In the past few months I have put online the links to a couple of my encounters, or shall we call them ‘debates’ with Fred Weir, a Canadian journalist who has served numerous news agencies and newspapers but is probably best known for his long service as Moscow bureau chief of the Boston-based Christian Science Monitor.
Our encounters have been ‘virtual,’ in arranged discussions hosted by Iran’s Press TV. Today I present the link to our latest debate, in which our different perspectives on the war ongoing in Ukraine are sufficiently differentiated for the viewer to benefit from contrast as well as agreement about the misery and death it is bringing to both sides in the conflict.
You don’t work for mainstream print media and get to say what you think much of the time. In the present situation, Weir has complemented his censored work for his paymasters with more nuanced and informative statements on his social media accounts. What he says on Press TV is situated somewhere on a sliding scale between these two positions. The question is not about distortion of information but about information and personal judgments held back, about stories that he is not encouraged to cover for the mainstream news channels.
For my part, I dared in this discussion to step back a bit from the ‘dissident’ or ‘anti-war’ folks who have been reposting my essays and who have brought 10,000 or more readers to any one of my recent articles. What I say in this video is that the side of the angels also often lives in its own bell jar. They largely do not speak Russian, cannot monitor what the Russians are saying among themselves in their domestic oriented media and so may be cheerleading the Russian war effort without being aware of the Russians’ own circumspection about their chances of success and of success in what time frame.
Let me be specific. The Scott Ritters and Douglas Macgregors of this world are speaking as if the war is just about over and the Ukrainian capitulation may be expected in a couple of weeks. Of course, anything is possible: the new and accelerating Russian offensive may bring the Ukrainian army to its knees. However, at the same time, in Russian news agency postings, I read that the boss of the swashbuckling Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin has just been quoted as saying that it may take two years more of fighting for Russian forces to completely conquer the Donbas. Where does the truth lie?
In closing, I use this opportunity to bring to the attention of readers several key points from a private correspondence I have been conducting with a Lt Colonel in the U.S. army who is busy working in a think tank following the action on the ground very closely day to day. The question was whether time is on the side of the Russians or on the side of the Ukrainians.
We both came to the same conclusion: that the end result of the Special Military Operation is likely to be the strengthening of the Russian armed forces and not the weakening that Pentagon boss Austin has declared to be the principal American objective of refusing peace talks and drawing out the war by dispatching ever more lethal equipment to the Ukrainian side.
My argument for strengthening is based on the way the Russian army is now projected to grow from 600,000 men at arms to 1.5 million, and possibly to as many as 3 million. This expansion of the armed forces requires the active support of the Russian population, whose boys and men will be subject to what may become universal conscription. The escalation of the threat to their nation posed by the American led forces in Ukraine has brought to the Kremlin the full patriotic support that it needs for the changeover in the structure and scale of the army as well as the changeover in the economy to a war footing.
The Lt. Colonel’s matching conclusion is based on the way he has seen the operational capabilities of the Russian armed forces grow immensely from the incompetent, bungling performance of the opening weeks and months of this war to the very impressive performance he has witnessed since the changes in command back in September of last year.
https://www.urmedium.com/c/presstv/121871
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2023
Translations below into French (Youri) and Brazilian Portuguese (Evandro Menezes)
Débat avec le chef du bureau de Moscou, Fred Weir : Troisième round
Au cours des derniers mois, j’ai mis en ligne les liens de plusieurs de mes rencontres, ou plutôt de mes « débats », avec Fred Weir, un journaliste canadien qui a travaillé pour de nombreuses agences de presse et de nombreux journaux, mais qui est probablement plus connu pour avoir été longtemps le chef du bureau de Moscou du Christian Science Monitor, basé à Boston.
Nos rencontres ont été « virtuelles », dans le cadre de discussions organisées par la chaîne iranienne Press TV. Aujourd’hui, je vous présente le lien vers notre dernier débat, dans lequel nos perspectives différentes sur la guerre en cours en Ukraine sont suffisamment différenciées pour que le téléspectateur puisse bénéficier d’un contraste ainsi que d’un accord sur la misère et la mort qu’elle entraîne pour les deux parties au conflit.
On ne travaille pas pour la presse écrite grand public en disant ce que l’on pense la plupart du temps. Dans la situation actuelle, Weir a complété son travail censuré pour ses maîtres payeurs par des déclarations plus nuancées et informatives sur ses comptes de médias sociaux. Ce qu’il dit sur Press TV se situe quelque part sur une échelle mobile entre ces deux positions. La question n’est pas de savoir si l’information est déformée, mais si l’information et les jugements personnels sont refoulés sur des sujets qu’il n’est pas encouragé à couvrir pour les chaînes d’information grand public.
Pour ma part, j’ai osé, dans cette discussion, prendre un peu de recul par rapport aux « détracteurs » ou aux « anti-guerre » qui ont repris mes essais et qui ont apporté 10 000 lecteurs ou plus à chacun de mes articles récents. Ce que je dis dans cette vidéo, c’est que le côté des anges vit aussi sous sa propre cloche de verre. La plupart d’entre eux ne parlent pas le russe, ne peuvent pas surveiller ce que les Russes disent entre eux dans leurs médias nationaux et peuvent donc encourager l’effort de guerre russe sans être conscients de la circonspection des Russes quant à leurs chances de succès et à quel moment.
Permettez-moi d’être précis. Les Scott Ritter et Douglas Macgregor de ce monde parlent comme si la guerre était sur le point de se terminer et que l’on pouvait s’attendre à une capitulation ukrainienne dans quelques semaines. Bien sûr, tout est possible : la nouvelle offensive russe, qui s’accélère, pourrait mettre l’armée ukrainienne à genoux. Cependant, dans le même temps, j’ai lu dans des dépêches d’agences de presse russes que le patron du groupe Wagner, Evgueni Prigojine, aurait déclaré qu’il faudrait encore deux ans de combat aux forces russes pour conquérir complètement le Donbass. Où se trouve la vérité ?
Pour conclure, je profite de cette occasion pour porter à l’attention des lecteurs plusieurs points clés d’une correspondance privée que j’ai entretenue avec un lieutenant-colonel de l’armée américaine qui travaille dans un groupe de réflexion et suit de très près l’action sur le terrain au jour le jour. La question était de savoir si le temps est du côté des Russes ou du côté des Ukrainiens.
Nous sommes tous deux arrivés à la même conclusion : le résultat final de l’opération militaire spéciale sera probablement le renforcement des forces armées russes et non l’affaiblissement que le patron du Pentagone, M. Austin, a déclaré être le principal objectif américain, à savoir refuser les pourparlers de paix et prolonger la guerre en envoyant des équipements toujours plus meurtriers du côté ukrainien.
Mon argument en faveur de ce renforcement est fondé sur la manière dont on prévoit maintenant que l’armée russe passera de 600 000 hommes en armes à 1,5 million, voire à 3 millions. Cette expansion des forces armées nécessite le soutien actif de la population russe, dont les jeunes gens et les hommes seront soumis à ce qui pourrait devenir la conscription universelle. L’escalade de la menace que les forces dirigées par les Américains en Ukraine font peser sur leur nation a apporté au Kremlin le soutien patriotique total dont il a besoin pour modifier la structure et l’ampleur de l’armée ainsi que l’économie sur un pied de guerre.
La conclusion analogue du lieutenant-colonel est fondée sur son observation des capacités opérationnelles des forces armées russes qui ont considérablement augmenté depuis les résultats maladroits et bâclés des premières semaines et des premiers mois de cette guerre jusqu’aux performances très impressionnantes dont il a été témoin depuis les changements de commandement en septembre de l’année dernière.
Debates com o editor chefe em Moscou, Fred Weir: Terceiro Assalto
Nos últimos meses, coloquei aqui os enlaces para alguns de meus encontros, ou devemos chamá-los de ‘debates’, com Fred Weir, um jornalista canadense que trabalhou em várias agências de notícias e jornais, mas provavelmente é mais conhecido por seu longo trabalho como chefe do escritório de Moscou do Christian Science Monitor, com sede em Boston.
Nossos encontros foram “virtuais”, em discussões organizadas pela Press TV iraniana. Hoje, apresento o enlace para nosso último debate, no qual nossas diferentes perspectivas sobre a guerra em curso na Ucrânia são suficientemente diferenciadas para que o espectador se beneficie do contraste e também da concordância sobre a miséria e a morte que ela está trazendo para ambos os lados do conflito.
Não se trabalha para a grande mídia impressa podendo dizer o que se pensa na maior parte do tempo. Na situação atual, Weir complementou seu trabalho censurado por seus empregadores com declarações mais sutis e informativas em suas contas de mídia social. O que ele diz na Press TV situa-se em algum ponto numa escala móvel entre estas duas posições. A questão não é sobre distorção de informações, mas sobre informações e julgamentos pessoais contidos, sobre histórias que ele não é incentivado a cobrir para os principais canais de notícias.
De minha parte, nesta discussão ousei me afastar um pouco das pessoas ‘dissidentes’ ou ‘anti-guerra’ que têm republicado meus ensaios e que trouxeram 10.000 ou mais leitores para qualquer um dos meus artigos recentes. O que eu digo nesse vídeo é que o lado dos anjos muitas vezes também vive em sua própria redoma. Eles em grande parte não falam russo, não podem monitorar o que os russos estão dizendo entre si em sua mídia doméstica e, portanto, podem estar torcendo pelo esforço de guerra russo sem estar ciente da circunspecção dos próprios russos sobre suas chances de sucesso e quando.
Sendo mais específico, os vários Scott Ritter e Douglas Macgregor deste mundo estão falando como se a guerra estivesse prestes a terminar e a capitulação ucraniana pudesse ser esperada em algumas semanas. Claro, tudo é possível: a nova e acelerada ofensiva russa pode colocar o exército ucraniano de joelhos. No entanto, ao mesmo tempo, em artigos de agências de notícias russas, li que o chefe do intrépido Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, acabou de ser citado como tendo dito que pode levar mais dois anos de luta para que as forças russas conquistem completamente o Donbas. Onde está a verdade?
Encerrando, aproveito esta oportunidade para chamar a atenção dos leitores para vários pontos chaves de uma correspondência privada que tenho mantido com um tenente-coronel do exército dos EUA que está trabalhando em um grupo de pesquisa acompanhando de perto o dia a dia das ações em campo. A questão era se o tempo estava do lado dos russos ou dos ucranianos.
Ambos chegamos à mesma conclusão de que o resultado final da Operação Militar Especial provavelmente será o fortalecimento das forças armadas russas e não seu enfraquecimento, que o chefe do Pentágono, Austin, declarou ser o principal objetivo dos EUA recusarem negociações de paz e prolongarem a guerra enviando equipamentos cada vez mais letais para o lado ucraniano.
Meu argumento a favor do fortalecimento baseia-se na forma como o exército russo está agora projetado para crescer de 600.000 homens armados para 1,5 milhão, e possivelmente para até 3 milhões. Esta expansão das forças armadas requer o apoio ativo da população russa, cujos rapazes e homens estarão sujeitos ao que pode se tornar o recrutamento universal. A escalada da ameaça à sua nação representada pelas forças lideradas pelos estadunidenses na Ucrânia trouxe ao Kremlin todo o apoio patriótico de que necessita para a mudança na estrutura e escala do exército, bem como a mudança na economia para uma de guerra.
A conclusão correspondente do tenente-coronel baseia-se na maneira como ele viu as capacidades operacionais das forças armadas russas crescerem imensamente, desde o desempenho incompetente e desajeitado das primeiras semanas e meses desta guerra até o desempenho impressionante que ele testemunhou desde as mudanças no comando em setembro do ano passado.
Gilbert Doctorow 
Dear Mr Doctorow,
But what exactly makes you say that the initial phase of the SMO was characterized by incompetence? The Ukrainian navy as well as the largest part of their airforce was quickly eliminated. Then the hoped-for quick Ukrainian capitulation did not happen – because the anti-Russian hatred of groups like Azov had far more influence on the Ukrainian population than anticipated. And then NATO’s involvement grew very fast. Indeed, had the conflict started as an official war between Russia and NATO, it might have been better for Russia: they would have downed the drones, AWACS planes and satellites that keep giving Ukraine the essential battlefield information. So, Russia had to learn how to counter NATO weapons, from Javelins to HIMARS, and they are countering very well now but of course this took time. Perhaps Russia was forced to act when it wasn’t quite ready yet, perhaps they underestimated NATO’s malignancy, but accusing Russia of incompetence may be too severe a judgement.
I would also like to draw your attention (perhaps needlessly) to Alaistar Crooke’s interpretation of Russian strategy ( https://strategic-culture.org/news/2023/02/06/russia-strategic-aims-consequence-to-collapsing-us-empire/ ). That is, in the end, none of us knows what this strategy eventually will turn out to be, but bungling it is not in any way. Many people deem the Russian way of warfare too cautious but I think we should respect the “better safe than sorry” approach. And it may turn out to be a clever trap for the whole of arrogant NATO in the end, not just the elimination of the Nazi part of Ukraine.
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I appreciate your remarks and taking the time to set them out here. However, I have good reason to have spoken of Russia’s bungling the war at the outset. I first mentioned this issue in the spring drawing on what I heard from a single but very interesting source: the taxi driver who drove me for an hour from the St P suburb where I was living into the center of the city. He was a retired officer from the military intelligence who kept close contact with his former comrades and they were outraged that incompetent armchair generals who enjoyed political favor had not invited real professionals into the deliberations that were behind the opening military moves of the SMO. However, let us look at the growing literature of military experts here in the West who say the same thing and with great precision and disinterest identify what the Russians did wrong from day one. Moreover, as you see, I have gotten a very similar read-out from this Lt Colonel with whom I have been corresponding and he has no axe to grind, he is simply calling it as he sees it from a professional military point of view. At the same time, I fully recognize that Russia’s planning and early implementation of the war was influenced by the fact of Ukraine having moved 100,000 troops to the line of demarcation with Donbas ready to pounce at any moment and retake the rebel provinces with great loss of civilian life. So it is not a simple piece of business here.
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Dear Mr Doctorow,
well, perhaps the start of any war is fraught with difficulties like who is best to take command, which commander is up to the job or not. And even if corruption in the Russian army is only, say, 5 % of that in the Ukrainian or perhaps US counterparts, it certainly will cause tactical problems including many needless casualties. Still, I do not have faith in “Western” analysts, be they military men or not, seeing that in our (Belgian) press their opinion is clearly nothing but propaganda, endlessly repeating that Russia has lost most of its tanks, has a lack of soldiers, has run out of missiles, has only low quality weapons (the Western ones being, of course, far superior…that must be why the Tiger tanks won the battles of Kursk and Berlin I guess…).
All the same, I very much admire your blog and I hope you can continue it!
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It is very likely that the “bungling” at the start of the operation was caused by political interference, aka Mr. Putin, who might have wanted a small footprint on the Ukrainian population and infrastructure, as to not antagonize them.
What everyone in the military likely is saying is that a “shock and awe” approach was needed (and this is commented as the lessons learned by China in its potential military approach to Taiwan – and maybe this is what Taiwan is learning to expect…). And remember, the Anglo-American interference has strengthened the resolve of Zelensky, who now has all the rights to ask for the moon, given the blood his men are shedding. However, Zelensky is not entitled to cajole and harass every and all countries in NATO for support, because these countries have not promised anything to start with, they were dragged into this mess as well. Just taking a look at Article 5 of NATO, countries in the alliance are to respond as they sit fit if one of them is attacked. Taking a similar approach, Hungary is within its rights to do nothing for Ukraine, including for his president to not applaud Zelensky and even give him the cold shoulder.
But I agree that all this sorry business will only strengthen Russia’s military capacity, from manpower, to their industrial complex, that will be forced to produce, improve, innovate, and become very efficient. And here I am a bit optimistic in the sense that Mr. Putin seems to insist that the civilian production of goods will not be neglected but strengthened. I have seen a clip with him berating and pushing some guy responsible for signing contracts with civilian aviation producers, who were waiting for orders…
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Certainly to a non-military outsider there were actions of the Russian armed forces at the beginning of the “war” that seem unfathomable. However, simply put the problem is that we are supposed to believe that the Russian general staff were incompetent until they rather suddenly became competent. So why not assume the simpler hypothesis that they were always competent. If we assume this then there is a simple explanation: the Russian government gave the general staff inappropriate and unreasonable instructions, which were based on a false understanding of the political situation inside Ukraine. Perhaps the real “culprits” were members of the Russian intelligence services, that is to say, our taxi driver’s mates were the incompetents. (It is quite likely that a hypothetical taxi driver with connections to the Russian officer caste would argue exactly this.) Unlike many in the Russian blogosphere members of the Russian general staff keep schtum, even when the “public” criticism of them is extremely emotional. Aleksandr Lapin seems to be a classic example of this- I wouldn’t be surprised if the new chief of staff of the Russian Ground Forces is perfectly competent. Probably it will be decades before we have a satisfactory understanding of why certain decisions were made at the beginning of the conflict.
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A military fact that many do not understand is that all armies start a major war poorly–all of them. A good example of this is the US Army’s performance in North Africa after it entered WW2. The reason for this is simple: peacetime armies operate under vastly different priorities than war time armies. At peace, armies focus on shiny boots and pressed uniforms, promotions are based on politics, and procedures get clogged with bureaucracy. To be effective at war all these peacetime habits have to be tossed aside and new ones developed. This is especially painful when it comes to leadership. Politically connected leaders have to removed in favor of those are effective in war. Some armies never manage to do this and suffer for it.
A second factor that makes this transition difficult is that previous assumptions about the nature of the battlefield, assumptions under which all training took place, need to be updated. Think horse cavalry charges against WW1 machine guns. This requires adaptation and is usually a painful process and can be very slow under poor leadership. In Ukraine, for instance, we could very well be seeing WW2 style “blitzkrieg” maneuver warfare, long considered the peak of operational art, being rendered obsolete.
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In response to cornellencar, I see very good reasons for Russia to have refrained from the sort of ‘Shock & Awe’ offensive that the US used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, that this sort of military offensive is damaging to the entire population of the country, while it is only a small minority that could be considered the legitimate target, i.e., the military. (We can set aside here the issue of whether Iraq or Afghanistan was guilty of the crimes for which they were punished). So, the measured and gradual response of Russia to the Ukraine escalation against the Donbas oblasts can be viewed as an appropriate response when only the Ukrainian government and military are the target and not the general population. This is consistent with the general pattern of Russian military action, which has aimed at Ukrainian military targets and avoided civilian targets.
There is another dimension to this aspect of Russian strategy, which involves the media propaganda which accompanies every war and which is much greater in this war than in those before, hence the description that it is a hybrid war of military action and public opinion. By minimizing civilian casualties, which the US considered standard operating procedure in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia has minimized the degree to which civilian casualties can inflame public opinion against it. We have all seen the enormous effort of the US media to treat every civilian Ukrainian casualty as a premeditated murder by Russia; just imagine how that would be if Russia had treated Ukraine the way the US treated Iraq and Afghanistan.
Regarding the alleged incompetence of Russia in the initial engagement, I personally believe that Russia expected, with good reason, that Ukraine would seek a quick negotiated end to the hostilities. As evidence for this, we can see that Ukraine and Russia were close to a cease-fire agreement back in March of 2022, until Boris Johnson made a visit from the UK to pressure Zelensky against negotiations. I believe that the size of the initial Russian force was consistent with the strategy of seeking a quick negotiated end to the conflict and was not intended to conquer Ukraine, never mind the evidence-free claims to the contrary in the Western media.
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What will those two years look like? The West insists Russia is losing in any way that can be imagined. The West cannot find a limit to the amount of money they ship to Ukraine. In this setting Ukraine has no choice but to attack attack attack, defend every square centimeter, etc. What is more we already hear about American “Advisors” redeploying into Ukraine cf. Vietnam. So, as I say we have a crypto WWII fought entirely within the territory of Ukraine. Who benefits? Who has already benefited? General Austen needs to visit the Hundred Acre Wood.
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There is one other thing. The accepted wisdom is that Russia has lost the war of words, and lost very, very badly. Nothing could be further from the truth! The best example are the long remarks by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the appearance of German tanks in Ukraine: https://youtu.be/o3PbvWdweMY
But that is only a sliver of the larger reality. The West has very successfully cast the war as a Russian Imperialist Adventure that can be defeated by the West at no cost in blood and very little in treasure. If the West supplies enough weapons to Ukraine, Ukraine will win. Does this successful propaganda campaign hurt Russia? No! On the contrary it is essential to Russian war aims! Every single solitary weapon the West provides to Ukraine strengthens the belief in and the resolve to defeat the *Western* Imperialist Adventure in Ukraine in the minds of the Russian people. And Yevgeny Prigozhin is clearly privy to the thinking of the Russian Administration and perhaups a little too voluble when he says that the war will stay on Russian territory for at least two years. Nothing could be better for Russia! And worse for the U.S.
George W. Bush famously said of Iraqi attacks on American troops, “Bring ’em on!” He is a moron. Res ipsa loquitur. Putin is not.
One wonders when the tiny clique running the American Ukraine desk will finally realize they have been duped and act accordingly. Their track record would indicate never.
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Russia was unprepared for the SMO because it had taken the rational and socially decent decision to switch state spending from Defence to other more useful sectors.
Russia believed, until it was impossible to do so any longer, in the essential decency of American opinion which it trusted would force the war party in Washington to turn away from confrontation and towards diplomacy.
This was not just wishful thinking. Given Russia’s parity in nuclear weapons and delivery systems it is rational to assume that, its conventional military capability having been trimmed, it would see anything like the deliberate provocations by NATO as brinkmanship.
Where Russia miscalculated was in its failure to recognise that the US imperial system was founded on military aggression, sustained by brute force and cannot exist in an era of peace.
Russia assumed that, whether or not the US wanted peace, Europe most certainly would and that the dividends of peace in Europe would be immediately apparent to its people and their leaders.
Again Russia miscalculated in believing that it was dealing with rational actors: Europe’s political class- even while its economies are plummeting into insignificance- is so irrational in its blind allegiance to the US that it is happy for the US to blow up its major source of cheap energy.
The US wants war with Russia-it has stopped pretending otherwise. And then it wants war in south east Asia. It wants war not just because it wants to hobble its potential competitors, but because it depends on war to preserve itself. In the unlikely event that the Us defeats Russia and China it would be bound to seek out other enemies to subdue.
The good news is that- for Russia and an increasingly large number of other countries- victory in Ukraine will mean the end of NATO aggression, a return to bilateral peace and non aggression deals in europe (rebuilding the bloc of neutrals) and the possibility of a much needed era of peaceful development and cooperation. It will also lead to a reversal of the recent US campaign to enlist Asian countries, The Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, south Korea into a new Cold War alliance to prevent China from realising its dream of leading the region into prosperity and away from neo-colonialism.
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