the decisive voice on whether the tariffs agreed by von der Leyen will go through. And many other policy decisions. Your question about why foreign policy? That’s what you do when you’re losing and you can’t control domestic policy. You’re speaking about very unpopular leaders.

25:45
Keir Starmer has lost control of the Labour Party on domestic issues. He had a very severe setback when his reforms on support of the needy, of the wealth, of the benefits reforms were rejected by his own party and watered down to almost nil where they hoped to save a lot of money in the budget. Starmer on domestic issues is very weak. Therefore he can only hope to shine on international issues where nobody can say much.

The same is true of Macron. His domestic standing is negligible. He has very little popular support. And so he goes trotting around the globe, speaking like Mr. France and getting the press to listen to him. This is normal politics of the losing side.

Diesen: 26:46
What does it say about the future of the European Union though? Because not only was this a terrible agreement being made, but as you suggested before, the optics wasn’t great either. That is, von der Leyen coming to Trump’s golf course in Scotland. And well, the general benefit, I guess, or attractiveness of the European Union to begin with has always been this collective bargaining power, that they can negotiate from a position of strength. With obviously the US being the most important partner; that you can have some equality between Europe and the US as opposed to having 27 member states stand on their own.

But if we look back in the ’90s, early 2000s, this was the main selling point of the European Union as well. That is, it could set this asymmetrical interdependence with its neighborhood in the wider world. That is, when the EU sat down to negotiate trade with another state, Moldova or anyone, then the EU could dictate all the terms and not only having a favorable economic agreement, but they can also translate this into political power. So they set political conditions for trade, which became a form of external governance, which is why many people in academia refer to the EU as a regulatory power or regulatory superpower. If you want to trade with us, you have to follow our rules.

28:12
And this imperial model is maybe a bit over the top, but nonetheless, what will happen to the EU now? Because there is no equality with the US. The EU has … kissed the ring of Trump and subordinated itself and also with the rest of the world as the economic power of the EU continues to decline, as its leaders look more and more incompetent and corrupt and unable to reach proper agreements, this whole geopolitical EU, It seems to become more of a burden. If you’re Germany, you want to have good trade deal with the Chinese, you don’t bring the EU along because they will come with their geopolitical objective, which means to insult the Chinese instead. So, well, what does this say about the future of the European Union? Is this club, you know, is this a death sentence or is it, you know, expiring? How are you reading it? It’s not a good sign at least, I would say.

Doctorow: 29:17
To relax, I often turn on YouTube and just see what they’re proposing to look at. And mixed in with the geopolitical videos, they have a lot of animal videos, particularly dogs.

I think about one of these little videos which has a German shepherd and a golden retriever. They’re in the middle of a maze, And the golden retriever is saying, “We’re doomed.” Europe is doomed. The present configuration is doomed. This cannot continue.

They are driving down the welfare of people directly in measurable ways. As I’ve written recently, the rejuggling of the Belgian budget, which the new Flemish-dominated federal government has put into place, takes away benefits from what has been outstanding medical services, severe cuts. This is typical. The cuts are being made to make room for the burgeoning re-armament program, which is all a result of a dead wrong foreign policy. I’m just wondering when this will come out and we will have demonstrations similar to what we saw in Kiev a week ago.

31:03
This cannot go on forever. It defies gravity that the national leaderships in Belgium and in 25 out of 27 other member states of the European Union are working directly against the interests of the people who voted them into office. That is becoming more and more apparent as the budgets are revised to take away benefits for the sake of raising arms manufacturing, for the purpose of fighting a war which is unnecessary, which is driven by the same personal ambition as Mr. Netanyahu and his war in Gaza. That is called out by the Western press now openly.

This is not just a supposition of people like you and me. It is accepted as mainstream that Netanyahu is fighting a war to keep himself from going to court and prison. I say the same thing about all of the European leaders. They are pushing re-armament to avoid being put out in the street where they belong, because the budgets that they are submitting to the member states are anti-popular, they are against the people. It cannot go on, and so I agree with that … golden retriever: we’re doomed.

Diesen: 32:34
If, well, if you’re going to look at how this will affect Europe, then obviously, given that the main purpose of this trade agreement was to tie the Americans in and commit them to Project Ukraine. But also a lot of, as you said, a lot of the political elites there, they see their hold on to power that is in Brussels, dependent on the continuation of the Ukraine war again.

Continuation of Ukraine war is necessary to keep America in Europe, it’s necessary to keep these political elites in power. But beyond that, we also see that not just the European Union, but the European member states bet a lot of political legitimacy on defeating Russia. And not just the political legitimacy, the entire economy has been thrown into this and sacrificed. So what happens when the Ukraine war is eventually lost? And well, it depends what a defeat looks like, but what the Europeans were promising, they’re destroying Russia and having the Ukraine join NATO, all of this obviously is not going to happen.

33:59
And I think that’s an important question now, that Zelensky looks as if he is somewhat in a weaker position. He’s no longer the reincarnation of Churchill, apparently. And suddenly the Europeans, you know, a few weeks ago, it was Russian propaganda to say that he was an authoritarian. Now, suddenly, it’s permitted. So what do you see happening with Zelensky and Ukraine? How does this affect Europe once we eventually lose this war?

Doctorow: 34:35
It’s permitted not just to YouTube channels, it’s permitted to the “Financial Times”. They use that word in a headline of an article dealing with the new law stripping the anti-corruption agencies of their independence. He is damaged goods now. And he’s damaged goods in the Anglo-Saxon press in particular, on both sides of the Atlantic. Now, the question that I’ve had is: who was behind the enabling of the demonstrations that took place, the mass demonstrations that took place in Kiev and in other major cities in Ukraine over the course of several days, in the past week, against the law, which ultimately ended in the revocation of the new law and restoration of what is said to be the independence of these agencies.

35:36
The speculation, and again, I will share with your audience what the Russians are saying about this. They’re saying that we can expect in the immediate future, very scandalous trials. Already yesterday’s indication [was] that the newly installed prime minister was about to be charged with corrupt practices for having used together with Yermak, the head of the presidential administration, Ukrainian airplanes which are only to be used for state purposes. She as the prime minister has the right to use it. Yermak didn’t.

It was pretty obvious that she was doing the man who was behind her, who protects her, Mr. Yermak, she was doing this trip with him for his benefit, not for her own. So that’s the first shoe to fall. There are going to be some very big accusations made in the next few weeks against people in the close entourage of Zelensky and probably of Zelensky himself.

36:53
We are now in the last stages of Zelensky’s time in office. The question is who is pushing this most? Is it Britain with the MI6 who helped arrange that the Ukrainian police and military would not attack the demonstrators? Or was it the CIA?

There are two. These are now, you could say in the past they were one and the same, but not any more, because the United States and Britain have parted ways on the Ukraine war. For the Brits to have done this, it would be to replace Zelensky probably with Zaluzhny. Let’s remember for the last year and a half Zaluzhny, who was the head of the armed forces of Ukraine for several years and who was viewed by Americans in particular as being a good candidate to replace Zelensky, was moved out of Kiev and sent off into exile to London precisely so that to avoid that eventuality, that he would be on the inside, being able to muster support if the West nodded to him as the one to succeed Zelensky.

38:16
Well, he’s been biding his time in London. He’s been learning English, because he hardly could say two words when he arrived there. And he got there because he had said at the time what was true, how badly the Ukrainians were losing the war. And that was unacceptable to Zelensky. Now, that is one possibility. Another candidate, one that I call out on the American side is a very different story by saying Zaluzhny would be put in if the intent was to continue the war and to have somebody who has more credibility with American and West European suppliers of arms to Ukraine, because he is a genuine military person, and his orders would not be for PR stunts like Zelensky’s were, but having some genuine military foundation. Now, the other I’m saying is the Americans probably have a different game.

If they were behind this, then it is probably to install somebody like Umerov, who is now the leader of negotiations in Istanbul. Umerov is a civilian. Umerov is a Crimean Tatar, a Muslim by the way, probably speaks some Arabic, some Turkish, it would be logical. He has been a leading personality in Ukrainian meetings with the Gulf States.

39:45
More importantly for the United States, he’s their boy. When he was in secondary school, he spent a year in the United States living with an American family. When he went back, finished his higher education, became a successful businessman in high tech area, made a lot of money, he established fellowships for Ukrainians at Stanford University. Why Stanford University? Why United States? So he has an American connection, which is always looked upon. He doesn’t have an American wife, but you can’t get everything.

40:21
So he would suit the Americans very nicely as a stand-in and it is reasonable to assume that he could and would negotiate a peace treaty with the Russians, not on the ridiculous basis of Russian capitulation, but something close to Russian demands.

Diesen: 40:41
Yeah, this is interesting though. Of course, who Zelensky is replaced with will be a good indication of what’s intended for Ukraine to go. That is, is it continuing the war or not?

But yeah, I remember back in the days when it looked as if Zelensky was on very shaky grounds and I thought that he might be going away and then instead of course he shipped Zaluzhny to London which is an interesting thing. So I guess Zelensky would, well people like Aristović have said he will probably leave. I mean, I would also expect him to go to Miami or the south of France, but there will be a lot of pressure in the future to have him return to Ukraine. He made himself a lot of enemies and it wouldn’t be very difficult to put in a criminal case against him. However, how do you see, as I guess my last question, how do you see the war progressing from here though?

Is peace agreement now completely off the table or will it depend on who comes after Zelensky? Because it seems as if it would be possible to get an agreement on Ukraine’s neutrality that is going back to Istanbul. The problem is the plus, Istanbul plus the territorial concessions, especially humiliating would be to have a recognition of territories which aren’t even seized by Russia yet, that is of the four regions. But as Russia progresses on the territory, that humiliation wouldn’t it be reduced. That is the Russians are controlling more and more territory.

In other words, the gap between what they demand and what they already have is reduced. Do you see any possibility of anyone in Ukraine accepting these terms? Because you said they’re quite draconian. It’s, you know, I’ll be the first to say that Russians have some very high demands upon Ukraine.

Doctorow: 42:59
They are especially high demands when you’re demanding a concessionary territory that you haven’t even won on the battlefield. I think that problem will be solved before September. I think it’s entirely to be envisaged that Russia will sweep to the Dnieper. Chasov Yar was fought over for more than six weeks, seven weeks. This is a logistics center that was highly contested, very well armed, protected, fortified, and Russians finally overran it in the last few days. The next big center is in Pakrovsk, which the Russians call Krasnoyarsk, that is now facing Russian troops on the outskirts of the city. This has been going on for months, of course, this progress.

43:58
The Russians draw it out because they have wanted to avoid close-contact fighting, which can be very expensive in human life for both sides. They’ve mostly been conducting their war on Pakrovsk with aerial bombing, artillery bombing, and so forth, which costs them very little in lost soldiers and officers, but it’s quite devastating to the Ukrainian side. Once they take Pakrovsk, it’s a clean sweep across to the Dniepr. And so I think that if they take Pakrovsk in the next few weeks, they will take the whole of Donetsk and possibly Zaporizhzhye by September. And then the Russians can be generous in the terms of a settlement, because they will not have to haggle over taking territory that they didn’t win on the ground.

45:04
So that would be a good time to look for a settlement. Again, coming close to Mr. Trump’s original deadline of first days of September, in anticipation of the general meeting of world powers in Beijing to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the war in the Pacific. I think these things come together. And so I would look for a change of leadership in Kiev within that timeframe, engineered either by the United States or by the Brits, depending on – now that will depend whether a peace treaty can be negotiated. But on the ground, the Russians will have gotten what they want.

Diesen: 45:53
Yeah, it looks, yeah, I think people– often you look at the defensive lines, obviously it’s not much west of Pakrovsk, but as you pointed out in this war especially, the logistics is really important and these logistics centers of Chasuviar, Kopiansk is what we can put in this. And Pakrovsk I think will be very important to crack the final stretch towards the Dnieper. So–

Well, thank you as always. It’s always a great pleasure to get your insights on this. So thanks again. And for people who want to follow you, you have your Substack. And of course, I’ll leave a link to your book, anywhere else people should look for you?

Doctorow:
No, no, that sums it up. If they look at the substack, just look at the last few issues because I’m particularly proud of, as I say, of 2015, which was quite a remarkable year for understanding who is who in Europe.

Diesen: 47:03
Oh, thanks again.

Doctorow:
All right.

Interview with Professor Glenn Diesen:  Europe is doomed, Regime change in Kiev

This 47 minute discussion with Professor Diesen was concentrated on the two interrelated issues in the headline.

Europe is doomed because 25 of the 27 heads of government of the European Member States presently have no interest in the prosperity and wellbeing of their citizens and are interested only in holding on to power, for which purpose maintaining support for Ukraine in its war with Russia and rearming Europe in preparation for a NATO-Russia war in 2029 are their top priority. Europe’s capitulation to Trump over tariffs may be explained by the hope it would keep Trump on side over further aid to Ukraine.  This, of course, is utterly delusional, since Trump has clearly shown he wants the USA to exit that war as soon as possible without any regard for Europe’s wishes.

Regime change in Kiev is coming soon. Thanks to the scandal over a new law that stripped the anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine of their independence, Zelensky lost credibility both in the USA and in Europe. Major media now speak of him as authoritarian, meaning anti-democratic. The wave of protests in Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities was unprecedented in the three years of war and suggests to me the active intervention of one or another Western power to bring down Zelensky and achieve regime change.  The question of the day: was it the Brits, who surely would like to install as president General Zaluzhny, former commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, who has been serving as Ukrainian ambassador to the UK these past 18 months.  Zaluzhny as president would mean continuation of the war under the direction of someone who actually understands military strategy as opposed to the PR driven direction of the armed forces from Zelensky.  For their part, the Americans surely would favor as successor Zelensky Umerov, the current head of the Ukrainian negotiating team in talks with the Russians in Istanbul.  Umerov is a civilian who made a fortune in high tech commerce and who has a clear connection to the USA going back to his secondary school year spent in America.  Umerov, we may assume, could negotiate a peace with the Russians if he were his own man, not a subordinate to Zelensky as he is presently.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2025

Interview with Professor Glenn Diesen:  Europe is doomed, Regime change in Kiev

This 47 minute discussion with Professor Diesen was concentrated on the two interrelated issues in the headline.

Europe is doomed because 25 of the 27 heads of government of the European Member States presently have no interest in the prosperity and wellbeing of their citizens and are interested only in holding on to power, for which purpose maintaining support for Ukraine in its war with Russia and rearming Europe in preparation for a NATO-Russia war in 2029 are their top priority. Europe’s capitulation to Trump over tariffs may be explained by the hope it would keep Trump on side over further aid to Ukraine.  This, of course, is utterly delusional, since Trump has clearly shown he wants the USA to exit that war as soon as possible without any regard for Europe’s wishes.

Regime change in Kiev is coming soon. Thanks to the scandal over a new law that stripped the anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine of their independence, Zelensky lost credibility both in the USA and in Europe. Major media now speak of him as authoritarian, meaning anti-democratic. The wave of protests in Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities was unprecedented in the three years of war and suggests to me the active intervention of one or another Western power to bring down Zelensky and achieve regime change.  The question of the day: was it the Brits, who surely would like to install as president General Zaluzhny, former commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, who has been serving as Ukrainian ambassador to the UK these past 18 months.  Zaluzhny as president would mean continuation of the war under the direction of someone who actually understands military strategy as opposed to the PR driven direction of the armed forces from Zelensky.  For their part, the Americans surely would favor as successor Zelensky Umerov, the current head of the Ukrainian negotiating team in talks with the Russians in Istanbul.  Umerov is a civilian who made a fortune in high tech commerce and who has a clear connection to the USA going back to his secondary school year spent in America.  Umerov, we may assume, could negotiate a peace with the Russians if he were his own man, not a subordinate to Zelensky as he is presently.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2025

Transcript of ‘Judging Freedom,’ 30 July

Transcription submitted by a reader

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1Bud26z87M

Napolitano: 0:34
Hi, everyone. Judge Andrew Napolitano here for “Judging Freedom”. Today is Wednesday, July 30th, 2025. Professor Gilbert Doctorow will be here with us in just a moment on “The European Union capitulates to Trump”. What’s behind it?

But first this. [commercial message]

2:01
Professor Doctorow, good day to you, my dear friend. Thank you very much for joining me today. Thanks for accommodating my schedule. What has been the general reaction amongst European leaders and European media to the announcement by Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump the other day about this agreement for 15% tariffs for everything the EU wants to sell in the US?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD:
I don’t know of anyone who was rejoicing on that here in Europe. On the contrary, the consensus is that this is a tragic moment for Europe, that this will cost them dearly in future investments in manufacturing, which will now be directed to the United States by their local manufacturers here, because it is the only way for them to save their market share in the States under the new regime of US duties. So jobs will move to the States, jobs will be lost here, and there is the understanding that the very low growth, or negative growth in some countries, that has prevailed in Europe for the last two to three years will continue indefinitely when this new system is applied. The question is how do you explain the capitulation?

3:33
I think most everyone understands that von der Leyen was kissing Trump’s ring, bending the knee, and that Europe was a supplicant and not an equal partner in negotiations.

Napolitano:
Some of your colleagues on this show have criticized the agreement, arguing as you did, but in addition, we can’t even read it because it’s not even been reduced to writing. Is that true? Have they just agreed on the 15% and nothing has been reduced to writing yet?

Doctorow:
There is nothing more than a handshake as far as we know. But that is sufficient for these purposes because there [is] a lot of detail work that has to be done. This is not assumed to be the comprehensive and complete agreement.

There will be some discussions at the margins. For example, over the fate of automobiles, will they be at the 25% or indeed at 15%, such as liquor, which was not a subject of agreement during that meeting in Scotland. So there are these little bits and pieces along the way, but the general understanding is a 15 percent blanket tariff on all European wares. That may be accepted as a solid fact, not as a speculation.

Napolitano:
Back to what you said a few minutes ago, I suppose you could manufacture a Mercedes-Benz automobile in Tennessee, but you can’t make French champagne in New Jersey. So some of the goods and products unique to Europe cannot be put together here. Impossible.

Doctorow: 5:21
Yes, that’s true. So they will forego some of their sales volume in products like champagne or fine wines. That is a given. And that is part of what some critics say is wrong with the European economy that has been very dependent on exports for future growth. This was precisely the line of critique in the leading Belgian French-speaking newspaper, Le Soir, a couple of days ago. They’re looking for explanations. How was it that we were so weak in these negotiations? Of course, that logic doesn’t hold up when you consider that China is another part of the world where exports have driven growth.

6:08
And they record five percent GDP annual growth, not 0.1 percent as the Europeans are now boasting about the first quarter results in 2025. So that is an excuse that this paper, that people like this paper, who are supporters of the status quo in Europe, are exploring to explain what went wrong. But in their discussion, there is a fact which really is evident when you look at it closely, and that is they capitulated to Trump on the trade agreement because they’re hoping to keep him in play. They’re hoping that they can agree with Trump on further support to Ukraine, which is the leading issue of all of the heads of state and prime ministers in Europe.

Napollitano:
I want to get into that in some depth with you, but before we do, one or two more questions about the Trump-Von der Leyen agreement. What’s the next step for the agreement? I mean, is this it, or do the French who’ve condemned it and the Germans who’ve condemned it have the ability to veto or modify or create carve-outs?

Doctorow:
Well, they do. This is not just on the say-so of von der Leyen that a treaty is agreed and is imposed on all the 27 member states. It has to go through parliament.

It requires a ratification. And that is going to take a lot of negotiation within Europe. Considering that the largest economy in Europe, Germany, headed by a defeatist leader in terms of the tarif war, but a bold leader in terms of the future war with Russia, considering his role, how he and his party, the Christian Democrats, are leaders of the European People’s Party, which is the most important party in the European Parliament. And he, Merz, has come out two days ago saying that this is, yes, it’s a black day for Europe, but, but, but … but this is the best that we could get. That assumes that the Germans will vote for the deal.

8:37
The French are going to put up a lot of resistance. Let’s remember that the major economies are the ones that are most interested in the nature of the agreement with the States because they have the biggest trade flows with the States. The smaller countries, the smaller economies here are, well, let’s say, bystanders. They are not going to have a decisive say. They will follow what they are told to do by the likes of Germany.

So the French are the single biggest points of resistance to the agreement that von der Leyen has set down, not just the the so-called far right of Marine Le Pen, who instantly came out condemning this, but even the centrist Bayrou, the prime minister installed by Macron to manage the difficulties he has with his parliament, he came out against it as well.

9:38
So the French are going to dig in their deals and they will certainly demand concessions, though I doubt that they will overturn the agreement that von der Leyen reached, because so many other countries will follow Germany’s lead.

Napolitano:
Is it a simple majority vote in the European Parliament? Is it country by country? Is it two-thirds? How does it work?

Doctorow:
No, to my knowledge it would be a majority vote.

Napolitano:
All right, and you’re of the view that not withstanding this disenchantment for other reasons, which we’ll get into presently, this will likely be ratified.

Doctorow:
I think it will be. There will be modifications.

Napolitano:
Is she popular, von der Leyen, or is she not popular? That’s an inartful question. Is she popular with the folks in the streets? Is she popular with elites?

Doctorow:
No, I think it’s with elites. And “popular” is not an adjective I would apply here. Respected, willing to accept her judgment. However, let’s remember from the last several weeks, she was under fierce challenge in the parliament, and this was covered in the daily news. So the broader public, and even among elites, they are aware that she has opposition for the way she has managed the parliament and the European institutions. So she doesn’t have a free ride any more. Her situation is more tenuous than it was before the challenge to the way she negotiated the covid vaccine contracts.

11:14
That has put her in some jeopardy. And I think the broad public is aware of that, though it has other problems to worry about and isn’t very concerned about Madame van der Leyen.

Napolitano:
I mean, let’s just suppose, this may be fantastical, but let’s just suppose Marie Le Pen becomes the President of France. What can she do, if anything, to get out of this?

Doctorow:
Well, let’s look first as what von der Leyen is doing to get us into this. She has appointed the commissioners, all of whom, or a large majority of the important or key positions, she’s assigned to the non-entity countries, the Baltics and other East European countries, which are under German sway. She has appointed people who are intellectually inferior in the expectation that she could dominate them, and that has turned out to be true. Now, if Marine Le Pen came in, all of these people would be thrown out, and you might have a chance of seeing competent people who represent the 450 million people, a population of the European Union, and not people like Kallas, who comes from a country with one million population, who are drawing Europe around by the nose for the sake of their anti-Russian positions. So everything could change in policies, because the policies now are made by those who are under the direct instruction and control of von der Leyen.

Anyone who replaces her will certainly not enjoy that position of strength to appoint all of the commissioners and to control the whole of European policy the way von der Leyen has in the last several years.

Napolitano: 13:04
Okay, got it. But if the agreement with Trump is reduced to writing and ratified, and if France rebels, there’s nothing much they could do about it, right? This is part of the treaty that created the EU. They’re subject to this, or am I wrong?

Doctorow:
No, you’re right. But again, there is something here that we have to call out. There are parts of this agreement which are utterly unenforceable and which are probably the most damaging to the European economy.

Napolitano:
What are they?

Doctorow:
Not the 15 percent tariff, but the obligation to buy 650 billion dollars of American energy. That is the single biggest factor weighing on the weak European economies, starting with the German economy.

This, the dependence on liquefied natural gas at world prices, which has been the case ever since the destruction of the North Stream pipelines and the decisions in Parliament to phase out as quickly as possible use of Russian energy supplies — that has been the destructive factor in European economies more than this 15 percent tariff can possibly be. And the obligation to buy this, well, an obligation. What kind of obligations did the Chinese have in previous agreements with the United States? They never were effected.

14:34
And I doubt that this one ever will be carried out because the people who have signed onto it will not be in office.

Napolitano:
Got it. I don’t want to put you out on a limb, but which is the greater threat to European economic stability? Russia or the United States?

Doctorow:
At this point it’s the United States. To anyone with eyes to see what Mr. Trump has just done, the complete humiliation of Europe, the imposition of tariffs and purchase obligations from the United States, that is destructive of the European economy. It is not the act of a friend. And in that context, you have to ask, well, why are they going along with this? And there you have to look for the small print.

15:26
And is I said, even in the “Soir” editorial, it was, if you looked closely at the text, you found the answer. The answer is to keep up relations with Trump. And why do they want to keep up relations with Trump? In order to rope him in to continue American support for the Ukrainians in the war with Russia. This is the big, idee fixe of von der Leyen and her colleagues in the European institutions.

And it is not an economic concern. They don’t give a damn about the welfare of the broad populations in European countries. Their concern is their own holding onto power, which is made possible by this war with Russia because it gives them reason.

Napolitano:
Is it a coincidence that while all this is going on, France has announced a recognition of the state of Palestine and Great Britain with a little bit of wiggle room has announced that it is likely to do so by September.

Doctorow: 16:39
These are acts of impotence. They are giving Mr. Trump the finger in their pocket, which is what, which is a very common–

Napolitano:
In other words, giving him the finger and he can’t see them doing it.

Doctorow:
Exactly right.

Napolitano:
There’s a case in New Jersey where a guy gave a finger to the police. Oh, the prosecution went on for years. The Supreme Court said it was protected speech, but it was not in his pocket.

Doctorow:
Well, this is a Russian expression, by the way. So you see, they do have a sense of humor. It is a sign of impotence. They cannot say this openly. They are defying Trump. That’s what this recognition of the Palestine state is all about. It will change nothing, but it is holding up Trump to general opprobrium and criticism.

Napolitano: 17:36
Is this Epstein saga resonating in Europe? I mean, I was there for the past week and a half and talking to all kinds of folks, academics, elites, professionals, longtime friends, cab drivers. It wasn’t what Tulsi Gabbard was revealing. It was Epstein, Epstein, Epstein. Is it the same in Northern Europe where you are?

Doctorow:
Oh yes, and that’s certainly the Epstein story, it’s on the front page every day, and Ghislaine Maxwell’s picture is in the newspapers.

But the emphasis, I think, is on one feature which is also covered in the States The aspect of it that is watched most closely in European papers is what this says about the … MAGA. Are they a genuine revolt? Is there some loss of strength, political strength by Trump? That is the angle that interests them most, not the details of pedophilia or whatever. That side of it is not in the front pages.

Napolitano:
How close to the end of his days in office is President Zelensky?

Doctorow: 18:57
I think it’s very close, and I think he’s being prepared for eviction by the United States. And I say that with reference to very specific events that I followed from an angle I don’t see other people covering, strange to say.

The events that persuade me that Zelensky is on the way out have been the demonstrations in Kiev and other major cities around Ukraine last week, and these were as many as 10,000 demonstrators out on the streets, against the newly-passed law that stripped the anti-corruption agencies of their independence. That, the fact that everyone speaks about this having happened is if it were a natural thing. It’s not the least bit natural. Everyone is ignoring the authoritarian, dictatorial exercise of power by Zelensky and his immediate followers that [has] made it impossible to protest without getting your skull broken or getting yourself killed in a prison cell. No, there have not been demonstrations, not because the Ukrainian public was satisfied with Zelensky, because nobody dared.

20:20
Now, what changed? How is it that these demonstrations could take place? How is it that instructions were given to the Ukrainian army not to take part in the demonstrations wearing their uniforms? This is incredible.

I say that there was an outside intervention. Some organization imposed on the powers that be in Ukraine not to dare to fire on the demonstrators.

Napolitano:
Well, there’s only two organizations that could do that, I think: CIA and MI6.

Doctorow:
Well, I originally came down on the side of MI6, but received some very interesting comments from readers who pointed me in the other direction. MI6, after all, they have been the providers of security for Zelensky. They are his bodyguards. It is less than likely that they would be behind acts which are going to bring him down.

The United States and the CIA is a different story. Here it fits in perfectly with everything that Mr. Trump is doing, not with what he’s saying, of course not, but what he’s doing.

De facto, arms are being shipped [to a] much lesser extent and of much lesser use to Ukraine than his words would have indicated. The famous Patriots are going to take eight months to get there, if they get there at all. So on the side of Trump, who is by his actions, by his deeds, not by his words, in fact, been abandoning Zelensky, this would fit in perfectly to get him out over his violation of rule of law, which has been picked up by Western newspapers. Even the very anti-Russian “Financial Times”, day after day, is speaking about Zelensky having lost credibility because of this authoritarian behavior to neuter the agencies against corruption. So the way– the public is being prepared for his removal, because the guy is no longer a saint; he’s turning out to be a devil. And I believe that the Americans are behind this. [But that someone would agree.]

Napolitano:
If you’re correct, and you make a compelling case, Professor, you truly do, then the Americans would choose his successor.

Doctorow:
Yes. But of course, this is the thing that people immediately object to. “Well, it’s more of the same.”

Why do they assume that? There are, you have to look closely, but there are some people in Kiev who are not neo-Nazis and who are not of the same mindset as the present rulers. And I think of Mr. Umerov, the one who is the head of the Ukrainian delegation to the peace talks in Istanbul, as a possible candidate. There are others.

And the Americans certainly would know about it. Umerov–

Napolitano:
How about the fellow that’s the, I forget the name, Ukrainian ambassador to London.

Doctorow: 23:37
Zaluzhny. That’s also possible. There’s a lot of talk about it. That’s why he’s in London and not in Kiev, because Zelensky understood that the Americans were winking at Zaluzhny, because Zaluzhny told the truth about the real state of the military efforts, that they were losing badly, and it was time to get him out of the way. Now Mr. Umerov is another candidate. The interesting thing about him is his pure civilian background, a man who spent a year in the States living with a family while he was in secondary school, and so he’s fluent in English and knows American situation, and who has become very frankly wealthy by dint of his wits in high tech, and wealthy enough to have established fellowships in Stanford University.

24:33
So the man had an interest in the States. It would fit in nicely with the kind of leaders that Americans think–

Napolitano:
He will be the CIA’s type of guy. Professor Doctorow, thank you very much. A fascinating, as always, a fascinating conversation. I missed you in the past two weeks. I’m glad we’re all back together. Thank you for your time. We’ll look forward to seeing you next week.

Doctorow:
Very good.

Napolitano:
Thank you. And coming up later today, I’ve missed everybody, including all of you. At 11 o’clock this morning, Colonel Douglas Macgregor. At one this afternoon, Professor Glenn Diesen; at two this afternoon, Max Blumenthal; at three this afternoon, Phil Giroldi.

25:12
Judge Napolitano for “Judging Freedom”.

‘Judging Freedom,’ 30 July: EU Capitulates to Trump

Today’s session with Judge Andrew Napolitano centered on the von der Leyen – Trump agreement in Scotland on a 15%  tariff for European exports to the USA, which was in effect a humiliating defeat for the EU. Bad as that sounds, the far worse point agreed was for the EU to greatly expand its LNG and oil imports from the USA, with the figure 650 billion euros specifically named.  Of course, this obligation will likely never be met, just as similar obligations on China to import US agricultural products at certain target levels never were met. But the principle, if actually applied, will condemn European manufacturing to excessive costs, meaning to uncompetitive export prices and loss of markets abroad.

As I have noted elsewhere, the capitulation on tariffs was clearly motivated by the hopes of von der Leyen and of those European leaders supporting her that this concession will keep open relations with Washington and, in particular, lead to continuation of the common Euro-Atlantic stand on giving Ukraine the financial and flow of military equipment it needs to continue the war with Russia.  What I did not say in the interview but should be mentioned here is that the expectation of further U.S. assistance to Ukraine is delusional.  Trump wants out of the war and there is no way that Europe can so ingratiate itself with him as to change his mind on that cardinal point of U.S. foreign policy.

 Our brief discussion of the Epstein scandal that currently fascinates Washington, of the decision by Britain and France to recognize the Palestine state in September and of likely CIA hand in the anti Zelensky demonstrations that swept Ukraine last week  may also interest viewers.