It was a pleasure yesterday evening to join celebrated analyst and critic of the Ukraine War Scott Ritter on a Press TV “News Review” program commenting on the latest U.S. arms deliveries to Kiev. The link to this broadcast is here:
http://www.urmedium.net/c/presstv/126358
I freely acknowledge that the expert evaluation of U.S. military supplies which I brought to the table was given me by professional panelists appearing on the Russian state television program Sixty Minutes earlier in the day. The point is that the various elements in the mix of materiel being delivered to Kiev amount to contradictory signals on how the Pentagon reads the situation on the ground and, in particular, whether Ukraine is out of necessity about to change its posture from offense to defense.
The Abrams tanks would have been a major asset in an offensive posture had they come much earlier in the conflict and had the Russians not built the formidable “Surovikin” defense lines making grouped tank assault on their positions impossible. Coming as they do now, the Abrams tanks, all 31 of them, represent rhetorical support to Kiev, checking of the box of what had been promised, without any regard for the practical effect on the course of the war. The White House and Pentagon are only considering what to say to the broad American public after the Ukrainians are properly defeated.
On the other hand, the ATACMS 300 km-range missiles equipped with cluster bomb as opposed to unitary warheads are being shipped to Ukraine precisely in anticipation of the conclusion of the ongoing, failed offensive campaign and switch-over by the Ukrainians to a defense: as the Russians push them back to the West, these ATACMS will serve to continue bombing residential neighborhoods in the Donbas from distances much further away than today. They could be useful against waves of Russian infantry charging Ukrainian positions across open fields, but it is hardly likely the Russian command would repeat this kind of folly which the Ukrainians have committed in the last three months of their “counter-offensive.” Instead, using their superior air force, in particular the multifunctional “Alligator” helicopters and Lancet attack drones, the Russians may be expected to hunt and destroy both Ukrainian artillery pieces and HIMARS/ATACMS launchers in the field before their infantry advance.
There is no reason to be surprised that Washington is placing its bets on appearances rather than on realities as it pursues its assistance to the Ukraine war effort. The United States was once known to be results-oriented, pragmatic. No more: it is ideologues who call the shots in the corridors of power.
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2023
Gilbert Doctorow 
‘The Abrams tanks would have been a major asset in an offensive posture had they come much earlier in the conflict and had the Russians not built the formidable “Surovikin” defense lines making grouped tank assault on their positions impossible.’ The Abrams tank has a gas turbine engine that operates somewhat like a jet engine. It differs from most other modern battle tanks. My understanding is that the engine generates more heat than other tanks. That gives it a heat signature that makes it easier to locate and target from above. Russia already targets any armor that appears on the battlefield with surveillance drones using GPS to relay coordinates to artillery and missile launchers. The Abrams tank will suffer the same fate as the other tanks in Ukraine. Yet another ‘game-changer’ for Ukraine that will never live up to the billing.
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The heat signature is apparently discernible by satellite reconnaissance.
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I read that the U.S. is planning a move to all-electric armored vehicles in future designs. Also read that the Abrams being supplied to Ukraine will be first stripped of the latest armor technology, lest the Russians get their hands on one and reverse-engineer it. The Abrams has at least two other serious problems, dust can foul the engines quickly and the rate of fuel consumption is 1.85 gallons per mile on flat roads and 3.50 gallons per mile ‘cross-country.’ Fuel capacity 504.4 US gallons (1,909 L) Operational range. M1A2, road: 265 mi (426 km) Cross country: 93–124 mi (150–200 km) They are also highly complex to maintain. Adding to the complexity that Ukraine already faces in servicing a hodge-podge of U.S. and multiple other country’s equipment. With technical manuals having been written in various languages. Like everything else that comes out of Ukraine, each new weapon is ever more propaganda to fit the ‘Ukraine is winning’ false narrative.
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Oh that made me laugh…ATACMS for use against massed ranks of russian troops assaulting the ukrainian front.
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